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3Abstract
A large stream of the recent literature suggests that entrepreneurship boosts
economic development, but a key question remains as to how diﬀerent forms of en-
trepreneurship, both in developing and transition countries, are aﬀected by shocks.
The ﬁrst chapter of the thesis explores the relation between the change in conﬂict in-
tensity and the investment in private economic activity (PEA) of nearby households
in Afghanistan, exploiting a unique dataset. The analysis identiﬁes the eﬀect of dif-
ferent indicators of conﬂict on a range of diﬀerent types of PEA, using a shift-share
Instrumental Variables (IV) strategy. The results show that agricultural and low
capital-intensive self-employment increase as a consequence of an increase in conﬂict
intensity. The second chapter of the thesis is the ﬁrst study that links extensive and
intensive measures of child labour to conﬂict in Afghanistan between 2007/8. The
eﬀect of conﬂict on child labour is identiﬁed using an IV strategy. The results show
that an increase in conﬂict intensity has a positive impact on the extensive mar-
gin of child labour supply and that this increase is entirely driven by the response
of 6-12 year old female children. Interestingly, the results also show a decrease in
non-domestic hours worked (intensive margin), which is signiﬁcant just for younger
females between 6 and 12 years old. The empirical ﬁndings are discussed in relation
to the theoretical economic literature on child labour and conﬂict. The ﬁnal chapter
focuses on the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis both on European and non-European
transition economies. This is the ﬁrst study that provides a cross-country analysis
of the long-run impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on the labour demand of ﬁrms in transi-
tion countries. The eﬀect of the ﬁnancial crisis on ﬁrms' labour demand is identiﬁed
using data from the Business Environment Enterprise Survey 2009-2013, and an IV
strategy. The ﬁndings show that the share of temporary workers shrank by around
24% between 2009/10 and 2012/13, while no signiﬁcant impact of the ﬁnancial crisis
was found on the number of permanent workers. The analysis also shows that when
we distinguish between European and non-European transition countries, the latter
are those driving the results.
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Introduction
A large stream of recent literature suggests that entrepreneurship boosts economic
development (see for example Acs [2006], Audretsch et al. [2006], Bandiera et al.
[2013], Boettke and Leeson [2009], Iyigun and Rodrik [2004]). In developing and
transition countries sometimes entrepreneurship takes the form of small-medium en-
terprises as in the developed world, but also sometimes as informal self-employment
and even child labour. Equally, shocks to a developing economy can include fac-
tors other than shocks to the business environment typical in the developed world,
such as conﬂict and weather changes. Those diverse shocks could aﬀect the afore-
mentioned forms of entrepreneurship diﬀerentially and may hinder the process of
economic development in developing/transition countries. However, relatively little
is known about the impacts of shocks on developing countries. This thesis focuses on
shocks to the entrepreneurial environment, and addresses two key questions: what
impact do shocks have on diverse forms of entrepreneurship, and how can public
policies be targeted to remove these obstacles to economic development.
Both the ﬁrst and the second chapter of the thesis focus on a conﬂict-ridden
developing country: Afghanistan. Chapter one, Conﬂict, Entrepreneurship and Self-
Employment: Evidence from Afghanistan,1 explores the relation between the change
in conﬂict intensity and the investment in private economic activity (PEA) of nearby
households in Afghanistan, exploiting a unique dataset containing geographically
detailed information on conﬂict events and on households' activity. The analysis
identiﬁes the eﬀect of diﬀerent indicators of conﬂict on a range of diﬀerent types of
PEA, diﬀerentiating across levels of formality, sectors, and capital intensity using
a shift-share strategy. The results show that an increase in the conﬂict activity in
the district is correlated with a higher probability that a household in the same
district owns a small business. An additional conﬂict over a thousand individuals in
a district increases the probability that within the district a household engages in
self-employment (S.E.) of about 21.5 percentage points. The result is driven by an
increase in both agricultural S.E. and in low and high capital intensive activities.
1This chapter describes part of the analysis done for a joint paper with Tommaso Ciarli (Uni-
versity of Sussex) and Carlo Menon (OECD): Business as unusual. An explanation of the increase
of private economic activity in high-conﬂict areas in Afghanistan
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The results are both robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the conﬂict variable and to
the exclusion of the Kabul district.
Chapter two, Child Labour and Conﬂict, Evidence from Afghanistan, is the ﬁrst
study that links extensive and intensive measures of child labour to conﬂict. In the
last decade the Afghan territory has seen an escalation in conﬂict intensity since the
U.S. led coalition overthrow of the Taliban. The eﬀect of conﬂict on child labour
is identiﬁed using data from the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007-
2008, and an IV strategy based on past conﬂict district shares during the Russian
invasion. The results show that an increase in conﬂict intensity has a positive impact
on the extensive margin of child labour supply and that this increase is entirely
driven by 6-12 year old female children. It also provides evidence of the impact
of higher conﬂict intensity in Afghan districts on the intensive margin response of
child labour supply. Interestingly, the results show that despite an increase in the
extensive margin of child labour supply due to conﬂict, there is a decrease in non-
domestic hours worked which is signiﬁcant for younger females between 6 and 12
years old. The empirical ﬁndings are discussed in relation to the theoretical economic
literature on child labour and conﬂict.
The third chapter of the thesis: The Diﬀerential Labour Demand Response
to the Financial Crisis: Evidence from Firms in Transition Countries focuses on
the impact of the Financial Crisis both in European and non-European transition
economies. This is the ﬁrst study that provides a cross-country analysis of the
medium-run impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on ﬁrm's labour demand in transition
countries. The eﬀect of the ﬁnancial crisis on ﬁrm's labour demand is identiﬁed
using data from the Business Environment Enterprise Survey 2009-2013, and an IV
strategy that uses the ﬁrst lags of the explanatory variables. The ﬁndings show
that the share of temporary workers shrank by around 24% between 2009/10 and
2012/13, while no signiﬁcant impact of the ﬁnancial crisis was found on the number
of permanent workers. Interestingly the analysis also shows that when we distin-
guish European and non-European transition countries, the latter drive the results.
The empirical ﬁndings are discussed in relation to the theoretical economic litera-
ture on labour demand in transition countries and the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis
on ﬁrms' labour demand.
Chapter 1
Conﬂict, Entrepreneurship and
Self-Employment: Evidence from
Afghanistan
Introduction
International organisations and aid agencies may be interested in knowing about
which kind of entrepreneurship is more resilient towards obstacles that conﬂict and
insecurity set on economic activities, as during and in the aftermath of wars en-
trepreneurship could work as leverage for economic development. Similarly, interest
lies in identifying which aspects of conﬂict plays the biggest role in hindering pri-
vate economic activity (PEA), for example the intensity of the conﬂict versus the
impact on infrastructures and people lives. However, the relationship between con-
ﬂict, economic development, and private economic activity PEA is still a puzzling
one, despite the recent increase in studies investigating the microeconomic impacts
of conﬂict. First, violent conﬂict has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on low-income
countries' economic growth.1 At the microeconomic level violent conﬂict reduces
the incentives to invest in entrepreneurial activities by destroying physical and hu-
man capital, increasing risks, lowering expected returns, reducing labour supply
via displacement and reduced education, and disrupting markets, institutions, and
1See for exampleChen et al. [2008a], Collier [1999], Cramer [2006], Hoeer and Reynal-Querol
[2003], Iyer and Santos [2012], World Bank [2011].
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social networks.2
Second, entrepreneurial activity is one key determinant of economic develop-
ment.3 Reduced investments and entrepreneurship have a negative eﬀect on output
and employment. If, as generally understood, unemployment contributes to fuelling
the conﬂicting armies [e.g. Iyer and Santos, 2012], a country experiencing violent
conﬂict may enter a vicious cycle of conﬂict, reduced PEA, reduced labour demand,
increased migration and enrolment into conﬂict, reduced labour supply, and further
reduced economic activity. The reduced economic activity may contribute to fuelling
this cycle.4
Third, there is evidence showing that in in-conﬂict countries there are more
people employed in conﬂict areas than in non-conﬂict areas [e.g. Iyer and Santos,
2012]. There is also growing evidence that entrepreneurship, and more generally
PEA, does not decrease, and sometimes increases in the aftermath of conﬂicts, for
example leading to a rise in subsistance agriculture.5
How do we reconcile the positive eﬀects of business development with the neg-
ative relationship between growth and conﬂict, and the evidence of resilience and
increased self-employment under conﬂict? One possible explanation is that the neg-
ative eﬀect of conﬂict on growth is transmitted through distinct micro mechanisms,
which are not related to entrepreneurship, and which are stronger than the positive
eﬀect of entrepreneurship on growth (for example decreasing health and education).
Another possible explanation is that the observed PEA under conﬂict is either non
productive, or even harmful for economic growth (subsistance self-employed activi-
ties, war-related businesses) [Baumol, 1990, Naudé, 2007].
This paper provides new robust empirical evidence on the above question, rec-
onciling the co-existence of intense conﬂict, increased PEA, and low output growth.
We build on an unprecedented level of data granularity, substantially reﬁning the
identiﬁcation of the relationship between conﬂict and PEA with respect to the lit-
2Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo [2006], Brück and Schindler [2009], Hoeer and Reynal-Querol
[2003], Ravallion [1988].
3See for example Acs [2006], Audretsch et al. [2006], Bandiera et al. [2013], Boettke and Leeson
[2009], Iyigun and Rodrik [2004].
4As suggested, among others, in Collier et al. [2004], Do and Iyer [2010], Elbadawi and Sambanis
[2002], Fearon [2004], Murshed and Gates [2005].
5From diﬀerent perspectives and countries, see for example Anugwom [2011], Brück et al. [2013],
Bullough et al. [2014], Cañares [2011], Guidolin and La Ferrara [2007], Justino et al. [2012], Menon
and Rodgers [2013], Nillesen and Verwimp [2010], Peschka et al. [2011].
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erature.
This paper contributes to the recent stream of literature that aims at identify-
ing both the causal relationship between conﬂict and self-employment and between
conﬂict and entrepreneurship. Especially, the aim of this paper is to test the causal
relation between conﬂict and private enterprise by examining the household's income
generation choice over time, using repeated cross sections of the National Risk and
Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) from 2003, 2005, 2007-08. These include formal
and informal activities such as small businesses, self-employment, illegal activities
such as opium cultivation, agriculture and a number of private and public sectors
employments. The analysis opens a new stream of research questions. Which house-
holds are more likely to maintain an entrepreneurial activity, under diﬀerent levels
of conﬂict? How does this compare with evidence from high income countries? How
do institutions and reconstruction eﬀorts aﬀect this choice? What role do missing
markets  credit, inputs, and labour  play in the household choice? Does regula-
tory capture facilitate or constraint entrepreneurial activities? Is the income choice
related to the household income?
The originality of the paper lies ﬁrstly in the research question. This is the
ﬁrst study that aims at identifying the relationship between either changes in con-
ﬂict intensity or in perceived insecurity and entrepreneurship/self-employment in
Afghanistan over time. There is just one previous study [Ciarli et al., 2010b] where
this relationship is tested only for 2005. The reason for the lack of previous studies
is both the scarce availability of data and the challenge in the identiﬁcation of the
parameters of interests. Secondly, the paper is innovative because it aims at dealing
with the endogeneity of conﬂict intensity relying on an IV approach based on past
conﬂict district shares during the Russian invasion. Thirdly, the paper is original
because the conﬂict data that are used for the analysis come from the Afghan War
Diary. Thus, these data were reported directly by ISAF (International Security As-
sistance Force) troops and were not cleared, reducing the number of misreported
events (a general issue when using conﬂict data). Finally, the paper is original
because conﬂict intensity data were matched to the Afghan districts using the geo-
graphic coordinates of each conﬂict event so that the analysis could be run at the
district level.
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The analysis is based on a pooled cross-section analysis using both LPM (linear
probability model) and IV estimation.
Section 1 brieﬂy describes the relationship between entrepreneurship, self-employment
and conﬂict. Section 2 describes the empirical strategy used. Section 3 discusses the
results. Section 4 discusses the robustness checks. Section 5 debates the econometric
concerns while section 6 describes the policy relevance of this study.
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1.1 Entrepreneurship, self-employment and Conﬂict
Entrepreneurial activity is a key determinant of economic development [Acs, 2006,
Audretsch et al., 2006, Boettke and Leeson, 2009, Iyigun and Rodrik, 2004] and
supporting entrepreneurship is widely seen as a mechanism to facilitate economic
growth. However, a recent stream of literature suggests that also self-employment
and informal activities can lead a country to economic growth so that the analysis
is extended not only to entrepreneurial households but also to the informal self-
employed ones.
Acs [2006] distinguishes between "opportunity" and "necessity" entrepreneurs.
Opportunity entrepreneurs create new businesses and jobs, enhance competition
and production encouraging technological change leading to high levels of economic
growth. Necessity entrepreneurs instead lead to low economic growth. This latter
deﬁnition includes any type of informal self-employment and is a result of the exis-
tence of barriers to the creation of new businesses or to the fact that the economy
is creating no wage-earning job opportunities. Acs [2006] ﬁnds that there exists
a positive relationship between the opportunity ratio (number of opportunity en-
trepreneurs over number of necessity entrepreneurs) and the GDP per capita.
Even unproductive entrepreneurs [Baumol, 1990, Naudé, 2007] are a source
of growth and poverty alleviation in fragile, developing [Amorós and Cristi, 2011,
Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2007] and transition countries [Estrin et al., 2006, Smallbone
and Welter, 2001]. [Naudé, 2007] points out that even though informal and survival-
ist entrepreneurs do not make a signiﬁcant impact on economic growth they have
have an anti-poverty role as they support the high proportion of small and micro-
entreprises that proliferate in the aftermath of the war. [Amorós and Cristi, 2011]
also recognize that necessity-based entrepreneurs, especially in developing countries,
may build blocks for more productive activities in the future as they generate enough
resources to increase the human capital of future generations.
Conﬂict has a strong negative eﬀect on low-income countries' growth [e.g. Chen
et al., 2008a, Collier, 1999]. If entrepreneurship is an essential determinant of country
growth, we would expect conﬂict to have a negative eﬀect on entrepreneurial activ-
ity, reconciling the macroeconomic evidence of the negative eﬀect on growth with a
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microeconomic explanation. Conﬂict reduces incentives to invest in entrepreneurial
activity by destroying physical and human capital, increasing risks, lowering ex-
pected returns, displacement, reducing labour, and disrupting markets, institutions,
and social networks [Bozzoli and Brück, 2009, Hoeer and Reynal-Querol, 2003,
Ravallion, 1988].
However, due to data constraints, only a small number of studies explore the
eﬀect of conﬂict on private enterprises. Ksoll et al. [2013] ﬁnd the expected nega-
tive relationship (using exports), but other studies ﬁnd that exposure to violence
increases entrepreneurial activity [Branzei and Abdelnour, 2010], often in resource
intense industries [Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2007], substitutes for basic institutions
and infrastructures [Nenova and Harford, 2004], and promotes pro-social behaviour
[Gilligan et al., 2011] that can be conducive to entrepreneurship. Analysis of a large
cross section of Afghan households ﬁnds that conﬂict intensity6 is very weakly neg-
atively correlated with the household's choice to run a small business [Ciarli et al.,
2010b].
These varying ﬁndings suggest the need for detailed empirical research on the
causal relations, particularly if we consider the evidence at the macro level suggesting
that entrepreneurial activity may reduce conﬂict (see Miguel et al. [2004] on the eﬀect
of the reduction in income on civil conﬂict, but also the critique by Ciccone [2011]
and the opposite micro evidence in Berman et al. [2011b]). The mechanisms through
which economic activity induces conﬂict remain unclear, as there is little evidence
at the micro level [Brück et al., 2011]. Theory suggests opposite eﬀects: shared
economic advantages might reduce ethnic contrasts, or conﬂict might be sustained
by entrepreneurs entering the market for conﬂict-related goods, or willing to reduce
the requirements needed to enter the market [Bennett, 2010]. These contrasting
eﬀects remain unexplored.
Moreover, the number of studies on Afghanistan is very small and they do not
cover an extended time period of three years like our one aims to do. The reason
is the lack of data on Afghanistan and the necessity of harmonizing the geographic
units (districts and provinces) in the surveys available, as they changed throughout
the years.
6Measured with 13 indicators of subjective and objective conﬂict intensity from diﬀerent sources.
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With reference to the main intuition that conﬂict reduces income through a
reduction in ﬁrm activities, Ksoll et al. [2013] ﬁnd the expected negative relationship
using exports of ﬂowers from Kenya. They suggest that the main eﬀect of conﬂict
is reducing labour mobility. Narayan and Petesch [2010] ﬁnds evidence that many
factories that shut down due to the intensity of the armed conﬂict do not go back to
business even after security is re-established . Using micro data, Chowdhury [2011]
ﬁnds that local armed conﬂict reduces the probability that a household owns a
business in the high conﬂict region by 11 percent compared to households elsewhere
in Bangladesh. Using a small sample of ﬁrms Vijayakumar [2012] ﬁnds that the
civil conﬂict in Sri Lanka had a negative eﬀect on ﬁrms growth in terms of assets
value, turnover and employment. According to Deininger [2003], closeness to civil
strife reduced investment and the number of non-agricultural enterprise start-ups in
Uganda between 1992 and 2000. Besley et al. [2011] show that farmers in the Punjab
decreased investments in tube wells when violence started. A similar results is found
also in Singh [2013], who mainly refers to farmers' long term investments. According
to the analysis by Besley et al. [2011], the reduction in investment is aﬀected mainly
by the expected level of conﬂict persistence. Similarly, Cañares [2011] reports lower
investment and growth of ﬁrms in conﬂict areas in the Philippines, and Bullough
et al. [2014] reports a lower entry of ﬁrms in conﬂict zones in Afghanistan.
However, both Cañares [2011] and Bullough et al. [2014] show that these slow-
downs are accompanied by strong resilience, resulting in no diﬀerence in the number
of small ﬁrms or self employed. This is conﬁrmed by an analysis of a large cross sec-
tion of Afghan households ﬁnding that conﬂict intensity7 is only weakly negatively
correlated with the household's choice to run a small business [Ciarli et al., 2010a].
Indeed, ﬁrms can gain from violent conﬂict (civil war) in resource intense industries,
as it has been the case for Angola ﬁrms engaged in diamond extraction [Guidolin
and La Ferrara, 2007]. A number of studies go further and ﬁnd that exposure to
violence even increases entrepreneurial activity [Branzei and Abdelnour, 2010]. For
example, using micro data on self-employment in Colombia, Bozzoli et al. [2013]
ﬁnd that between 2002 and 2006 the displacement due to violence has a positive
eﬀect on self-employment in services, but with reduced income. Other microeco-
7Measured with 13 indicators of subjective and objective conﬂict intensity from diﬀerent sources.
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nomic studies that ﬁnd an increased PEA are Abdelnour et al. [2008] for women
in Sudan and Anugwom [2011] for women in Nigeria. Conﬂict may also inﬂuence
PEA by aﬀecting social capital. For example, Gilligan et al. [2011] and Voors et al.
[2012] ﬁnd that the violent conﬂict has promoted pro-social behaviour, respectively
in Nepal and in Burundi, which can be conducive to entrepreneurship.
1.1.1 Casual and formal entrepreneurship
The core of these diﬀerent ﬁndings may be that entrepreneurship is highly hetero-
geneous. In the recent literature on entrepreneurship in low income countries major
distinctions are made. For instance, Monitor [2001] distinguish between necessity
and opportunity entrepreneurship, where the ﬁrst one is mainly a substitute for the
lack of employment and yields low value-added. In practice, it is diﬃcult to dis-
tinguish between households that invest in an entrepreneurial activity only because
of necessity from those that invest only because they see a business opportunity
[Cañares, 2011]. However, this literature seems to agree that entrepreneurship in
low income countries leans toward the necessity type [Acs et al., 2004, Acs and Szerb,
2009], particularly in areas with violent conﬂict [Naudé, 2007].
Similarly, Lerner and Schoar [2010] distinguish between subsistence and trans-
formational entrepreneurs. Assuming that two ideal types of entrepreneurs can be
distinguished, which for simplicity can be referred to as casual (self-employed, for
subsistence and necessity) and formal (opportunity seekers and transformational),
the literature suggests that casual self-employment is a substitute for labour: un-
employed individuals become self-employed to earn a leaving. As soon as labour
opportunities re-emerge, some of these will be better than self-employment, and
some self-employed will leave their activity and return to a paid job [Lucas, 1978].
The evidence collected in Lerner and Schoar [2010] shows that subsistence en-
trepreneurs tend to move between the labour market and self-employment, and
rarely they manage to make the step towards transformational entrepreneurs. Mondragón-
Vélez and Peña [2010] also suggest that casual entrepreneurs have a lower human
capital than formal ones. A large study over 74 developing countries [Gindling and
Newhouse, 2014] suggests that it can be usually observed a transition from casual
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self-employment in agriculture, to casual self-employment out of agriculture to paid
work.
1.1.2 Private economic activity choice under conﬂict in Afghanistan
Between 1979 and 2003 the Afghan economy went through several changes. The
three major bocks of the Afghan history, that had a big impact on private economic
activity, can be summarized as below.
The Soviet invasion (1979-1989)
The Russian war was mainly experienced by agricultural areas and there was a
large ﬂux of migrants not only to neighbouring countries, but also to urban centres
where the population was heavily dependent on Soviet supplies for basic subsistence
commodities. The agricultural harvest had by 1982 already dropped to only a fourth
of its 1978 level. The rest of the decade and beyond would be marked by tremendous
food insecurity [Ghiasi et al., 2015]
During the Soviet occupation, Afghanistan experienced massive trade reorien-
tation towards the Communist bloc and isolation from Western markets. Natural
gas, a sector built and heavily used by the Soviet Union, represented a large bulk of
Afghan exports in the 1980s, although gas production declined and ﬁnally ceased as
active wells were depleted and Soviet maintainers left the country. After the Soviet
occupation, a deleterious war economy continued to function ([Ghiasi et al., 2015]).
Before Russians invaded the country much of Afghanistan's pre war urban em-
ployment was in the public sector. But as the central state crumbled during the
Soviet occupation, formal economic institutions and employment opportunities gave
way to an unregulated and increasingly criminal economy ([Ghiasi et al., 2015]).
Trade and agriculture, areas where the private sector dominated, increasingly
became intertwined with illicit cash-generating activities controlled by political and
military power. Smuggling consumer goods (such as weapons, narcotics, and even
human traﬃcking) to Afghanistan and then re-exporting them to Pakistan had been
a perpetual problem since the signing of the Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement
(ATTA) in 1965 ([Ghiasi et al., 2015]).
The Taliban years (1996-2001)
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By 1998, the Taliban had consolidated control over the large majority of the
country's roads, transport points and customs points. The improved stability and
road access allowed for marginal resumption of economic activity.
During these years Afghanistan developed an illicit economy centred on smug-
gling goods and drugs. Illegal cross-border trading and smuggling became the Tal-
ibanÄôs largest source of oﬃcial revenue, Opium production spread into Afghanistan
from Pakistani networks and trended upwards through the 1980s and 1990s. By
1991, Afghanistan had become the world's largest opium producer ([Ghiasi et al.,
2015]).
However, regular agricultural production did begin to recover: cereal production
improved throughout the 1990s, and by 1998 nearly reached 1977 levels as a result
of enhanced security and good precipitation. Livestock production also improved
([Ghiasi et al., 2015]).
These gains were quickly reversed in the next year, due to a massive drought
that by 2001 had brought production down to half those levels. With the inﬂux
of repatriating Afghans and population growth post-2001, there would continue
to be tremendous food insecurity for many parts of the country and segments of
society. Rather than being met in greater capacity by domestic supply, demand
was, and continues to be, predominantly met through imports of staple crops and
international humanitarian aid ([Ghiasi et al., 2015]).
International intervention (2001-2014)
The international intervention that toppled the Taliban and destroyed al-Qaeda
cells in late 2001 was followed by notable economic development. From 1980 to 2001
Afghanistan had no growth or negative growth, economic growth in the years after
the 2001 intervention has been inconsistent but robust at an average 10.5 per cent
between 2005 and 2012.27.
However, much of the growth was not driven by either domestic demand or
supply, but by international community presence, particularly after the surge in
combat and stabilization operations post-2009 (military and civilian aid) ([Ghiasi
et al., 2015]).
If, as suggested by some of the evidence, PEA does not fall back, or even grows,
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in areas plagued by violent conﬂict, what kind of PEA is likely to develop? This
chapter studies the available evidence for Afghanistan. [Iyer and Santos, 2012] show
that despite the shortfalls in the private sector demand for labour in conﬂict areas, in
Afghanistan, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka there is more employment in conﬂict areas
than in non-conﬂict areas. They note that the forms of employment that increase in
these conﬂict areas are: (i) women workers replacing absent men, particularly in the
agricultural sector;8 (ii) agricultural employment; (iii) and unpaid family labour.
In sum, in the South Asian countries that have experienced, or are experiencing
violent conﬂict, conﬂict areas may have a higher rate of self-employment, but these
are lower quality activities, involving people with signiﬁcantly lower education at-
tainment than in non-conﬂict areas. This is mainly because in conﬂict areas wages
are signiﬁcantly lower, due to an increase in the supply of labour and a reduction in
demand, associated with the closure of most productive businesses [Iyer and Santos,
2012].
This is in line with Berman et al. [2011a] ﬁndings that in Iraq, Afghanistan and
the Philippines unemployment is negatively related to insurgent activities, with the
ﬁnding that Afghan individual who are exposed to violence tend to have a higher
preference for certainty [Callen et al., 2014]  which may reduce the number of
household holding a business, and that the perception of danger in Afghanistan
reduces the disposition to entrepreneurial activity, except for resilient individuals
[Bullough et al., 2014].
1.1.3 Doing business in Afghanistan
Despite high growth rates in the last decade, Afghanistan is one of the poorest
countries in the world. Average per capita income in 2008 (the last year of our
study) was about 325 US dollars per year, and social indicators were also at the
bottom of the world rankings. Agriculture is the main source of household income
and the size of the informal sector is large [Ward et al., 2008]. Ward et al. [2008]
describes the Afghan economy as an informal equilibrium not conducive to growth
where informal sector enterprises are too small, disparate and not organized to meet
8The added worker eﬀect found in a number of empirical analysis of conﬂict [e.g. Justino et al.,
2012, Menon and Rodgers, 2013, Shemyakina, 2011a].
30 CHAPTER 1. CONFLICT, ENTREPRENEURSHIP
the needs of the market.
Conﬂict has persisted in Afghanistan since the early 1980s, with a changing in
intensity over time. The high level of insecurity represents a major impediment to
development [Ward et al., 2008].
The World Bank ﬁrm survey in 2008 [IFC, 2014] shows that, although ﬁrms expe-
rienced growth in sales, their participation in the export market was extremely low
with respect to other low income countries. Firms experienced barriers to business
with respect to (i) the high cost of dealing with the government, (ii) the large number
of bribes paid, and (iii) access to ﬁnance. But the main obstacles to doing business
were (i) crime, theft and disorder, (ii) electricity, and (iii) political instability. That
is, the violent conﬂict and its consequence on infrastructures. The situation was
even gloomier in high conﬂict areas, where ﬁrms were even more constrained from
doing business with respect to infrastructures, the regulatory framework, security,
and skills [Iyer and Santos, 2012].
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1.2 Empirical Strategy
1.2.1 Data set development
The unique dataset used for the analysis combines both household data with infor-
mation on entrepreneurial activity and conﬂict data. The datasets were matched by
district.
• National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) surveys: The
originality of the analysis is that it relies on a unique data set built from
three waves of risk and vulnerability assessment (NRVA) surveys that cover
a large number of households (11,757 households in 2003, 30,826 in 2005,
20,668 in 2007/2008 ) over the whole of Afghanistan. Sample selection was not
fully random; instead stratiﬁed by diﬀerent agro-ecological zones. Household
selection but randomly selected within wealth groups, with 6-7 households
assessed within each village.
NRVA 2003 : This wave of data diﬀers from the 2005 and 2007 - 2008 surveys
both in the structure of the survey and in the sampling design. In particular,
the sample frame relied on a World Food Protection (WFP) village lists. The
data collection is therefore expected to be biased for larger rural settlements.
The four levels of data collection of the survey are: district level, community
(shura) level, wealth group level, household level. Much data collection is at
the community or district level. Female interviewers were not involved in the
south (resulting in poor female coverage) and in most eastern areas only rural
areas and Kuchi (nomadic) population were interviewed. The survey repre-
sents one season as the survey was conducted within 3 months. The analysis
covers 32 provinces, 368 districts, 1,853 villages, 5,559 wealth groups, 11,757
rural households, 85,577 persons. The survey collects information on basic
demographics, health, housing, household assets, migration, risk exposure and
response, livestock ownership, agricultural activities and household food con-
sumption. The questionnaire has a common form, some data were manually
entered while other data were transcribed into Teleform format and scanned.
Several trainers were involved in training of interviewers, resulting in variation
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in interviewer performance and a large number of part-time interviewers were
hired.
NRVA 2005 : The sample frame was obtained from the Central Statistical Or-
ganisation (CSO) precensus household listing. The sampling is proportional
to the population, except in the smaller provinces and urban centres, where
over - sampling insured enumeration of a suﬃcient number of households. The
sample selection is based on a random selection from geographically ordered
primary sampling units (PSUs), to give a random spread that represent the
spatial distribution of the population. The household selection was based on
the random start method, where 12 households were assessed in each selected
village. The data collection was therefore done on three diﬀerent levels: the
district level, the community (shura) level and the household level. The data
collection was predominantly completed at the individual and household level.
In all provinces except Zabul female interviewers were recruited, to ensure a
high rate of female respondents. The survey covers both rural and urban ar-
eas and the Kuchi population. As in 2003, the survey was conducted within
3 months, June-August, during or immediately after harvest, and is therefore
representative of this season only. The 2005 survey was more comprehen-
sive than the 2003 questionnaire, containing questions regarding remittances,
HIV/AIDS, maternal and child health, household non-food consumption. The
questionnaires used were Teleform scannable questionnaires with data quality
routines built-in.
One of the main limitations of the 2005 survey was the limitation of data collec-
tion to the summer period June-August, during or immediately after harvest.
As this is a time of the year where high consumption patterns were expected,
the analysis inevitably produced seasonally biased results and poverty esti-
mates that are low compared to the annual average and several other months.
NRVA 2007 - 2008 : This wave is in many ways similar to the NRVA 2005,
and intentionally so. The draft questionnaires were tested twice in the ﬁeld
and a pilot test of the questionnaires took place in ﬁve regions for further
and ﬁnal improvements. The questionnaires were translated into Dari and
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Pashto. The questionnaire format was designed in Teleform (software that
extracts data from paper questionnaires) to allow data scanning instead of
manual data entry. Around 1.6 million questionnaire pages were completed
and scanned. The ﬁeldwork started in mid-August 2007 and lasted up to
the end of August 2008. A major diﬀerence with the 2005 assessment is the
removal of the seasonality bias by conducting the survey year round during all
12 months.
The sample frame came from the updated CSO pre-census household list-
ing. The sample is proportional to population, with over-sampling of smaller
provinces and urban centres. The sample selection is based on the random
start method to have a better geographic distribution of the sample. The sur-
vey covers both rural and urban areas and the Kuchi population. The survey
covers 34 provinces, 395 districts sampled, 2,572 clusters, no wealth groups,
20,576 households, 152,262 persons. Additional information collected in this
wave included questions on household food and non-food consumption, but the
questions regarding HIV/AIDS were omitted from the 2007/08 survey. The
questionnaires used were Teleform scannable, with data quality routines were
built-in. The training was uniform in one training session for all ﬁeld staﬀ for
the whole country and was more detailed and longer than the training for the
previous wave. 156 ﬁeld staﬀ were selected.
Comparability of NRVA 2007/2008 with the previous rounds : The methodolo-
gies used in order to collect the data are diﬀerent, as described above, and thus
only comparable to a limited extent. The radically diﬀerent sampling design of
the NRVA 2003 prohibits any meaningful comparison. Comparability between
the 2007/8 and 2005 surveys was maintained for a number of key indicators,
even though there was a signiﬁcant questionnaire revision resulting in diﬀerent
measures.
In this paper the covariates used in the analysis were harmonised across sur-
veys and evidence of how the dependent variable (self-employment (S.E.) or
entrepreneur household) built up from NRVA 2003 can be compared with the
ones built up from other two waves, even if the ﬁrst is an individual survey
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while the others are household surveys. See the details of the variables har-
monisation across surveys in the Appendix, in Section 1.5.2. Moreover, it is
reasonable to assume that the seasonality bias of waves 2003-2005 will not
aﬀect our results. In fact, our estimates rely on questions of the survey related
to the whole year.
• Afghan War Diaries (AWD): The Afghan war diaries (AWD) is a large
dataset of conﬂict reports recorded during the Afghan and the Iraq wars be-
tween 2004 and 2009 by US troops. All reports contain a large amount of
details on each registered event, among which the geographical coordinates,
the number of people (soldiers and civilians) killed and wounded, and a de-
scription of the action in which the military were involved. The data was
collected by soldiers and intelligence oﬃcers, and includes intelligence infor-
mation, reports of meetings with political partners, and related details. Most
of the reports were not cleared by the US Government, which is likely to re-
duce the likelihood of misreported events. The reports where assigned to one
among dozens of diﬀerent categories that diﬀerentiate the types of action, go-
ing from the Afghan Police training through indirect ﬁre and police actions,
up to vehicle interdiction (please refer to the war diaries website 9 for details).
Immediately after their release, the reports were machine coded into a large
database detailing a large number of variables, including geographic coordi-
nates, number of people involved and killed or wounded, types of action, perpe-
trators, etc. A number of studies have veriﬁed the reliability and the accuracy
of these conﬂict data (see for example the discussion in Zammit-Mangion et al.
[2012]).
The `relevant' conﬂict events are those events which may cause disruption of
economic activity, or fear, or any other condition that could aﬀect households'
behaviour.10 This is done using the conﬂict category which describes every
conﬂict event in the dataset (e.g. exploded bombs, disruption of drug labs)11,
and excludes categories such as unexploded bombs or medical interventions
9https://wardiaries.wikileaks.org
10See [O'Loughlin et al., 2010] for a similar classiﬁcation. The results using their classiﬁcation
of violent events instead of this study's classiﬁcation of `relevant' events do not change.
11See also https://www.wikileaks.org/afg/
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which do not seem to be relevant for entrepreneurial activity. All the categories
forming the set of `relevant' conﬂict are listed in the Appendix, Table 1.23.
Several robustness checks were done using alternative speciﬁcations of the
conﬂict variable, although if not reported for brevity. The results show that
the excluded categories from the speciﬁcation of the conﬂict variable (such as
unexploded bombs) do not have any impact on entrepreneurial activity. Then,
each conﬂict event was assigned to an area (district) in order to construct the
diﬀerent aggregate measure of conﬂict per area.
• Global Dataset on Events, Location and Tone (GDELT): The dataset
reports geo-referenced conﬂict events reported by media from 1979 to 2012.
The event taxonomy is ultimately broken into four primary classiﬁcations:
Verbal Cooperation (e.g. military agreements), Material Cooperation (actions
of allied troops), Verbal Conﬂict (e.g. declarations of a state of war), and
Material Conﬂict (e.g. exploded bombs etc.). This ﬁeld speciﬁes this primary
classiﬁcation for the event type, allowing analysis at the highest level of ag-
gregation. In order to quantify the district level of conﬂict intensity from 1979
to 1989 this paper uses a sum of all these geo-referenced events.
Afghan districts were subject to changes in 2005. The district boundaries of
2003 were harmonized using the geocodes provided in the NRVA dataset. The
analysis considers Afghanistan partitioned into 398 districts. See the details of the
harmonisation of district boundaries over time in the Appendix in Section 1.5.3.
Identiﬁcation of Household Types
There is no one single deﬁnition of private economic activity (PEA). In this paper
PEA is linked to entrepreneurship, an activity that is expected to add value to
production and to be commercialised. In the Afghan context such activity can be in
the form of a formal business activity or of (in)formal self-employment. The richness
of the NRVA questionnaire allows us to distinguish seven types of households, each
of which may be aﬀected diﬀerently by conﬂict.
For the analysis from 2003 to 2007/8 the ﬁrst type of household is engaged in an
activity that the respondent identiﬁes as a small business.The second type is engaged
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in an activity that is usually considered self-employment, such as sales of vegetables,
carpet weaving and taxi driving (see Table 1.1 below for a full list), but does not
own a small business. The third type of household is engaged in activities which are
also considered as self-employment in non-agricultural sectors and a fourth type of
household is engaged in agricultural self-employment activities.
The 2005-07/8 NRVA data is richer of information on the economic activity of
the households. Therefore, it is possibile to distinguish more household types for the
analysis. The main household activities are split both according to the type of work
(agricultural/non-agricultural) and according to the required ﬁxed investment in
capital to run the activity (high/low capital intensive). This last split of the sample
is justiﬁed by the diﬀerent implications of the impact of conﬂict on high/low capital
intensive activities. The latter ones generate, on average, a lower main household
income than the ﬁrst ones, also when comparing household living in conﬂict aﬀected
and non-aﬀected districts, as shown in Table 1.2. It was not possible to distinguish
high and low capital intensive agricultural activities because of lack of information
in the survey questionnaire to distinguish them.
These household types are only used for the analysis between 2005-07/8 Thus,
for the 2005-07/8 database, the following deﬁnitions of PEA are added.
• Low K: identiﬁes households which answered that one of the non agricultural
activities that require a relatively lower capital investment listed in Table 1.1,
second column, was their main source of income.
• High K: identiﬁes households which answered that one of the non agricultural
activities that require a relatively larger capital investment listed in Table 1.1,
third column, was their main source of income.
• Agriculture: identiﬁes households which answered that one of the agricultural
activities listed in Table 1.1, fourth column, was their main source of income.
• Subsistance agriculture: identiﬁes households which answered that one of the
agricultural activities for home consumption listed in Table 1.1, ﬁfth column,
was their main source of income.
• Agriculture for sale: identiﬁes households which answered that one of the
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agricultural activities which are not only for home consumption listed in Table
1.1, sixth column, was their main source of income.
Income source self-employment types
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non-agric. Low K High K Agric. Subsist. agric. Agric. for sale
Crop production for home
consumption
Yes Yes
Livestock production for home
consumption
Yes Yes
Production & sale of ﬁeld
crops
Yes Yes
Prod & sales of cash crops (ex-
cept Opium)
Yes Yes
Prod & sales of orchard prod-
ucts
Yes Yes
Prod & sales of livestock &
products
Yes Yes
Sales of prepared foods Yes Yes
Miller Yes Yes
Petty trade/ shopkeeping Yes Yes
Cross border trade Yes Yes
Firewood /charcoal sales Yes Yes
Handicrafts (sewing, embroi-
dery, etc)
Yes Yes
Carpet weaving Yes Yes
Taxi/transport Yes Yes
Table 1.1: List of the sources of income considered as self-employment for
2005 and 2007/8
Main HH activity Whole sample Conﬂict areas No conﬂict areas
Business owners 71492.6 74676.6 65605.0
Self-employed (S.E) 78161.7 83649.5 66528.6
Agric. S.E. 57766.9 59055.0 56312.2
Non-agric. S.E. 87608.8 90992.7 75606.2
Low K 85437.1 89174.0 73460.4
High K 91809.6 94284.0 80932.4
Table 1.2: Average income by main household activity (in Afghani).
Table 1.3 below shows how PEA is distributed in the sample for all the years
of the survey. The highest share of households earns its main income from self-
employment, and in particular from subsistence agriculture. Around 70% of house-
holds whose main source of income is in agriculture cultivate mainly for direct con-
sumption. Only between ten and sixteen percent of the households earn their main
source of income from self-employment unrelated to agriculture. This percentage in-
creases signiﬁcantly from 2003 to 2007/8. Among the self employed, approximately
two thirds own an activity that requires a small capital investment, and the rest
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have invested in an activity with a higher capital need. Only a very small portion
of Afghan households are formal entrepreneurs, earning their main income from a
small business.
Variable Deﬁnition 2003 2005 2007/8
1 bus small business 2.0 5.0 2.0
2 se_na non agricultural self-employment 10.4 10.8 16.3
3 Low_K lower capital intensive activities N.A. 6.4 11.2
4 High_K higher capital intensive activities N.A. 4.4 5.1
5 agric agricultural self-employment 32.8 39.5 29.1
6 agr_sub subsistence agriculture N.A. 29.0 19.7
7 agr_sale agriculture for sale N.A. 10.4 9.3
3 + 4 (= 2) 10.8 16.3
5 + 7 (= 5) 39.5 29.1
Table 1.3: Percentage of PEA for diﬀerent years of the survey
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Because of signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the survey questionnaires between the 2003
wave and the most recent ones (2007/2008) we use for the pooled cross-section
analysis of 2003-2008 just four diﬀerent categories of household's activity (business
owners, self-employment, agricultural and non-agricultural self-employment). The
partition in eight diﬀerent old activities is used for the 2005-2007/8 comparison.
For all three types in 2003 the type of household is identiﬁed with the number
of household members working in a small business or self-employment, while in
2005-2008 the type of household is identiﬁed with the income generated by a small
business or self-employment activity. How the dependent variables were harmonised
across the diﬀerent surveys is described in detail in the Appendix, Section 1.5.2.
Finally, the three types are identiﬁed using a dummy variable that equals 1 if
the household is an entrepreneurial household and 0 otherwise.
Figure 1.1 plots the distribution of the three main entrepreneurship types per
district in 2003, 2005 and 2007/8. The similarity of the distributions across years
suggests that the harmonisation of the entrepreneurship variable captures similar
households. There are some changes from 2003 to 2008 though: the percentage of
small business owners (top-left) ﬁrst grows, then shrinks again in 2008; the percent-
age of self-employed (top-right) grow even more in 2005 and keeps growing in 2008;
the percentage of self-employed in non-agriculture activities (bottom-left), though, is
relative stable from 2003 and 2005 and increases only in 2008. The ﬁgure also shows
that in 2005 there is the highest density of household holding a self-employment
activity. This is due to a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the number of self-employment
activities in agriculture, whereas the number of self employed in non-agricultural
activities is lower in 2005.
40 CHAPTER 1. CONFLICT, ENTREPRENEURSHIP
(a) Small business (bus) (b) self-employment in agriculture (agric)
(c) Non agricultural self-employment
(se_na)
Figure 1.1: Comparison of the distribution of PEA density by district
across the three NRVA waves. Kernel density estimations for the PEA variables
(2003, 2005, and 2007/8).
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(a) 2003 (b) 2005
(c) 2007 (d) 2008
Figure 1.2: Share of entrepreneur households per district
Figures 1.2, 1.3 and 1.5 below show the evolution of the percentage of, respec-
tively, small business owner, self-employed and self-employed in non-agricultural
activities, for all Afghan districts from 2003 to 2008.
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(a) 2003 (b) 2005
(c) 2007 (d) 2008
Figure 1.3: Share of self-employed households per district
(a) 2003 (b) 2005
(c) 2007 (d) 2008
Figure 1.4: Share of non-agricultural S.E. households per district
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(a) 2003 (b) 2005
(c) 2007 (d) 2008
Figure 1.5: Share of of agricultural S.E. households per district
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Conﬂict intensity measures
Conﬂict intensity, is identiﬁed at the district level using diﬀerent sources of data that
measure both the type and the extent of conﬂict activity. The source that seems
most reliable and comprehensive to identify conﬂict events, because not cleared by
the US Government is the report of the U.S.A. army. The data was publicly made
available by the Afghan War Diary (AWD) 12 and are all geo-referenced.
The measures of conﬂict used for the main analysis are the sum of the number
of conﬂicts per district in each year and the number of households who perceived
an insecurity shock in each year. This latter information is available in the NRVA
surveys which asked to every household if it perceived any insecurity shock in the
previous year. As a robustness check, the analysis was done also using the total
number of wounded/killed per district. These measures are normalised by the pop-
ulation in the district 13 in order to obtain a measure of conﬂict intensity that takes
into account the size of the district.
A number of measures of the intensity of conﬂict are constructed in order to
control for diﬀerent sources of information, covering two or more of the household
survey years (see Table 1.4 below).
Variable Description Source Years
1 N. of conﬂicts N. of conﬂict events normalised
by population per district AWD 2004-9
2 N. of wounded and killed N. of wounded and killed normalised
by population per district AWD 2004-9
3 Percentage of insecurity shocks % of household
aﬀected by insecurity shocks NRVA 2003-8
4 N_event4 N. of material conﬂict events normalised
N. of conﬂicts GDELT 1979-14
Table 1.4: Summary of conﬂict variables.
Figure 1.6 below shows the extent of the increase of the conﬂict looking at the
distribution of the number of conﬂict activities per district in the diﬀerent years of
the survey. Due to data limitations the AWD data are used to compare 2005 and
2008 and the GDELT to compare 2003 and 2005, 2007/8. The ﬁgure shows that
the percentage of districts with a large percentage number of conﬂict events has
increased, particularly from 2005 to 2008.
12(http : //wikileaks.org/wiki/Afghan_War_Diary_2004_2010)
13The data are available by district just for 2011 from the Central Statistics Organization (CSO)
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(a) Afghan war diaries (AWD) (b) GDELT
(c) ShockInsec
Figure 1.6: Kernel density of conﬂict intensity (normalised by population
per district) for diﬀerent years
of Afghanistan
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Figures 1.17 - 1.10 compare the geographical distribution through time of conﬂict
using the diﬀerent measures (all normalised by the size of the population). Figure
1.17: number of conﬂict events recorded by The US army; Figure 1.8: number of
material conﬂict events recorded by the media; Figure 1.9: number of individuals
killed or wounded and Figure 1.10: percentage of households that experience a shock
related to violence and insecurity. First the ﬁgures show that the cost of the conﬂict
in terms of human lives has increased from 2005 to 2008. Second, they also show
that the conﬂict has moved to districts that initially experienced low conﬂict levels,
while there is little evidence of the conﬂict moving out of some of the districts. This
spatial variation is exploited in order to analyse the eﬀect that increased conﬂict has
on entrepreneurial activity in the neighbourhood.
Figure 1.7: Number of conﬂicts recorded by the AWD per district, 2005-
2008. Conﬂicts are normalised by the district population
1.2. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 47
Figure 1.8: Number of conﬂicts recorded by the media (GDELT) per dis-
trict, 2003-2008. Conﬂicts are normalised by the district population
Figure 1.9: Number of total individuals wounded and killed recorded by the
US army per district (AWD), 2005-2008. Wounded and killed are normalised
by the district population
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Figure 1.10: Percentage of households in a district that have experienced
a shock related to violence and insecurity in t− 1.
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The geographical distribution of conﬂict events estimated with the variables
used for this paper is compared with the geographical distribution of conﬂict in
Afghanistan estimated using diﬀerent data sources, methods, or variables.
The Guardian newspaper was the ﬁrst one to publish ﬁgures using the Afghan
Warlogs 14. For instance, Figure 1.11 maps the distribution of IED attacks in
Afghanistan from 2004 through 2009. The geographical distribution is very sim-
Figure 1.11: IED attacks per year in Afghanistan. From the Afghan Warlogs
data published by The Guardian newspaper. Source: Guardian website
ilar to the one plotted int the ﬁgures above using the same source of data and
normalised by population size. Moreover, the Guardian data also show a sharp
increase in the intensity of conﬂict between 2005 and 2008, and how it spreads to
initially unaﬀected areas in the North of the country.
Also using the Afghan war diaries Zammit-Mangion et al. [2012] suggest a very
similar geographical distribution of the number of events through years (see the
paper supporting material), covering all events, not only the ones that may be
considered relevant for economic decisions. Perhaps more interesting to show here is
the escalation of conﬂict between 2004 and 2009 across Afghanistan (see the paper
for details on this is modelled). Figure 1.12 reports Figure 2 from Zammit-Mangion
et al. [2012] where they plot the weekly growth in the number of events registered
in the Afghan war diaries. The ﬁgure conﬁrms what the other ﬁgures have shown:
the conﬂict increases mainly in Helmand province and in the North, where in 2004
14Accessible here: http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/jul/27/wikileaks-
afghanistan-data-datajournalism
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Figure 1.12: Growth of the conﬂict activities registered in the Afghan war
diaries between 2004 and 2009. Only regions with positive overall growth. For
more details about the ﬁgure see Zammit-Mangion et al. [2012]
there were no activities registered. The less signiﬁcant increase in the South, were
the conﬂict is more pronounced, is due to the fact that the number of activities were
relatively already very high in 2004.
Very similar results on the number of deaths and woundings by year are reported
by the Visualizing data website 15, as shown in Figure 1.13.
15http://www.visualisingdata.com/index.php/2010/07/visualising-the-wikileaks-war-logs-using-
tableau-public/
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Figure 1.13: Number of deaths and woundings using the Afghan war diaries
(2005-2008). Source: Visualizing data website.
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Finally, [O'Loughlin et al., 2010] compare the conﬂict ﬁgures from the Afghan
war diaries with those from the Armed Conﬂict Location & Event Data Project
(ACLED). Figure 1.14 reports the authors ﬁgure number 5 where they plot the
geographical distribution of the share of violent event data per province with respect
to the total number of events. Although data availability in ACLED limits the
Figure 1.14: Share of conﬂict per province with respect to the total number
of conﬂict in the country (2008-2009). The authors use the Afghanistan war
diaries and ACLED. The restrictions on the period compared is due to the data
availability in ACLED (2008-09). Source: [O'Loughlin et al., 2010]
comparison to the years 2008 and 2009, the ﬁgure shows a strong similarity in the
geographical distribution of conﬂict captured by diﬀerent data sources. Thus, our
speciﬁcation of the conﬂict variable has a very similar geographical distribution to
the one of diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the conﬂict variables used by other authors.
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Finally, it is shown how the diﬀerent types of entrepreneurship are correlated with
conﬂict intensity. The district-level relation between the two variables it is plotted
in Figure 1.15 for small business owners (top-left), self-employed in the agricultural
sector (top-right) and self-employed in the non-agricultural sector (bottom-right).
The blue line represents the line of best ﬁt.
Figure 1.15: Relationship between the average dependent variable and con-
ﬂict intensity per district (AWD)
First, there is no evidence of a linear relation between conﬂict on entrepreneur-
ship. Second, the ﬁgure shows that the three diﬀerent types may be aﬀected by large
levels of conﬂict in diﬀerent ways. When agriculture is included, self-employment
is at best not aﬀected, although there is an indication of positive relation. Turning
to small business and self-employment with the exclusion of agricultural activities,
high levels of conﬂict seem to be correlated with lower level of entrepreneurial ac-
tivity, in a non linear way: for intermediate levels of conﬂict intensity the number
of entrepreneurs and self-employed do not change from districts with no conﬂict; for
very high levels, though, there are less entrepreneurs and self employed.
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Control variables
On top of the intensity, impact, and frequency of the conﬂict - described in the
previous Section - the model speciﬁcation includes a large number of potential de-
terminants of a household engagement with a PEA.
Table 1.5 describes the variables used in the model speciﬁcation. The controls
are the traditional determinants of entrepreneurial activity widely studied in the
literature (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Evans and Leighton, 1989, e.g.), such as
household features and access to markets (credit, inputs and outputs), geographical
features such as infrastructures, institutions, and shocks other than conﬂict. To
proxy for the size of the local market ar also distinguished urban areas from rural
ones. To further control for issues related to spatial sorting, the regression controls
for the members of the households that migrated in the previous year.
Table 2.7-1.9 show the summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis.
The summary statistics show that about 70% of the households used an informal
credit source (e.g. relatives, friends, etc.). Almost half of the households in the
sample asked for a loan in the previous year, perceived a shock and experienced
the migration of a household member (either in another Afghan region or abroad).
About 40% of the housolds live close to a market, while more than half of the sample
do not have access to electricity. Finally, on average, between 2003-2007/8 Afghan
districts were aﬀected by about 0.19 conﬂicts for every 1000 inhabitants. For 2003 it
was possible to match only a subset of the control variables which were comparable
with 2005 and 2007/8. All control variables are summarised in Table 1.5, where it
is indicated when the variable was computed also for 2003.
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Control variables Description 2003
HHMemb2 = 1 if household members are < 2 Yes
HHMemb5 = 1 if household members are < 5 & > 2 Yes
HHMemb10 = 1 if household members are < 10 & > 5 Yes
HHMemb15 = 1 if household members are < 15 & > 10 Yes
HHMemb20 = 1 if household members are < 20 & > 15 Yes
MaleH = 1 if the household head is a male Yes
AgeHH Age of the household head Yes
GenderAvHH Average gender of the household Yes
LiteracyH = 1 if the household head is literate Yes
LiteracyAvHH Average literacy of the household members Yes
hhassets Number of assets in the household Yes
Rural = 1 if the household lives in a rural area No
Credit_Inst = 1 if the household obtained credit the previous year: credit institution No
Credit_Lender = 1 if the household obtained credit the previous year: private lender No
Credit_Inform = 1 if the household obtained credit the previous year: informal source No
Credit_Other = 1 if the household obtained credit the previous year: other sources No
Credit_None = 1 if the household did not obtain credit the previous year No
Loan = 1 if the household obtained credit the previous year No
HHMigration = 1 if any household member migrated the previous year Yes
shocks = 1 if the household experienced a shock in the previous year Yes
Dremittances = 1 if the household received remittance the previous year No
DSocialContr = 1 if the household received any social aid the previous year No
RoadKm Km from the closest road No
DElectrNo = 1 if the household has no access to electricity No
DMkt_Close = 1 if the household is close to the market No
Table 1.5: Control variables availability across waves.
The relevant choices that were made in order to make the most problematic
variables comparable across waves are summarised below.
First, the variable that indicates the number of household assets (hhassets)
(2003-2007/8), includes the number of households assets which were available in all
the three rounds of the survey: radio, bicycle, TV, motorcycle and car.
Second, shocks (2003-2007/8), counts only the number of shocks experienced by
the households which were asked in all the three rounds of the survey: unusually high
level of crops, unusually high level of livestock, earthquakes, landslides, ﬂooding, late
damaging frost, hailstorms, unusually high increases in food prices, and unusual
decrease in farm gate prices.
Third, the dummy variables that indicates if the household is close to the market
or not (DMkt_Close, available for 2005-2007/8), computes the presence of a close
market diﬀerently for 2005 and for 2007/8. For 2005 the dummy is equal to one
if either in winter or in the summer the market is in the same village were the
interviewed households live, or it takes less than one hour to reach it by foot, public
transport, or private vehicle (male shura questionnaire, Section 3). For 2007/8 the
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dummy variable is equal to one if the market is in the same village of the interviewed
households (male community questionnaire Section 3)
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Table 1.6: Summary statistics (full sample)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
2-5 HH Members (Dummy) 0.024 0.153 0 1 48519
5-10 HH Members (Dummy) 0.243 0.429 0 1 48519
10-15 HH Members (Dummy) 0.613 0.487 0 1 48519
15-20 HH Members (Dummy) 0.101 0.301 0 1 48519
> 20 HH Members (Dummy) 0.016 0.127 0 1 48519
Male HH head (Dummy) 0.98 0.14 0 1 46403
Age of the HH head 43.335 13.358 1 99 45993
% of males in the HH 0.693 0.461 0 1 48519
Literacy of HH head (Dummy) 0.183 0.387 0 1 46404
Avg. HH literacy 0.266 0.277 0 1 48496
N. of HH assets 2.356 1.849 0 7 48519
N. of HH assets (squared) 8.968 12.798 0 49 48519
Rural (Dummy) 0.788 0.409 0 1 48311
Credit from Institution (Dummy) 0.009 0.097 0 1 46757
Credit from Lender (Dummy) 0.159 0.366 0 1 46547
Informal source of credit (Dummy) 0.737 0.44 0 1 46757
No Credit (Dummy) 0.073 0.261 0 1 46757
Credit from other source (Dummy) 0.007 0.082 0 1 46757
Loan (Dummy) 0.467 0.499 0 1 48021
Migration of some HH member (Dummy) 0.538 0.499 0 1 48465
Shocks in the previous year (Dummy) 0.488 0.5 0 1 48519
Receipt of remittances (Dummy) 0.061 0.239 0 1 48519
Receipt of social aid (Dummy) 0.009 0.097 0 1 48515
Km from the main road 3.426 13.337 0 602 47455
Km from the main road (squared) 189.594 5312.043 0 362404 47455
Market is nearby (Dummy) 0.404 0.491 0 1 47842
No electricity (Dummy) 0.675 0.468 0 1 47788
Business owner (Dummy) 0.038 0.192 0 1 47343
Self-employed (Dummy) 0.484 0.5 0 1 47343
Self-employed (agric.) (Dummy) 0.353 0.478 0 1 47343
Self-employed (non-agric.) (Dummy) 0.131 0.338 0 1 47343
Low K (Dummy) 0.084 0.277 0 1 47343
High K (Dummy) 0.047 0.212 0 1 47343
Subsistance agric. (Dummy) 0.253 0.434 0 1 47343
Agric. for sale (Dummy) 0.1 0.3 0 1 47343
N. of conﬂicts (AWD) 0.194 0.636 0 9.273 48393
N. of wounded/killed (AWD) 0.248 0.771 0 11.021 48393
N. of conﬂicts (GDELT) 0.096 0.321 0 9.73 48401
% of insecurity shocks 0.023 0.063 0 0.704 48519
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Table 1.7: Summary statistics (2003)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
2-5 HH Members (Dummy) 0.001 0.035 0 1 11635
5-10 HH Members (Dummy) 0.144 0.351 0 1 11635
10-15 HH Members (Dummy) 0.810 0.392 0 1 11635
15-20 HH Members (Dummy) 0.044 0.204 0 1 11635
> 20 HH Members (Dummy) 0.001 0.032 0 1 11635
Male HH head (Dummy) 0.874 0.332 0 1 10845
Age of HH head 43.83 10.832 1 99 10817
% of males in the HH 0.594 0.491 0 1 11635
Literacy of HH head (Dummy) 0.166 0.372 0 1 10720
Avg. HH literacy 0.212 0.244 0 1 11499
N. of HH assets 0.824 0.885 0 5 11637
N. of HH assets (squared) 1.463 2.615 0 25 11637
Migration of some HH member (Dummy) 0.144 0.352 0 1 11498
Shocks in the previous year (Dummy) 0.64 0.48 0 1 11339
N. of conﬂicts (GDELT) 0.092 0.321 0 4.865 11464
Business owner (Dummy) 0.02 0.141 0 1 10605
Self-employed (Dummy) 0.405 0.491 0 1 10480
Self-employed (non-agric.) 0.105 0.306 0 1 10480
Self-employed (agric.) 0.328 0.47 0 1 10480
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Table 1.8: Summary statistics for 2005
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
2-5 HH Members (Dummy) 0.019 0.138 0 1 29087
5-10 HH Members (Dummy) 0.236 0.424 0 1 29087
10-15 HH Members (Dummy) 0.63 0.483 0 1 29087
15-20 HH Members (Dummy) 0.098 0.298 0 1 29087
> 20 HH Members (Dummy) 0.014 0.118 0 1 29087
Male HH head (Dummy) 0.98 0.139 0 1 26972
Age of HH head 43.202 12.803 1 99 26562
% of males in the HH 0.724 0.447 0 1 29087
Literacy of HH head (Dummy) 0.31 0.463 0 1 26972
Avg. HH literacy 0.262 0.281 0 1 29087
N. of HH assets 1.953 1.293 0 6 29087
N. of HH assets (squared) 5.486 6.074 0 36 29087
Rural (Dummy) 0.798 0.401 0 1 29087
Credit from other source (Dummy) 0.009 0.092 0 1 27437
Credit from institution (Dummy) 0.003 0.056 0 1 27437
Credit from lender (Dummy) 0.134 0.341 0 1 27437
Informal source of credit (Dummy) 0.761 0.426 0 1 27437
No Credit (Dummy) 0.088 0.284 0 1 27437
Loan (Dummy) 0.386 0.487 0 1 28599
Migration of some HH member (Dummy) 0.845 0.362 0 1 29087
Shocks in the previous year (Dummy) 0.339 0.473 0 1 29087
Receipt of remittances (Dummy) 0.066 0.248 0 1 29087
Receipt of social aid (Dummy) 0.007 0.086 0 1 29083
Km from the main road 3.691 9.274 0 99 29087
Km from the main road (squared) 99.622 534.371 0 9801 29087
Market is nearby (Dummy) 0.574 0.494 0 1 28410
No electricity (Dummy) 0.74 0.439 0 1 28356
Income 67372.286 79536.213 4 999999 20345
Business owner (Dummy) 0.051 0.219 0 1 27937
Self-employed (Dummy) 0.504 0.5 0 1 27937
Self-employed (agric.) 0.395 0.489 0 1 27937
Self-employed (non-agric.) 0.109 0.311 0 1 27937
Low K 0.064 0.245 0 1 27937
High K 0.044 0.206 0 1 27937
Subsistance agric. (Dummy) 0.291 0.454 0 1 27937
Agric. for sale (Dummy) 0.105 0.306 0 1 27937
N. of conﬂicts (AWD) 0.05 0.128 0 1.689 29017
N. of wounded/killed (AWD) 0.105 0.477 0 10.694 29017
N. of conﬂicts (GDELT) 0.055 0.2 0 5.541 29017
% of insecurity shocks 0.022 0.066 0 0.704 29087
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Table 1.9: Summary statistics 2007-2008
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
2-5 HH Members (Dummy) 0.031 0.172 0 1 19432
5-10 HH Members (Dummy) 0.253 0.435 0 1 19432
10-15 HH Members (Dummy) 0.588 0.492 0 1 19432
15-20 HH Members (Dummy) 0.104 0.305 0 1 19432
> 20 HH Members (Dummy) 0.02 0.14 0 1 19432
Male HH head (Dummy) 0.98 0.141 0 1 19431
Age of HH head 43.516 14.079 4 99 19431
% of males in the HH 0.647 0.478 0 1 19432
Literacy of HH head (Dummy) 0.006 0.077 0 1 19432
Avg. HH literacy 0.27 0.27 0 1 19409
N. of HH assets 2.959 2.33 0 7 19432
N. of HH assets (squared) 14.181 17.562 0 49 19432
Rural (Dummy) 0.772 0.419 0 1 19224
Credit from other source (Dummy) 0.004 0.066 0 1 19320
Credit from institution (Dummy) 0.018 0.134 0 1 19320
Credit from lender (Dummy) 0.196 0.397 0 1 19110
Informal source of credit (Dummy) 0.703 0.457 0 1 19320
No Credit (Dummy) 0.052 0.222 0 1 19320
Loan (Dummy) 0.586 0.493 0 1 19422
Migration of some HH member (Dummy) 0.078 0.267 0 1 19378
Shocks in the previous year (Dummy) 0.711 0.453 0 1 19432
Receipt of remittances (Dummy) 0.053 0.224 0 1 19432
Receipt of social aid (Dummy) 0.012 0.111 0 1 19432
Km from the main road 3.005 17.974 0 602 18368
Km from the main road (squared) 332.07 8509.978 0 362404 18368
Market is nearby (Dummy) 0.156 0.363 0 1 19432
No electricity (Dummy) 0.58 0.494 0 1 19432
Income 62934.947 69956.426 2 1200000 19315
Business owner (Dummy) 0.02 0.141 0 1 19406
Self-employed (Dummy) 0.455 0.498 0 1 19406
Self-employed (agric.) 0.292 0.454 0 1 19406
Self-employed (non-agric.) 0.164 0.37 0 1 19406
Low K 0.112 0.316 0 1 19406
High K 0.052 0.221 0 1 19406
Subsistance agric. (Dummy) 0.198 0.398 0 1 19406
Agric. for sale (Dummy) 0.094 0.291 0 1 19406
N. of conﬂicts (AWD) 0.41 0.953 0 9.273 19376
N. of wounded/killed (AWD) 0.463 1.033 0 11.021 19376
N. of conﬂicts (GDELT) 0.158 0.437 0 9.73 19376
perc_ShockInsec 0.025 0.058 0 0.444 19432
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1.2.2 Estimation strategy
We estimate a pooled cross-section for 2003/2008 and one for 2005/2008, using the
information on the conﬂict at district level. The analysis is split for the two time
periods as, as mentioned above, the data on entrepreneurship from 2005 to 2008 are
more detailed
The probability that a household h ∈ [1, N ] holds an activity of one type i =
{1, 2, 3} is estimated in a given year t = {2003, 2005, 2007− 8}, for a level of conﬂict
Conf that changes across districts d ∈ [1, 398]:
Yhdt = α + βConfhdt + ηyeart + δdistrictd + γXhdt + uhdt (1.1)
Where, Y is the private economic activity dummy, Conf is the conﬂict indicator
(number of wounded/killed per district), X are other determinants of private eco-
nomic activity and u is the residual error. In the equation above year ﬁxed eﬀects
capture macro inﬂuences on both entrepreneurship and S.E., while district ﬁxed
eﬀects capture geographic-speciﬁc inﬂuences on the dependent variables. The equa-
tion is estimated clustering standard errors at the district level in order to control for
the group correlation of the error term caused by measuring conﬂict at the district
level.
1.2.3 Identiﬁcation strategy
As discussed earlier, the potential bias due to omitted variables and measurement
error has to be addressed. Other studies in the current literature used instrumental
variable strategies.
Collier and Duponchel [2013] study geographical variations in the intensity of
conﬂict across chiefdoms to estimate the impact of violence on ﬁrms in Sierra Leone,
a country that was ravaged by violent conﬂict from 1991 to 2002. They instrument
the intensity of conﬂict using the distance to Monrovia from the epicenter of the
chiefdom in kilometers. The assumption is that the closer to Liberian capital the
chiefdom is, the more intense the conﬂict. On the contrary, distance from Monrovia
should not impact the dependent variables because the lacks of infrastructures (poor
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roads) and adverse weather conditions.
Camacho and Rodriguez [2013] evaluate the eﬀect that armed conﬂict measures
have on entrepreneurial activities in Colombia and Bozzoli et al. [2013], study the
impact of violent conﬂict on self-employment and they use diﬀerent instruments
that vary across time and municipality levels. They both use as instruments lagged
laboratories dismantle and antinarcotics operations at the municipality level . The
exogeneity of the instrument is proved by a Sargan test.
Bozzoli et al. [2013] also use the instrument found by Rodriguez and Sanchez
[2012] in their study about the impact of conﬂict on child labour in Colombia.They
use an indicator of central government deterrence measures: (lag) the rate of homi-
cide captures10 at the state level, interacted with the respective municipal pop-
ulation. The instrument is valid if homicide captures are not directly correlated
with labor market outcomes. This is plausible since, it is argued, that deterrence
decisions are under "central government control (the Ministry of Defense)."
As discussed earlier, in this study the potential bias due to omitted variables,
is addressed controlling for a large number of diﬀerent PEA activities and conﬂict
measures, and for household and district controls and districts ﬁxed eﬀects. How-
ever a time-variant instrumental variable (IV) is also used in a two-stages least
square (2SLS) estimation. In this section are given details of how the instrument is
constructed.
The instrumental strategy is inspired by the so-called shift-share methodology
used in urban and regional economics to instrument regional economic growth, at
least since Bartik [1991] and Blanchard and Katz [1992]. In both papers, the au-
thors instrument regional economic growth interacting the lagged regional sectoral
structure with the contemporaneous national sectoral trend. A similar methodology
has also been widely used in the migration literature to instrument local migration
ﬂows. Here researchers interact the lagged ethnic enclaves with the contemporane-
ous nation-wide ﬂows of ethnic groups [Altonji and Card, 1991a, Bartel, 1989, Saiz,
2007].
Following the shift-share approach, the district share of total conﬂict per dis-
trict between 1979 and 1989 (the conﬂict during the Soviet occupation) (Share0d), is
interacted with the contemporaneous (i.e. 2003-2008) nationwide number of conﬂict
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events (Global_Conft):
Share0d = Conf0d/Global_Conf0 (1.2)
iv1td = Share0d ∗Global_Conft (1.3)
where Conf0d is the number of district-level conﬂicts in time 0 in district d,
Global_Conf is the number of nationwide level conﬂicts in time 0 and time t, the
index 0 refers to the pre-sample period (1979-1989), and the index t represents the
years of our analysis t=[2003, 2005, 2007/8].
In order to instrument for conﬂict the instrumental variable has to be strongly
correlated with the district-level variation over time in conﬂict intensity (relevance
condition) and, at the same time, it has to be properly excluded from the second
stage regression, i.e., it should aﬀect PEA only through its eﬀect on the conﬂict
intensity variable, not directly (exogeneity or exclusion condition).
The relevance of the instrument (the ﬁrst stage-correlation), is measured by the
magnitude of the F-tests available in Panel A of the tables in Section 1.3, which is
safely above 10. This suggests that past conﬂict shares might be correlated with
the current ones because of exogenous geographical factors (such as accessibility,
position, etc.). These factors make a given district more or less likely to be aﬀected
by conﬂict events where the overall conﬂict intensity in the whole country increases.
Figure 1.16a and Figure 1.16b below provide evidence of the correlation between
the Taliban and the Russian conﬂict. In order to build up the IV used in the
regressions are used the GDELT data. In particular events related to conﬂict are
classiﬁed as material cooperation, verbal cooperation, verbal conﬂict and material
conﬂict. In order to use as an IV the district level of conﬂict intensity from 1979 to
1989 it is used a sum of all these geo-referenced events.
Although the two conﬂicts were completely diﬀerent, they both spread through-
out the whole country. Figure 1.16 below shows the average number of conﬂicts per
district over the periods of interest for the Soviet conﬂict (1.16a) and for the conﬂict
studied in this paper (data between 2004 and 2009) (1.16b). Due to diﬀerences
in reporting between 30 years ago and recent years (e.g. because of diﬀerences in
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the media coverage), the overall number of conﬂicts registered is clearly diﬀerent.
However, the ﬁgure shows that both conﬂicts were spread throughout the country,
although the average intensity might diﬀer between districts. The fact that the
two conﬂicts, on average, cover similar districts with similar intensity is conﬁrmed
by a signiﬁcant Spearman's correlation coeﬃcient of 0.41 between the number of
events per district in the two periods. Finally, Figure 1.16c plots the routes of the
Soviet invasion, which follows the main trade route/highway in Afghanistan and it
is remarkably close to the belt of strongest conﬂict plot in Figure 1.16a.
In order for the instrument to be valid, also the exclusion restriction has to be
satisﬁed. It is realistic assuming that the exclusion restriction holds in this context
because the Soviet invasion took place thirty years before the period of our analysis
and the Afghan economy has gone through many structural changes since then.
In particular, the surge of illecit opium activities and cross-border trade with the
arise of the Talibans and the cease of the production of natural gas after the Russian
occupation (see the discussion in Section 1.1.2) provide clear examples of how private
economic activity between 1979 should not be correlated with PEA in 2003-2008 if
not through observable ﬁxed factor that are controlled for in the estimation strategy.
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(a) Soviet conﬂict (1979-1989)
Source: own computation based on GDELT
data.
(b) ISAF conﬂict (2004-2009 only)
Source: own computation based on AWD data.
(c) US Map of Soviet Invasion in
Afghanistan
Source: Braithwaite [2011]
Figure 1.16: Geographical distribution of the Soviet (a-c) and the ISAF
conﬂicts (b). Maps 1.16a and 1.16b plot the averge number of relevant conﬂict
events in each district (post-2005 deﬁnitions of districts) during the periods of inter-
est: 1979-1989 for the Soviet conﬂict (a) and 2004-2004 for the ISAF conﬂict (b).
Due to diﬀerences in reporting between 30 years ago and recent years, the overall
number of conﬂicts registered is clearly diﬀerent. However, the ﬁgure shows that both
conﬂicts were spread throughout the country, although the average intensity might
diﬀer between districts. Map 1.16a plots the Soviet invasion route, covering an area
that is quite similar to the ISAF conﬂict belt in Figure 1.16b.
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Fourth, as suggested by Zammit-Mangion et al. [2012] the volatility of the conﬂict
within provinces is quite high, suggesting that it is diﬃcult to identify trends. On
the contrary, the irregular warfare observed can be predicted, only because random
eﬀects cancel out, showing a Gaussian distribution of the conﬂict's intensity.
1.3 Results
Table 1.10 and 1.11 show the results from a Linear Probability Model (LPM) and an
IV estimation of the eﬀect of conﬂict intensity on PEA measured with both AWD
data on the diﬀerent types of entrepreneurship using the pooled data from 2005 and
2007-2008 and clustering by district level. The IV results from the second stage
equation are presented in panel B of Table 1.10 and 1.11 in columns 3, 6, 9 and 12.
The ﬁrst stages reported in the tables in panel A of both tables conﬁrm both the
positive correlation between the Russian conﬂict between 1979-1989 and the Tal-
iban conﬂict in 2005-2007/8 and the validity of the instrument as the F-test is safely
above 10. The IV estimates in Table 1.10, column 6, show that a unitary increase in
the conﬂict intensity measure (one conﬂict over 1000 inhabitants) increases the prob-
ability of a household of being self-employed of about 21.5 percentage points (about
36 standard deviations of the conﬂict variable). When a distinction is made between
agricultural and non-agricultural self-employment the probability of an household of
engaging in agricultural self-employment increases about 16 percentage points. Ta-
ble 1.11 column 3, shows that among non-agricultural self-employment activities the
probability of an household of engaging in a low capital intensive activity increases
about 9.6 percentage points with a unitary increase in conﬂict intensity versus an
increase of about 6.4 percentage points in high capital intensive activities. However,
given the size of the standard errors these coeﬃcients are not statistically diﬀerent
from each other. A unitary increase of conﬂict intensity also causes an increase of
about 5.5 percentage points in agriculture for sale while it also increases subsistence
agriculture, but not signiﬁcantly. Overall, the results show that Afghan households
respond to an increase in conﬂict intensity in the district increasing non-agricultural
activities, especially those which require lower capital investments.
The 2SLS coeﬃcients are generally larger than those presented in the LPM re-
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gressions.This may be due to omitted variables, as well as to an attenuation bias.
Concerning omitted variables, good candidates for omitted variables are household
wealth (not well accounted for by the number of assets), natural resources, and,
with a less clear eﬀect, in-migration (both internal immigrants from other districts
or from other countries). Higher household wealth is positively correlated with
higher capital intensive investments and possibly with conﬂict targeting, but nega-
tively correlated with subsistence agriculture. Similarly, a large presence of natural
resources attracts both higher capital intensive investments, and conﬂict, and is
likely to reduce land for subsistence agriculture. Finally, migrants are more likely to
take up subsistence jobs, rather than investing in higher capital intensive activities;
and people will tend to migrate where there is less conﬂict. However, it is not clear
if areas characterised by less migration are more likely to host higher capital in-
vestors or subsistence farmers. Other behavioural unobservables, which may relate
to both the source of income and to the level of conﬂict, such as risk preferences,
are not good candidates to explain the LPM bias. Indeed, risk aversion is negatively
correlated with capital investment and positively with the level of conﬂict.
However, the explanation of the attenuation bias of the 2SLS estimates can be
simply related to the independence of the measurement error of the district-level con-
ﬂict for the endogenous variable and for the instrument. Given that the information
on the conﬂict level during the Russian conﬂict (used to construct the instrument)
and the most recent conﬂict level (instrumented) comes from two completely diﬀer-
ent datasets, it is likely that the measurement error components potentially aﬀecting
both variables are mutually independent. This is the necessary condition to make
the 2SLS estimates consistent in presence of well-behaved measurement errors.
However, it is worth noticing that the diﬀerences between the two sets of esti-
mates  LPM and 2SLS  are small and not always signiﬁcant, which suggests that
the measurement error  as well as other sources of bias  does not aﬀect the main
conclusions of the analysis. Overall, the instrumental variable estimations suggest
that the LPM results should be considered to be a conservative or lower-bound es-
timate of the true eﬀect. Table 1.25 and 1.31 in the Appendix show also the impact
on the probability of the household of engaging in PEA of other covariates at the
household level.
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Table 1.12 shows the LPM estimation of an increase in conﬂict intensity on
the main activity of the household using pooled data from 2003 and 2008 using as a
measure of conﬂict the material conﬂict events reported in the GDELT dataset, while
Table 1.13 shows the LPM estimation of an increase of the percentage of insecurity
shocks perceived by the households in the district. Both the conﬂict indicators seem
to have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of the household of engaging in PEA.
The reason could be that the stimates which include also 2003 rely on variables that
were harmonised across surveys. Despite all the eﬀorts to make the survey waves
comparable, the variable could be not homogeneous causing the diﬀerence with
respect to the coeﬃcients of the 2005/2007-8 analysis. The coeﬃcients of Table 1.13
instead could not be signiﬁcant because insecurity shocks do not necessarily involve
wounded/killed or conﬂict events that destroy infrastructures. This could explain
the diﬀerence with respect to the previous results, where the conﬂict variable was
capturing conﬂict events causing damage either to individuals or infrastructures.
The results are also fairly smilar when using a diﬀerent measure of conﬂict: the
total number of wounded and killed per district normalised by district population
(N_wk). This conﬂict measure does not keep into account the destruction of the
infrastructures, but measures its magnitude as its impact on individuals (both sol-
diers and civilians). Table 1.14 ishows a signiﬁcant increase in non-agricultural
self-employment (column 9) and in 1.15 a positive increase in both high and low
capital intensive self-employed activities (columns 3 and 6). These results also sug-
gest that the impact of conﬂict on PEA is not just due to the presence of conﬂict
and its impact on infrastructures, but also to the impact of conﬂict on human lives.
However, the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients of interest are smaller when looking
just at the impact of the number of wounded and killed by district. The diﬀerence
in the magnitude of the results suggests that part of the impact of conﬂict of en-
trepreneurship is due partly to the distruction of infrastructures such as transports,
shops etc. and partly to the impact it has on human lives. Panel A of both Tables
1.14 and 1.15 show the ﬁrst stage of the IV regressions. The correlation between the
Russian conﬂict and the number of wounded and killed per district in 2005-2007/8
is positive. The F-test is above ten, showing that again, the IV is valid. This F-test
is signiﬁcantly larger than the one in Table 1.10 and 1.11.
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1.3.1 Heterogeneous eﬀects
Table 1.16 and Table 1.17 show the IV estimates of the impact of conﬂict on the
diﬀerent types of entreprenurial activity on heterogeneus households, distinguishing
between female headed and household headed ones. The results show that the im-
pact of conﬂict is heterogeneous across households with heads of a diﬀerent sex. In
female headed households, shown in Table 1.16, an additional unit of conﬂict signif-
icantly decreases the probability that the household is engaged in a self-employed
activity of about 1.2 percentage points, see column 2. In particular, the probability
that a household is engaged as a main activity in low capital intensive activities de-
creases of about 78 percentage points at a 10% level of signiﬁcance. On the contrary,
in male headed households, shown in Table 1.17 an additional unit of conﬂict in-
creases the probability of a household of being mainly engaged in self-employement
of 21 percentage points. In particular, the probability of being engaged in non-
agricultural self-employment increases of 16 percentage points. The probability of
a household of being engaged both in low and in high capital intensive activities
increases, respectively of 9 and 6 percentage points.
The results suggest that under higher conﬂict intensity, female headed households
reduce informal entrepreneurial (self-employement) activities. The policy implica-
tions of these results point in the direction of subsidizing/providing aid to female-
headed households, which activity seems to be more disrupted by higher conﬂict
intensity.
76 CHAPTER 1. CONFLICT, ENTREPRENEURSHIP
T
ab
le
1.
16
:
IV
e
st
im
a
te
s,
p
o
o
le
d
d
a
ta
2
0
0
5
/
2
0
0
8
(N
R
V
A
)
-
F
e
m
a
le
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
h
e
a
d
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(I
V
)
(I
V
)
(I
V
)
(I
V
)
(I
V
)
(I
V
)
(I
V
)
(I
V
)
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
bu
s_
ow
n
se
_
hh
se
_
na
g
ag
ri
c
L
ow
_
K
H
ig
h_
K
su
b_
ag
r
ag
r_
sa
le
N
_
co
nﬂ
ic
t
-0
.4
86
-1
.2
08
**
-0
.5
53
-1
.4
39
-0
.7
84
*
0.
23
1
-0
.7
84
-0
.6
55
(0
.3
60
)
(0
.5
77
)
(0
.3
93
)
(1
.9
52
)
(0
.4
52
)
(0
.2
60
)
(1
.9
48
)
(0
.4
83
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
80
9
80
9
80
9
80
9
80
9
80
9
80
9
80
9
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
-0
.1
83
-0
.5
79
-0
.0
87
-1
.1
88
-0
.3
96
-0
.0
01
-0
.4
52
-0
.6
68
N
ot
es
:
C
lu
st
er
ro
bu
st
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
th
e
cl
us
te
r
is
th
e
di
st
ri
ct
d
.
**
*
p<
0.
01
,
**
p<
0.
05
,
*
p<
0.
1
T
he
de
p
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
de
ﬁn
ed
at
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d
le
ve
l
sp
ec
if
yi
ng
th
e
ty
p
e
of
ac
ti
vi
ty
of
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d
(s
ee
T
ab
le
1.
3
fo
r
de
ﬁn
it
io
ns
).
co
nﬂ
ic
t
m
ea
su
re
s
ar
e
co
m
pu
te
d
at
th
e
di
st
ri
ct
le
ve
l
an
d
ar
e
no
rm
al
is
ed
by
p
op
ul
at
io
n.
A
un
it
of
co
nﬂ
ic
t
is
1/
10
00
in
ha
bi
ta
nt
s
(s
ee
T
ab
le
1.
4
fo
r
de
ﬁn
it
io
ns
).
A
ll
eq
ua
ti
on
s
ar
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
w
it
h
th
e
co
nt
ro
l
va
ri
ab
le
s
de
sc
ri
b
ed
in
T
ab
le
1.
5,
ye
ar
an
d
di
st
ri
ct
ﬁx
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
.
1.3. RESULTS 77
T
ab
le
1.
17
:
IV
e
st
im
a
te
s,
p
o
o
le
d
d
a
ta
2
0
0
5
/
2
0
0
8
(N
R
V
A
)
-
M
a
le
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
h
e
a
d
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(I
V
)
(I
V
)
(I
V
)
(I
V
)
(I
V
)
(I
V
)
(I
V
)
(I
V
)
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
bu
s_
ow
n
se
_
hh
se
_
na
g
ag
ri
c
L
ow
_
K
H
ig
h_
K
su
b_
ag
r
ag
r_
sa
le
N
_
co
nﬂ
ic
t
0.
01
25
0.
21
7*
*
0.
16
2*
**
0.
05
63
0.
09
85
**
*
0.
06
39
**
0.
00
19
8
0.
05
44
(0
.0
20
3)
(0
.0
96
9)
(0
.0
52
6)
(0
.0
97
7)
(0
.0
32
0)
(0
.0
30
7)
(0
.1
47
)
(0
.0
64
0)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
40
,1
48
40
,1
48
40
,1
48
40
,1
48
40
,1
48
40
,1
48
40
,1
48
40
,1
48
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
00
6
-0
.0
26
-0
.0
27
0.
03
5
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
10
0.
02
5
0.
00
9
N
ot
es
:
C
lu
st
er
ro
bu
st
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
th
e
cl
us
te
r
is
th
e
di
st
ri
ct
d
.
**
*
p<
0.
01
,
**
p<
0.
05
,
*
p<
0.
1
T
he
de
p
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
de
ﬁn
ed
at
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d
le
ve
l
sp
ec
if
yi
ng
th
e
ty
p
e
of
ac
ti
vi
ty
of
th
e
ho
us
eh
ol
d
(s
ee
T
ab
le
1.
3
fo
r
de
ﬁn
it
io
ns
).
co
nﬂ
ic
t
m
ea
su
re
s
ar
e
co
m
pu
te
d
at
th
e
di
st
ri
ct
le
ve
l
an
d
ar
e
no
rm
al
is
ed
by
p
op
ul
at
io
n.
A
un
it
of
co
nﬂ
ic
t
is
1/
10
00
in
ha
bi
ta
nt
s
(s
ee
T
ab
le
1.
4
fo
r
de
ﬁn
it
io
ns
).
A
ll
eq
ua
ti
on
s
ar
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
w
it
h
th
e
co
nt
ro
l
va
ri
ab
le
s
de
sc
ri
b
ed
in
T
ab
le
1.
5,
ye
ar
an
d
di
st
ri
ct
ﬁx
ed
eﬀ
ec
ts
.
78 CHAPTER 1. CONFLICT, ENTREPRENEURSHIP
1.3.2 Mechanisms
The mechanisms that could explain an increase in PEA, especially in non-agricultural
self-employment could be those listed in the diagram in ﬁgure . First, households
could shift their main activity from wage employment to self-employment. Table
1.18 shows that that the probability of an household main activity of being wage
employment decreases of about 17 percentage points when our measure of conﬂict
goes up by one unit.
Also, as conﬂict intensity increases, households could engage more in lower cap-
ital intensive activities as insecurity could make investments riskier. Table 1.11
Column 3, shows that households have a higher probability of being engaged in low
capital intensive activities of 9.6 percentage points.
Finally, households might decrease their investments in agriculture and con-
sequently increase non-agricultural self-employed activities. Table 1.19 shows the
impact of conﬂict intensity respectively on the number of livestock, the number of
tractors and threshers and the dummy variable that identiﬁes households who own
land. However, the results show that the impact of conﬂict is not signiﬁcant.
	
Increase	in	PEA	
Decrease	of	investment	in	agriculture	
Increase	of	non-agricultural	lower-capital	intensive	activities	
Switch	from	wage	employment	to	informal	self-employment	
Figure 1.17: Mechanisms
1.3. RESULTS 79
Table 1.18: IV estimates, pooled data 2005/2008 (NRVA) - Impact of an
increase of conﬂict intensity on wage income
(IV)
VARIABLES Wage Income
N_conﬂict_dis -0.177***
(0.0660)
Observations 40,957
R-squared 0.007
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, the cluster is
the district d.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are dummy variables deﬁned at the house-
hold level specifying the type of activity of the household (see Table
1.3 for deﬁnitions). conﬂict measures are computed at the district
level and are normalised by population. A unit of conﬂict is 1/1000
inhabitants (see Table 1.4 for deﬁnitions). All equations are esti-
mated with the control variables described in Table 1.5, year and
district ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 1.19: IV estimates, pooled data 2005/2008 (NRVA) - Impact of an
increase of conﬂict intensity on investment in agricultural assets owned
by households engaged in agriculture
(1) (2) (3)
(IV) (IV) (IV)
VARIABLES N. of livestock N. of tractors and threshers Land ownership
N_conﬂict_dis -1.760 0.0150 0.0366
(4.039) (0.0302) (0.0522)
Observations 14,402 14,402 14,402
R-squared 0.028 0.713 0.017
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, the cluster is the district
d.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are dummy variables deﬁned at the household level
specifying the type of activity of the household (see Table 1.3 for deﬁnitions).
conﬂict measures are computed at the district level and are normalised by pop-
ulation. A unit of conﬂict is 1/1000 inhabitants (see Table 1.4 for deﬁnitions).
All equations are estimated with the control variables described in Table 1.5,
year and district ﬁxed eﬀects.
1.3. RESULTS 81
1.3.3 Robustness checks
Tables 1.20, 1.21 below show that the results of the analysis are fairly robust to
the exclusion of the district of Kabul from the sample. In the district that includes
the capital of Afghanistan conﬂict intensity is much higher than the average across
districts (159.2 conﬂict events in the district versus 25.92 conﬂict events on average
in the other districts 16). Thus, it could be an outlier driving the results. A few
diﬀerences in the IV coeﬃcients can be noticed both for subsistance agriculture,
agriculture for sale and non-agricultural self-employment. When excluding the dis-
trict of Kabul, even if conﬂict still has a positive impact on the probability of the
household of engaging in agricultural self-employment (Table 1.20, column 12), it is
not possible to distinguish if this increase is due to more subsistance agriculture or
to more agriculture for sale (Table 1.21, column 9 and 12).
Also, the impact of conﬂict on non-agricultural self-employment is positive, but
not signiﬁcant (Table 1.20, column 9). The reason seems to be the loss of signiﬁ-
cance of the coeﬃcient on high capital intensive self-employment activities. Thus,
the results suggest that once the district of Kabul is excluded, where conﬂict inten-
sity is above the average, the positive impact of conﬂict on subsistance agriculture,
agriculture for sale in high capital intensive activities is not signiﬁcant anymore.
16before normalising the conﬂict measure by population per district
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1.4 Concluding Remarks
Entrepreneurship is a crucial driver of economic development and growth, both in
developing and in industrialized economies. Violent conﬂict, conversely, is a clear
obstacle to economic development and growth, particularly in countries ragged by
several decades of conﬂict such as Afghanistan.
International organisations and aid agencies may be interested in knowing more
about which kind of entrepreneurship is more resilient towards the obstacles that
conﬂict and insecurity set on economic activities, as it could work as leverage for
economic development, during and in the aftermath of wars. Similarly they might
be interested in which aspects of the conﬂict plays the biggest role in hindering PEA
 e.g. the intensity, frequency or the impact on infrastructures and people lives.
However, the evidence of the empirical economic literature so far is, at best,
mixed. This is the case also because large part of the studies consider a generic
entrepreneurial activity, when they focus on the households, or formal ﬁrms; and
they control for one speciﬁc indicator of conﬂict, usually the impact in terms of
number casualties.
This study is based on a detailed and comprehensive dataset to carefully inves-
tigate the relation between conﬂict and PEA in the context of Afghanistan. Two
unique sources of information are matched with a detail of precision along many
diﬀerent dimension (type of economic activity, household background information,
and type of conﬂict events) and a comprehensiveness which are extremely rare in
a developing country. The dataset enabled to assess how the households' choices
with respect to the source of income are aﬀected by the conﬂict intensity in the area
in which they live. This chapter focused on the choice to hold one type of private
economic activity.
The results show that the probability that a household engages in PEA is, in
general, positively aﬀected by the level of conﬂict. However, the results are hetero-
geneous with respect to the type of activity and the conﬂict indicator used.
Indeed, it is mainly less capital-intensive self-employment activities  e.g. sales of
prepared food and petty trade, which drive the positive relationship. More capital-
intensive self-employment activities requiring higher ﬁxed capital investments  e.g.
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milling and taxi driving  are less positively aﬀected by the intensity of the conﬂict.
All these results are remarkably stable across a number of diﬀerent speciﬁca-
tions and robustness tests, and an instrumental variable approach aimed at double-
checking the direction of the causality links conﬁrms the overall consistency of the
baseline estimates. However, it is worth noticing that the estimated eﬀects are rather
small in magnitude, which in turn might suggest that empirical applications based
on less precise data could fail to properly estimate these eﬀects.
All in all, this study ﬁnds evidence that conﬂict pushes households towards
marginal self-employment activities. Thus, whereas the overall eﬀect of conﬂict on
the economy is likely to be negative, people tend to hold on their survival capabilities.
Are the ﬁndings supportive of directing international aids to entrepreneurship
in conﬂict-ridden countries? Possibly, for two reasons. The results show that the
causal relation goes from conﬂict to entrepreneurship: it is resilient private economic
activity  self-employment  which is driven by intensity, and not private economic
activity which attracts more conﬂict (at least at the scale of private economic activity
that an Afghan households holds). Second, and more speculatively, if ﬁnanced,
some of the entrepreneurial activity may become a strong leverage for economic
development as soon as a conﬂict reduces in a speciﬁc area, even though it continues
in other areas of the country. People who are forced out from employment into self-
employment may become a source of future development.
However, more importantly, the results do show that violent conﬂict, even when
driven by a foreign coalition, rewinds the slow process of structural change of a low
income country. If the conﬂict lasts long enough, such regression may require a long
time before the country can change direction again.
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1.5 Appendix: Data Description
1.5.1 Household data harmonisation and construction
As described in Section 1.2.1 the methodologies used for data collection, as well as
the questionnaires were diﬀerent across waves. The harmonisation is easier for 2005
and 2007/8, as this surveys used the same sampling, and a more similar question-
naire. The comparison with 2003 is more complicated, particularly because of the
diﬀerent sampling, and is used in this paper as a robustness check providing a longer
time variation.
Below we brieﬂy describe the harmonisation procedure across waves that was
followed, starting with the main control variables (1.2.1). Then the focus is on how
the diﬀerent sources of PEA were deﬁned (1.5.2). Finally, we summarise how the dif-
ferences that were introduced in the Afghan sub-national administrative boundaries
(Provinces and Districts) were harmonised (1.5.3).
1.5.2 Private economic activity
As discussed in Section 1.2.1 the deﬁnition on the household's PEA is built using
the the main source of the household income, for 2005-2007/8. Both waves use the
same options, which makes the comparison seamless, allowing to deﬁne a number
of diﬀerent types of PEA. However, in order to harmonise the information on PEA
also with the 2003 wave two main challenges had to be dealt with.
First, the 2003 questionnaire is less detailed and the information in the labour
section (Section F) allows to identify only four PEA comparable with the information
from the 2005-2007/8 surveys: business and self-employment, which can be further
divided into agricultural and non-agricultural.
Second, the 2003 survey does not contain information on the sources of household
income, but collects information on the household members' employment (including
self-employment). On the other hand, in 2005 there is no section collecting labour
information. Fortunately, in the 2007/8 survey both sections were available: income
sources, as in 2005 (Section 8), and on employment, as in 2003 (Section 9). This
allowed us to compare two diﬀerent measures of the main household occupational
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choice: one reﬂecting the main source of household income (comparable with 2005),
and one reﬂecting the activity where each household member was employed (com-
parable with 2003). Correlating measures of self-employment using the two sources
allowed to use the deﬁnition of self-employment in 2003 (deﬁned through the employ-
ment sections) that is closer to the corresponding deﬁnition used for 2005-2007/8
(deﬁned through the income section).
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Table 1.22 compares the correlation between the level of self-employment in non
agricultural activity, measured as the main source of income, and diﬀerent measures
of the level of self-employment, measured as the relative number of individuals work-
ing as self employed in non-agricultural activities. The variables are computed for
the 2007-8 NRVA survey, using the income and labour sections, respectively. These
are:
• Non-agricultural self-employment: is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least
one individual in the household is self-employed in a non-agricultural activity
(members labour section).
• Absolute majority: is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the absolute majority
of individuals in the household is self-employed in a non-agricultural activity
(members labour section).
• Relative majority: is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the relative majority
of individuals in the household is self-employed in a non-agricultural activity
(members labour section).
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Labour section variables
At least one (at least one member of the HH works in non-agric. S.E.) (1) 1.000
Absolute majority of HH members work in non-agric. S.E. (2) 0.562 1.000
Relative majority of HH members work in non-agric. S.E. (3) 0.659 0.600 1.000
Income section variable
More than 50% of HH income is generated by non-agric. S.E. (4) 0.515 0.344 0.377 1.000
Table 1.22: Correlations between self-employment in non agriculture us-
ing the income information from the labour section of the questionnaire
(NRVA survey 2007/8).
Table 1.22 shows that the highest correlations when in the labour section is ob-
tained deﬁning self-employment considering that at least one member of the house-
hold is self employed in a non-agricultural activity. Therefore, for 2003 one member
of the household is enough to deﬁne the households as self employed. In this way
the households' occupational choice is deﬁned in a way that is close to the 2005 and
2007/8 deﬁnition where only the information on the income sources is available.
The longest panel (2003-2005-2007/8) includes the following deﬁnitions of PEA
for all years.
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• Business owners:
 2003: identiﬁes households for which the relative majority of the members
answered `private business' when asked about their main occupation, and
`self-employed' when asked about how they were paid.
 2005-07/8: identiﬁes households which answered that a `small business'
was their main source of income. That is, not all business owners, if the
business was not the main source.
• Non-agricultural self-employment
 2003: identiﬁes households for which the relative majority of the members
answered `self-employed' when asked about their main occupation, `self-
employed' when asked about how they were paid, and who's main activity
at place of job diﬀered from agriculture, as well as from mining, education
or health and administrative (oﬃce).
 2005-07/8: identiﬁes households which answered that one of the non
agricultural activities listed in Table 1.1, ﬁrst column, was their main
source of income.
• Agricultural self-employment:
 2003: identiﬁes households for which the relative majority of the members
answered `self-employed' when asked about their main occupation, `self-
employed' when asked about how they were paid, and who's main activity
at place of job is only agriculture.
 2005-07/8: identiﬁes households which answered that one of the agricul-
tural activities listed in Table 1.1, fourth column, was their main source
of income.
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1.5.3 Afghan districts
The administrative boundaries of Afghan districts and provinces were subject to
changes in 2005. We harmonized the district boundaries of 2003 (392 districts) using
the 2005 new administrative division (398 districts). The analysis uses a partition
of Afghanistan in 398 districts for all waves.
In particular, we re-assigned 2003 households to the newer 2005 districts using
the village latitude and longitude and a shape-ﬁle provided by the Afghanistan
Information and Management Services (AIMS) 17. The allocation of households was
implemented using ARCGIS.
For 2005-2007/8 we kept the same districts assigned by the CSO but we matched
their codes with the ones assigned through ARCGIS to 2003 (district_gis) using
the district names, in order to obtain homogeneous codes for all the three NRVA
waves.
1.5.4 Conﬂict data
Activities deﬁnition
AIR ASSAULT conﬂict air operations
AMBUSH ambushes that most of the times end up with
wounded/killed and with explosions
AMF-ON-ANA events where a ﬁre, even if friendly, occurred
ANA-ON-ANP events where a ﬁre, even if friendly, occurred
ARSON actions where buildings/infrastructures were set on ﬁre
ASSASSINATION events where people were killed
ATTACK events where someone was attacked. Not necessarily in-
volves wounded/killed
BLUE-GREEN events where there is a ﬁre
BLUE-BLUE events where there is a ﬁre
BLUE/WHITE events where there is a ﬁre
BREACHING events with ﬁre and possibly casualties
CARJACKING mainly enemies hijacking cars or other private vehicles
CCA diverse suspicious events
CAS events where helicopters are involved in the attack
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT events where helicopters are involved in the attack
17available at http://www.aims.org.af/ssroots.aspx?seckeyt=295
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COUNTER INSURGENCY violent actions
COUNTER MORTAR FIRE events where there is a ﬁre
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY it can include explosions, theft, wounded journalists during
attacks
DELIBERATE ATTACK it includes diverse violent actions, sometimes with
wounded/killed individuals
DIRECT FIRE events where there is a ﬁre
DOWNED AIRCRAFT it describes operations where aircrafts were downed
DRUG OPERATION it can include ﬁres and violent actions
ENEMY ACTION it describes violent events with ﬁre
ESCALATION OF FORCE It describes violent actions with possibly wounded/killed
GREEN-BLUE it describes events where there is a ﬁre
GREEN-GREEN it describes events where there is a ﬁre
GREEN-WHITE it describes events where there is a ﬁre
DF COUNTER FIRE it describes events where there is a ﬁre
KIDNAPPING it describes operations where someone was kidnapped
LOOTING it describes operations where a loot took place
MINE STRIKE events where there is an explosion
MURDER it describes operations where someone was murdered
IED AMBUSH attack on US army using Improvised Explosion Device
IDF INTERDICTION prediction of a future ﬁre/bombing while not happened yet
IED FOUND/CLEARED IED detonated by the US military
IED EXPLOSION mainly bombs, or suicide bombs against military and civil-
ians
INTERDICTION suicide bombers are spot and blocked, arrested, or killed,
sometimes the IED explodes
SNIPER OPERATIONS ﬁre starts from an hidden place
TRIBAL ﬁre events. Violent tribal disputes
TRIBAL FEUD violent tribal disputes
UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle): Mixed events that can include
ﬁre, wounded/killed
POLICE ACTIONS they can be either violent or not. They can include ﬁre
MEDEVAC(LOCAL NATIONAL medical interventions
MINE FOUND/CLEARED non-violent event
MOVEMENT TO CONTACT movement in order to contact the enemy. It can be violent
but not always
MUGGING it describes operations where someone was mugged
NARCOTICS disruption of a major drug labs
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NBC event that describes a show of force
NONE SELECTED diverse events some of them violent
OTHER conﬂict related event, with ﬁre, or explosion
OTHER (HOSTILE ACTION) events such as kidnapping/killing/robbery
OTHER DEFENSIVE it can include ﬁre/violent events
OTHER OFFENSIVE it can include ﬁre/violent events
POLICE ACTIONS they can be either violent or not. They can include ﬁre
POLICE INTERNAL violent events with ﬁre, wounded/killed
PLANNED EVENT mixed evidence but mostly violent events
PREMATURE DETONATION explosive events
RAID violent events with possibly wounded/killed individuals
RPG rocket-propelled grenade actions
SAFIRE surface to air ﬁre
SEARCH AND ATTACK violent actions with possibly wounded/killed individuals
SECTARIAN VIOLENCE violent events such as suicide bombers
SHOW OF FORCE it reports either battle events or events where there is a ﬁre
SMALL UNIT ACTIONS violent actions possibly with direct ﬁre, possibly with
wounded/killed individuals
SNIPER OPS ﬁre started from an hidden place
UNKNOWN EXPLOSION explosive event
VANDALISM diverse disruptive events
VOGE visual observation of ground explosion
Table 1.23: List of categories included among the relevant conﬂict events
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Conﬂict vs PEA maps
(a) Non agricultural self-employment (b) Agriculture for sale
(c) Subsistence agriculture (d) Conﬂict intensity per capita
Figure 1.18: Percentage of household activity per district and conﬂict in-
tensity: 2005. % of self employed in non agricultural activities per district 1.18a;
% of self employed in agriculture for sale per district 1.18b; % of self employed in
subsistence agriculture per district 1.18c ; number of conﬂict per district normalised
by population 1.18d.
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(a) Non agricultural self-employment (b) Agriculture for sale
(c) Subsistence agriculture (d) Conﬂict intensity per capita
Figure 1.19: Percentage of household activity per district and conﬂict in-
tensity: 2008. % of self employed in non agricultural activities per district 1.19a;
% of self employed in agriculture for sale per district 1.19b; % of self employed in
subsistence agriculture per district 1.19c ; number of conﬂict per district normalised
by population 1.19d.
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1.5.5 Additional tables
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Table 1.24: Pooled data 2005/2008, (AWD) (1)
(LPM) (LPM) (IV) (LPM) (LPM) (IV)
VARIABLES bus_own bus_own bus_own se_hh se_hh se_hh2
N_conﬂict 0.00308 0.00406 0.0131 0.0136 0.0109 0.215**
(0.00275) (0.00280) (0.0201) (0.00968) (0.00977) (0.0968)
HHMemb2 0.00388 0.00275 -0.0980** -0.124**
(0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0382) (0.0520)
HHMemb5 0.0115 0.0102 -0.0854** -0.113**
(0.0139) (0.0137) (0.0373) (0.0515)
HHMemb10 0.0122 0.0111 -0.0656* -0.0905*
(0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0358) (0.0508)
HHMemb15 0.0119 0.0109 -0.0482 -0.0724
(0.0137) (0.0135) (0.0348) (0.0493)
HHMemb20 0.00419 0.00387 -0.0148 -0.0222
(0.0141) (0.0140) (0.0358) (0.0400)
MaleH 0.00733 0.00708 0.0291** 0.0234*
(0.00736) (0.00720) (0.0121) (0.0136)
AgeHH -0.000212*** -0.000213*** 4.79e-06 -8.64e-07
(6.64e-05) (6.59e-05) (0.000193) (0.000199)
GenderAvHH 0.000813 0.000656 -0.00477 -0.00831
(0.00201) (0.00203) (0.00513) (0.00571)
LiteracyH -0.00122 -0.00182 -0.00970 -0.0232**
(0.00425) (0.00423) (0.00925) (0.0115)
LiteracyAvHH -0.00276 -0.00235 -0.00277 0.00644
(0.00661) (0.00663) (0.0159) (0.0176)
hhassets 0.00632** 0.00698** 0.0442*** 0.0590***
(0.00312) (0.00344) (0.00714) (0.0125)
hhasset2 -0.00126** -0.00142** -0.00464*** -0.00810***
(0.000501) (0.000605) (0.00136) (0.00269)
Rural -0.0341*** -0.0337*** -0.0829*** -0.0746***
(0.00974) (0.00970) (0.0248) (0.0265)
Credit_Other -0.00392 -0.00463 0.0621* 0.0463
(0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0370) (0.0383)
Credit_Inst 0.0224 0.0228 0.0771** 0.0863**
(0.0154) (0.0153) (0.0340) (0.0346)
Credit_Lender 0.00257 0.00245 0.0271 0.0244
(0.00754) (0.00750) (0.0186) (0.0197)
Credit_Inform 0.00428 0.00393 0.00913 0.00126
(0.00750) (0.00749) (0.0182) (0.0194)
Credit_None -0.00346 -0.00355 0.0204 0.0184
(0.00867) (0.00864) (0.0233) (0.0239)
Loan -0.00546* -0.00522* -0.0590*** -0.0536***
(0.00286) (0.00276) (0.00730) (0.00847)
HHMigration 0.0108*** 0.0106*** 0.00955 0.00522
(0.00285) (0.00284) (0.00917) (0.0108)
shocks -0.0139*** -0.0132*** -0.0297*** -0.0155
(0.00341) (0.00363) (0.0109) (0.0146)
Dremittances -0.0212*** -0.0211*** -0.134*** -0.130***
(0.00343) (0.00344) (0.0118) (0.0124)
DSocialContr -0.0299*** -0.0299*** -0.155*** -0.154***
(0.00716) (0.00709) (0.0238) (0.0242)
RoadKm -0.000137 -0.000139 -0.000277 -0.000334
(0.000171) (0.000170) (0.000658) (0.000715)
RoadKm2 3.24e-07 3.34e-07 1.35e-06 1.58e-06
(3.03e-07) (3.03e-07) (1.18e-06) (1.28e-06)
DMkt_Close 0.00457 0.00410 -0.0147 -0.0253*
(0.00318) (0.00335) (0.0102) (0.0132)
DElectrNo -0.00989** -0.0109** -0.0211** -0.0436***
(0.00388) (0.00466) (0.00941) (0.0159)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.0509*** 0.0651*** 0.215*** 0.315***
(0.00223) (0.0189) (0.00564) (0.0469)
Observations 40,957 40,957 40,957 40,957 40,957 40,957
R-squared 0.053 0.059 0.006 0.111 0.132 -0.025
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, the cluster is the district d.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are dummy variables deﬁned at the household level specifying the type of
activity of the household (see Table 1.3 for deﬁnitions). conﬂict measures are computed at the district
level and are normalised by population. A unit of conﬂict is 1/1000 inhabitants (see Table 1.4 for
deﬁnitions). All equations are estimated with the control variables described in Table 1.5, year and
district ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 1.25: Pooled data 2005/2008, (AWD) (2)
(LPM) (LPM) (IV) (LPM) (LPM) (IV)
VARIABLES agric agric agric se_nagr se_nagr se_nagr
N_conﬂict -0.0243 -0.0177 0.0577 -0.00627 -0.0117** 0.160***
(0.0161) (0.0154) (0.0987) (0.00411) (0.00495) (0.0523)
HHMemb2 -0.0564 -0.0658 -0.117*** -0.138***
(0.0460) (0.0525) (0.0336) (0.0434)
HHMemb5 -0.0534 -0.0637 -0.0989*** -0.122***
(0.0460) (0.0530) (0.0337) (0.0430)
HHMemb10 -0.0254 -0.0347 -0.0893*** -0.110***
(0.0454) (0.0522) (0.0327) (0.0425)
HHMemb15 -0.0156 -0.0246 -0.0715** -0.0920**
(0.0438) (0.0504) (0.0330) (0.0422)
HHMemb20 0.00389 0.00115 -0.0424 -0.0486
(0.0427) (0.0434) (0.0333) (0.0359)
MaleH 0.0400*** 0.0379*** 0.00910 0.00432
(0.0137) (0.0140) (0.0108) (0.0122)
AgeHH 0.00197*** 0.00197*** -0.000322** -0.000327**
(0.000233) (0.000231) (0.000147) (0.000156)
GenderAvHH -0.00327 -0.00458 -0.00353 -0.00650
(0.00478) (0.00510) (0.00419) (0.00455)
LiteracyH -0.0105 -0.0155 -0.00415 -0.0155*
(0.0120) (0.0131) (0.00726) (0.00816)
LiteracyAvHH -0.0258* -0.0224 0.0163 0.0241
(0.0138) (0.0142) (0.0148) (0.0157)
hhassets 0.0531*** 0.0585*** 0.0161*** 0.0285***
(0.00829) (0.0114) (0.00499) (0.00882)
hhasset2 -0.00605*** -0.00733*** -0.000855 -0.00377**
(0.00146) (0.00235) (0.000903) (0.00186)
Rural 0.254*** 0.257*** -0.151*** -0.144***
(0.0382) (0.0390) (0.0114) (0.0123)
Credit_Other -0.00790 -0.0138 0.0456** 0.0323
(0.0471) (0.0477) (0.0204) (0.0220)
Credit_Inst -0.0123 -0.00895 0.0783*** 0.0861***
(0.0424) (0.0426) (0.0301) (0.0305)
Credit_Lender -0.0140 -0.0150 0.0234** 0.0211*
(0.0340) (0.0339) (0.0111) (0.0120)
Credit_Inform -0.0203 -0.0232 0.0124 0.00577
(0.0335) (0.0336) (0.0107) (0.0116)
Credit_None -0.0367 -0.0374 0.0240 0.0223
(0.0356) (0.0354) (0.0154) (0.0160)
Loan -0.0319*** -0.0299*** -0.0355*** -0.0309***
(0.00924) (0.00925) (0.00496) (0.00620)
HHMigration 0.0317*** 0.0301** -0.00871 -0.0124*
(0.0118) (0.0122) (0.00562) (0.00721)
shocks 0.0685*** 0.0738*** -0.0436*** -0.0316***
(0.0138) (0.0162) (0.00739) (0.00991)
Dremittances -0.171*** -0.170*** -0.0865*** -0.0835***
(0.0157) (0.0156) (0.00958) (0.0101)
DSocialContr -0.1000*** -0.0993*** -0.122*** -0.121***
(0.0344) (0.0341) (0.0285) (0.0287)
RoadKm 0.00106 0.00104 -0.000493 -0.000541
(0.000757) (0.000765) (0.000325) (0.000407)
RoadKm2 -3.31e-07 -2.46e-07 9.17e-07 1.11e-06
(1.40e-06) (1.42e-06) (5.78e-07) (7.22e-07)
DMkt_Close -0.0301** -0.0340** -0.00285 -0.0118
(0.0122) (0.0137) (0.00617) (0.00892)
DElectrNo 0.0116 0.00327 -0.0347*** -0.0537***
(0.0115) (0.0164) (0.00661) (0.0103)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.404*** 0.0464 0.106*** 0.352***
(0.00680) (0.0726) (0.00332) (0.0399)
Observations 40,957 40,957 40,957 40,957 40,957 40,957
R-squared 0.235 0.267 0.036 0.110 0.136 -0.025
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, the cluster is the district d.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are dummy variables deﬁned at the household level specifying the type of
activity of the household (see Table 1.3 for deﬁnitions). conﬂict measures are computed at the district
level and are normalised by population. A unit of conﬂict is 1/1000 inhabitants (see Table 1.4 for
deﬁnitions). All equations are estimated with the control variables described in Table 1.5, year and
district ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 1.26: Pooled data 2005/2008, (AWD) (3)
(LPM) (LPM) (IV) (LPM) (LPM) (IV)
VARIABLES Low_K Low_K Low_K High_K High_K High_K
N_conﬂict -0.00694** -0.0112*** 0.0962*** 0.00185 -0.000405 0.0639**
(0.00278) (0.00323) (0.0316) (0.00315) (0.00306) (0.0309)
HHMemb2 -0.0411 -0.0545 -0.0754** -0.0834***
(0.0276) (0.0355) (0.0304) (0.0301)
HHMemb5 -0.0334 -0.0480 -0.0655** -0.0743**
(0.0277) (0.0353) (0.0299) (0.0296)
HHMemb10 -0.0283 -0.0414 -0.0610** -0.0689**
(0.0274) (0.0353) (0.0296) (0.0292)
HHMemb15 -0.0148 -0.0276 -0.0568* -0.0644**
(0.0276) (0.0351) (0.0293) (0.0289)
HHMemb20 -0.0101 -0.0140 -0.0323 -0.0346
(0.0268) (0.0296) (0.0300) (0.0294)
MaleH -0.000162 -0.00315 0.00926* 0.00747
(0.00962) (0.0107) (0.00553) (0.00540)
AgeHH 5.86e-06 2.88e-06 -0.000328*** -0.000330***
(0.000104) (0.000106) (0.000100) (0.000103)
GenderAvHH -0.00416 -0.00602** 0.000633 -0.000483
(0.00291) (0.00306) (0.00269) (0.00279)
LiteracyH -0.0102** -0.0173*** 0.00609 0.00184
(0.00436) (0.00526) (0.00557) (0.00562)
LiteracyAvHH 0.0234 0.0283* -0.00711 -0.00421
(0.0163) (0.0168) (0.00591) (0.00628)
hhassets 0.00496 0.0127* 0.0111*** 0.0158***
(0.00467) (0.00654) (0.00235) (0.00383)
hhasset2 0.000373 -0.00145 -0.00123*** -0.00232***
(0.000846) (0.00134) (0.000394) (0.000774)
Rural -0.120*** -0.116*** -0.0301*** -0.0275***
(0.0139) (0.0142) (0.00841) (0.00861)
Credit_Other 0.0169 0.00858 0.0287* 0.0237
(0.0153) (0.0159) (0.0149) (0.0153)
Credit_Inst 0.0703*** 0.0751*** 0.00805 0.0109
(0.0242) (0.0245) (0.0148) (0.0147)
Credit_Lender 0.0155 0.0141 0.00788 0.00703
(0.00981) (0.0103) (0.00686) (0.00694)
Credit_Inform 0.00696 0.00281 0.00544 0.00296
(0.00958) (0.0101) (0.00647) (0.00662)
Credit_None 0.0230* 0.0219* 0.000992 0.000352
(0.0124) (0.0126) (0.00784) (0.00805)
Loan -0.0202*** -0.0174*** -0.0153*** -0.0135***
(0.00373) (0.00438) (0.00319) (0.00357)
HHMigration -0.00739* -0.00967* -0.00132 -0.00268
(0.00444) (0.00518) (0.00327) (0.00374)
shocks -0.0321*** -0.0246*** -0.0115*** -0.00704
(0.00573) (0.00722) (0.00368) (0.00463)
Dremittances -0.0488*** -0.0469*** -0.0377*** -0.0365***
(0.00653) (0.00673) (0.00529) (0.00547)
DSocialContr -0.0844*** -0.0835*** -0.0376** -0.0370**
(0.0159) (0.0161) (0.0162) (0.0161)
RoadKm -0.000166 -0.000196 -0.000327** -0.000345*
(0.000260) (0.000296) (0.000147) (0.000178)
RoadKm2 4.28e-07 5.49e-07 4.88e-07* 5.60e-07*
(4.66e-07) (5.28e-07) (2.59e-07) (3.16e-07)
DMkt_Close 0.00200 -0.00361 -0.00485 -0.00821**
(0.00532) (0.00677) (0.00312) (0.00412)
DElectrNo -0.0219*** -0.0338*** -0.0128** -0.0199***
(0.00571) (0.00771) (0.00521) (0.00653)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.0653*** 0.213*** 0.0438*** 0.139***
(0.00266) (0.0320) (0.00205) (0.0323)
Observations 47,218 40,957 40,957 47,218 40,957 40,957
R-squared 0.092 0.107 -0.010 0.049 0.058 -0.010
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, the cluster is the district d.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are dummy variables deﬁned at the household level specifying the type of
activity of the household (see Table 1.3 for deﬁnitions). conﬂict measures are computed at the district
level and are normalised by population. A unit of conﬂict is 1/1000 inhabitants (see Table 1.4 for
deﬁnitions). All equations are estimated with the control variables described in Table 1.5, year and
district ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 1.27: Pooled data 2005/2008, (AWD) (4)
(LPM) (LPM) (IV) (LPM) (LPM) (IV)
VARIABLES sub_agr sub_agr sub_agr agr_sale agr_sale agr_sale
N_conﬂict -0.0433*** -0.0403*** 0.00299 0.0223*** 0.0226*** 0.0548
(0.0132) (0.0128) (0.148) (0.00828) (0.00868) (0.0643)
HHMemb2 -0.0749* -0.0803* 0.0185 0.0145
(0.0424) (0.0486) (0.0229) (0.0248)
HHMemb5 -0.0670 -0.0729 0.0136 0.00918
(0.0424) (0.0492) (0.0211) (0.0237)
HHMemb10 -0.0492 -0.0545 0.0237 0.0198
(0.0419) (0.0481) (0.0205) (0.0228)
HHMemb15 -0.0390 -0.0441 0.0234 0.0195
(0.0400) (0.0460) (0.0198) (0.0222)
HHMemb20 -0.0237 -0.0252 0.0275 0.0264
(0.0388) (0.0393) (0.0219) (0.0222)
MaleH 0.0200 0.0188 0.0200*** 0.0191**
(0.0125) (0.0132) (0.00734) (0.00746)
AgeHH 0.00164*** 0.00164*** 0.000327** 0.000326**
(0.000207) (0.000206) (0.000143) (0.000141)
GenderAvHH -0.00203 -0.00278 -0.00124 -0.00180
(0.00429) (0.00493) (0.00324) (0.00346)
LiteracyH -0.00498 -0.00784 -0.00555 -0.00767
(0.0117) (0.0151) (0.00715) (0.00837)
LiteracyAvHH -0.00671 -0.00476 -0.0191* -0.0176*
(0.0127) (0.0143) (0.00973) (0.00997)
hhassets 0.0250*** 0.0281** 0.0281*** 0.0304***
(0.00787) (0.0132) (0.00487) (0.00698)
hhasset2 -0.00227* -0.00300 -0.00378*** -0.00433***
(0.00130) (0.00283) (0.000861) (0.00144)
Rural 0.187*** 0.188*** 0.0677*** 0.0690***
(0.0323) (0.0330) (0.0216) (0.0217)
Credit_Other -0.0244 -0.0277 0.0165 0.0140
(0.0507) (0.0516) (0.0315) (0.0318)
Credit_Inst -0.0111 -0.00915 -0.00125 0.000196
(0.0381) (0.0387) (0.0188) (0.0189)
Credit_Lender -0.0177 -0.0182 0.00371 0.00328
(0.0346) (0.0344) (0.0162) (0.0162)
Credit_Inform -0.0170 -0.0187 -0.00327 -0.00451
(0.0344) (0.0346) (0.0155) (0.0157)
Credit_None -0.0331 -0.0335 -0.00356 -0.00388
(0.0360) (0.0358) (0.0180) (0.0179)
Loan -0.00836 -0.00721 -0.0235*** -0.0226***
(0.00795) (0.00864) (0.00605) (0.00605)
HHMigration 0.0134 0.0125 0.0183*** 0.0176**
(0.0111) (0.0115) (0.00683) (0.00697)
shocks 0.0546*** 0.0576*** 0.0139* 0.0161*
(0.0118) (0.0160) (0.00757) (0.00897)
Dremittances -0.124*** -0.123*** -0.0472*** -0.0467***
(0.0147) (0.0149) (0.00680) (0.00679)
DSocialContr -0.0667*** -0.0663*** -0.0333** -0.0330**
(0.0243) (0.0241) (0.0155) (0.0154)
RoadKm 0.000847 0.000835 0.000216 0.000207
(0.000741) (0.000742) (0.000581) (0.000578)
RoadKm2 -7.67e-07 -7.19e-07 4.36e-07 4.72e-07
(1.42e-06) (1.43e-06) (1.04e-06) (1.03e-06)
DMkt_Close -0.0183 -0.0205 -0.0118 -0.0135
(0.0113) (0.0139) (0.00853) (0.00931)
DElectrNo -0.00204 -0.00683 0.0137* 0.0101
(0.0106) (0.0198) (0.00703) (0.00997)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.296*** 0.0837 0.103*** -0.0373
(0.00577) (0.0663) (0.00383) (0.0366)
Observations 47,218 40,957 40,957 47,218 40,957 40,957
R-squared 0.237 0.258 0.026 0.163 0.174 0.009
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, the cluster is the district d.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are dummy variables deﬁned at the household level specifying the type of
activity of the household (see Table 1.3 for deﬁnitions). conﬂict measures are computed at the district
level and are normalised by population. A unit of conﬂict is 1/1000 inhabitants (see Table 1.4 for
deﬁnitions). All equations are estimated with the control variables described in Table 1.5, year and
district ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 1.28: Pooled data 2005/2008, (AWD) (1)
(LPM) (LPM) (IV) (LPM) (LPM) (IV)
VARIABLES bus_own bus_own bus_own se_hh se_hh se_hh
N_wk 0.00293 0.00352 0.00923 0.0178* 0.0134 0.151*
(0.00261) (0.00262) (0.0149) (0.00922) (0.00942) (0.0824)
HHMemb2 0.00398 0.00332 -0.0982** -0.114***
(0.0144) (0.0142) (0.0382) (0.0414)
HHMemb5 0.0115 0.0106 -0.0859** -0.106**
(0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0373) (0.0415)
HHMemb10 0.0122 0.0115 -0.0661* -0.0849**
(0.0141) (0.0139) (0.0358) (0.0400)
HHMemb15 0.0120 0.0112 -0.0486 -0.0661*
(0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0348) (0.0392)
HHMemb20 0.00410 0.00370 -0.0154 -0.0250
(0.0141) (0.0140) (0.0359) (0.0378)
MaleH 0.00728 0.00701 0.0287** 0.0221*
(0.00734) (0.00721) (0.0121) (0.0133)
AgeHH -0.000212*** -0.000212*** 6.04e-06 1.58e-05
(6.64e-05) (6.59e-05) (0.000193) (0.000196)
GenderAvHH 0.000843 0.000778 -0.00473 -0.00630
(0.00201) (0.00201) (0.00512) (0.00529)
LiteracyH -0.00122 -0.00165 -0.0100 -0.0205*
(0.00424) (0.00420) (0.00926) (0.0114)
LiteracyAvHH -0.00281 -0.00260 -0.00276 0.00238
(0.00660) (0.00657) (0.0158) (0.0167)
hhassets 0.00627** 0.00666** 0.0443*** 0.0537***
(0.00311) (0.00326) (0.00707) (0.0100)
hhasset2 -0.00125** -0.00134** -0.00467*** -0.00685***
(0.000497) (0.000551) (0.00134) (0.00212)
Rural -0.0340*** -0.0337*** -0.0826*** -0.0751***
(0.00975) (0.00974) (0.0248) (0.0251)
Credit_Other -0.00381 -0.00414 0.0622* 0.0543
(0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0370) (0.0376)
Credit_Inst 0.0224 0.0227 0.0774** 0.0853**
(0.0154) (0.0153) (0.0340) (0.0347)
Credit_Lender 0.00265 0.00269 0.0274 0.0283
(0.00754) (0.00750) (0.0186) (0.0194)
Credit_Inform 0.00435 0.00421 0.00921 0.00571
(0.00749) (0.00745) (0.0182) (0.0188)
Credit_None -0.00340 -0.00336 0.0206 0.0215
(0.00866) (0.00860) (0.0234) (0.0242)
Loan -0.00545* -0.00526* -0.0589*** -0.0544***
(0.00285) (0.00278) (0.00728) (0.00786)
HHMigration 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.00974 0.00936
(0.00286) (0.00283) (0.00916) (0.00987)
shocks -0.0139*** -0.0136*** -0.0296*** -0.0207
(0.00341) (0.00351) (0.0109) (0.0128)
Dremittances -0.0211*** -0.0209*** -0.133*** -0.127***
(0.00343) (0.00346) (0.0118) (0.0126)
DSocialContr -0.0298*** -0.0295*** -0.155*** -0.148***
(0.00713) (0.00696) (0.0238) (0.0248)
RoadKm -0.000141 -0.000151 -0.000295 -0.000518
(0.000171) (0.000172) (0.000659) (0.000729)
RoadKm2 3.32e-07 3.52e-07 1.39e-06 1.87e-06
(3.03e-07) (3.06e-07) (1.18e-06) (1.31e-06)
DMkt_Close 0.00466 0.00446 -0.0146 -0.0194*
(0.00322) (0.00323) (0.0102) (0.0113)
DElectrNo -0.00978** -0.0103** -0.0211** -0.0343***
(0.00383) (0.00420) (0.00936) (0.0126)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.0507*** 0.0647*** 0.213*** 0.314***
(0.00222) (0.0189) (0.00580) (0.0468)
Observations 40,957 40,957 40,957 40,957 40,957 40,957
R-squared 0.053 0.059 0.006 0.111 0.132 0.001
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, the cluster is the district d.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are dummy variables deﬁned at the household level specifying the type of
activity of the household (see Table 1.3 for deﬁnitions). conﬂict measures are computed at the district
level and are normalised by population. A unit of conﬂict is 1/1000 inhabitants (see Table 1.4 for
deﬁnitions). All equations are estimated with the control variables described in Table 1.5, year and
district ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 1.29: Pooled data 2005/2008, (AWD) (2)
(LPM) (LPM) (IV) (LPM) (LPM) (IV)
VARIABLES agric agric agric se_nagr se_nagr se_nagr
N_wk -0.0146 -0.00908 0.0406 0.000975 -0.00537 0.112***
(0.0137) (0.0130) (0.0665) (0.00590) (0.00616) (0.0435)
HHMemb2 -0.0576 -0.0633 -0.117*** -0.131***
(0.0467) (0.0488) (0.0336) (0.0361)
HHMemb5 -0.0545 -0.0619 -0.0997*** -0.117***
(0.0466) (0.0494) (0.0336) (0.0365)
HHMemb10 -0.0264 -0.0332 -0.0900*** -0.106***
(0.0462) (0.0487) (0.0326) (0.0355)
HHMemb15 -0.0166 -0.0229 -0.0723** -0.0872**
(0.0445) (0.0470) (0.0330) (0.0359)
HHMemb20 0.00388 0.000406 -0.0424 -0.0507
(0.0428) (0.0432) (0.0332) (0.0347)
MaleH 0.0399*** 0.0376*** 0.00903 0.00340
(0.0137) (0.0140) (0.0108) (0.0120)
AgeHH 0.00197*** 0.00197*** -0.000323** -0.000314**
(0.000233) (0.000231) (0.000147) (0.000151)
GenderAvHH -0.00348 -0.00404 -0.00367 -0.00501
(0.00480) (0.00485) (0.00419) (0.00429)
LiteracyH -0.0110 -0.0148 -0.00451 -0.0135*
(0.0120) (0.0125) (0.00728) (0.00802)
LiteracyAvHH -0.0253* -0.0235* 0.0166 0.0210
(0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0148) (0.0151)
hhassets 0.0537*** 0.0571*** 0.0165*** 0.0246***
(0.00825) (0.00977) (0.00499) (0.00695)
hhasset2 -0.00621*** -0.00700*** -0.000967 -0.00284**
(0.00146) (0.00190) (0.000906) (0.00142)
Rural 0.254*** 0.257*** -0.150*** -0.144***
(0.0384) (0.0385) (0.0114) (0.0116)
Credit_Other -0.00876 -0.0116 0.0450** 0.0383*
(0.0472) (0.0469) (0.0204) (0.0213)
Credit_Inst -0.0121 -0.00921 0.0786*** 0.0853***
(0.0424) (0.0424) (0.0301) (0.0305)
Credit_Lender -0.0142 -0.0139 0.0232** 0.0240**
(0.0340) (0.0339) (0.0111) (0.0116)
Credit_Inform -0.0207 -0.0220 0.0121 0.00908
(0.0335) (0.0334) (0.0106) (0.0111)
Credit_None -0.0369 -0.0366 0.0238 0.0246
(0.0356) (0.0355) (0.0154) (0.0158)
Loan -0.0317*** -0.0301*** -0.0354*** -0.0315***
(0.00926) (0.00913) (0.00495) (0.00549)
HHMigration 0.0313*** 0.0312*** -0.00894 -0.00927
(0.0119) (0.0120) (0.00563) (0.00632)
shocks 0.0691*** 0.0724*** -0.0431*** -0.0355***
(0.0138) (0.0149) (0.00741) (0.00871)
Dremittances -0.171*** -0.169*** -0.0865*** -0.0812***
(0.0157) (0.0156) (0.00959) (0.00991)
DSocialContr -0.100*** -0.0978*** -0.122*** -0.116***
(0.0345) (0.0336) (0.0285) (0.0293)
RoadKm 0.00107 0.000992 -0.000488 -0.000678*
(0.000757) (0.000779) (0.000326) (0.000387)
RoadKm2 -3.43e-07 -1.69e-07 9.11e-07 1.32e-06*
(1.40e-06) (1.44e-06) (5.79e-07) (6.88e-07)
DMkt_Close -0.0307** -0.0325** -0.00327 -0.00743
(0.0123) (0.0127) (0.00623) (0.00739)
DElectrNo 0.0105 0.00577 -0.0355*** -0.0468***
(0.0114) (0.0133) (0.00662) (0.00813)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.404*** 0.0487 0.105*** 0.353***
(0.00710) (0.0733) (0.00345) (0.0399)
Observations 40,957 40,957 40,957 40,957 40,957 40,957
R-squared 0.235 0.267 0.039 0.110 0.136 0.003
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, the cluster is the district d.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are dummy variables deﬁned at the household level specifying the type of
activity of the household (see Table 1.3 for deﬁnitions). conﬂict measures are computed at the district
level and are normalised by population. A unit of conﬂict is 1/1000 inhabitants (see Table 1.4 for
deﬁnitions). All equations are estimated with the control variables described in Table 1.5, year and
district ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 1.30: Pooled data 2005/2008, (AWD) (3)
(LPM) (LPM) (IV) (LPM) (LPM) (IV)
VARIABLES Low_K Low_K Low_K High_K High_K High_K
N_wk -0.00256 -0.00645 0.0676** 0.00381 0.00108 0.0449**
(0.00466) (0.00481) (0.0275) (0.00378) (0.00359) (0.0227)
HHMemb2 -0.0418 -0.0504* -0.0756** -0.0807***
(0.0279) (0.0301) (0.0304) (0.0301)
HHMemb5 -0.0340 -0.0450 -0.0657** -0.0723**
(0.0280) (0.0303) (0.0299) (0.0298)
HHMemb10 -0.0287 -0.0389 -0.0612** -0.0672**
(0.0277) (0.0301) (0.0295) (0.0293)
HHMemb15 -0.0153 -0.0247 -0.0569* -0.0625**
(0.0279) (0.0302) (0.0293) (0.0291)
HHMemb20 -0.0100 -0.0152 -0.0324 -0.0355
(0.0270) (0.0276) (0.0300) (0.0301)
MaleH -0.000166 -0.00370 0.00920* 0.00710
(0.00966) (0.0106) (0.00552) (0.00545)
AgeHH 5.09e-06 1.03e-05 -0.000328*** -0.000325***
(0.000104) (0.000104) (0.000100) (0.000102)
GenderAvHH -0.00428 -0.00512* 0.000614 0.000114
(0.00291) (0.00294) (0.00269) (0.00270)
LiteracyH -0.0105** -0.0161*** 0.00599 0.00264
(0.00437) (0.00513) (0.00558) (0.00557)
LiteracyAvHH 0.0237 0.0264 -0.00706 -0.00542
(0.0163) (0.0165) (0.00591) (0.00602)
hhassets 0.00534 0.0104* 0.0112*** 0.0142***
(0.00465) (0.00562) (0.00237) (0.00300)
hhasset2 0.000285 -0.000893 -0.00125*** -0.00195***
(0.000844) (0.00111) (0.000399) (0.000571)
Rural -0.120*** -0.116*** -0.0300*** -0.0276***
(0.0139) (0.0137) (0.00841) (0.00866)
Credit_Other 0.0164 0.0122 0.0286* 0.0261*
(0.0153) (0.0156) (0.0149) (0.0151)
Credit_Inst 0.0704*** 0.0747*** 0.00813 0.0107
(0.0242) (0.0245) (0.0148) (0.0147)
Credit_Lender 0.0153 0.0158 0.00788 0.00817
(0.00981) (0.0101) (0.00686) (0.00689)
Credit_Inform 0.00669 0.00480 0.00540 0.00428
(0.00958) (0.00985) (0.00646) (0.00649)
Credit_None 0.0228* 0.0233* 0.000995 0.00129
(0.0124) (0.0125) (0.00783) (0.00799)
Loan -0.0202*** -0.0177*** -0.0152*** -0.0138***
(0.00372) (0.00408) (0.00318) (0.00332)
HHMigration -0.00761* -0.00782 -0.00133 -0.00145
(0.00444) (0.00480) (0.00327) (0.00341)
shocks -0.0317*** -0.0269*** -0.0114*** -0.00860**
(0.00573) (0.00655) (0.00364) (0.00410)
Dremittances -0.0489*** -0.0456*** -0.0376*** -0.0357***
(0.00652) (0.00674) (0.00529) (0.00535)
DSocialContr -0.0847*** -0.0810*** -0.0375** -0.0353**
(0.0159) (0.0165) (0.0162) (0.0163)
RoadKm -0.000158 -0.000278 -0.000329** -0.000400**
(0.000261) (0.000286) (0.000147) (0.000173)
RoadKm2 4.18e-07 6.78e-07 4.92e-07* 6.46e-07**
(4.67e-07) (5.11e-07) (2.59e-07) (3.08e-07)
DMkt_Close 0.00164 -0.000973 -0.00491 -0.00646*
(0.00537) (0.00597) (0.00311) (0.00350)
DElectrNo -0.0225*** -0.0296*** -0.0130** -0.0172***
(0.00572) (0.00659) (0.00519) (0.00565)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.0652*** 0.214*** 0.0434*** 0.139***
(0.00278) (0.0324) (0.00207) (0.0322)
Observations 47,218 40,957 40,957 47,218 40,957 40,957
R-squared 0.092 0.107 0.006 0.049 0.058 -0.000
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, the cluster is the district d.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are dummy variables deﬁned at the household level specifying the type of
activity of the household (see Table 1.3 for deﬁnitions). conﬂict measures are computed at the district
level and are normalised by population. A unit of conﬂict is 1/1000 inhabitants (see Table 1.4 for
deﬁnitions). All equations are estimated with the control variables described in Table 1.5, year and
district ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Table 1.31: Pooled data 2005/2008, (AWD) (4)
(LPM) (LPM) (IV) (LPM) (LPM) (IV)
VARIABLES sub_agr sub_agr sub_agr agr_sale agr_sale agr_sale
N_wk -0.0298** -0.0279** 0.00210 0.0167** 0.0188** 0.0385
(0.0131) (0.0127) (0.104) (0.00809) (0.00920) (0.0491)
HHMemb2 -0.0767* -0.0802* 0.0192 0.0169
(0.0438) (0.0462) (0.0226) (0.0231)
HHMemb5 -0.0683 -0.0728 0.0138 0.0109
(0.0437) (0.0473) (0.0207) (0.0219)
HHMemb10 -0.0503 -0.0544 0.0239 0.0212
(0.0433) (0.0465) (0.0201) (0.0210)
HHMemb15 -0.0402 -0.0441 0.0237 0.0211
(0.0413) (0.0442) (0.0195) (0.0204)
HHMemb20 -0.0232 -0.0253 0.0271 0.0257
(0.0390) (0.0397) (0.0217) (0.0219)
MaleH 0.0202 0.0188 0.0197*** 0.0187**
(0.0125) (0.0134) (0.00721) (0.00747)
AgeHH 0.00164*** 0.00164*** 0.000329** 0.000330**
(0.000208) (0.000206) (0.000143) (0.000143)
GenderAvHH -0.00241 -0.00275 -0.00107 -0.00129
(0.00431) (0.00442) (0.00324) (0.00329)
LiteracyH -0.00552 -0.00781 -0.00549 -0.00699
(0.0117) (0.0140) (0.00716) (0.00812)
LiteracyAvHH -0.00593 -0.00481 -0.0194** -0.0186*
(0.0127) (0.0132) (0.00975) (0.00981)
hhassets 0.0260*** 0.0280*** 0.0278*** 0.0291***
(0.00786) (0.0105) (0.00481) (0.00601)
hhasset2 -0.00251* -0.00298 -0.00370*** -0.00401***
(0.00131) (0.00212) (0.000843) (0.00118)
Rural 0.187*** 0.188*** 0.0678*** 0.0688***
(0.0325) (0.0329) (0.0214) (0.0214)
Credit_Other -0.0259 -0.0276 0.0171 0.0160
(0.0509) (0.0508) (0.0315) (0.0315)
Credit_Inst -0.0109 -0.00916 -0.00119 -5.30e-05
(0.0381) (0.0385) (0.0188) (0.0189)
Credit_Lender -0.0184 -0.0182 0.00413 0.00426
(0.0346) (0.0344) (0.0162) (0.0162)
Credit_Inform -0.0179 -0.0186 -0.00287 -0.00337
(0.0344) (0.0343) (0.0155) (0.0155)
Credit_None -0.0337 -0.0335 -0.00321 -0.00308
(0.0360) (0.0358) (0.0181) (0.0181)
Loan -0.00819 -0.00722 -0.0235*** -0.0228***
(0.00801) (0.00843) (0.00607) (0.00605)
HHMigration 0.0127 0.0126 0.0187*** 0.0186***
(0.0112) (0.0112) (0.00682) (0.00683)
shocks 0.0556*** 0.0575*** 0.0135* 0.0148*
(0.0119) (0.0139) (0.00754) (0.00823)
Dremittances -0.125*** -0.123*** -0.0468*** -0.0459***
(0.0148) (0.0154) (0.00680) (0.00701)
DSocialContr -0.0677*** -0.0662*** -0.0326** -0.0316**
(0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0154) (0.0152)
RoadKm 0.000881 0.000832 0.000192 0.000160
(0.000740) (0.000760) (0.000584) (0.000589)
RoadKm2 -8.19e-07 -7.15e-07 4.77e-07 5.46e-07
(1.42e-06) (1.46e-06) (1.04e-06) (1.05e-06)
DMkt_Close -0.0194* -0.0204* -0.0113 -0.0120
(0.0114) (0.0120) (0.00855) (0.00872)
DElectrNo -0.00383 -0.00670 0.0144** 0.0125
(0.0106) (0.0148) (0.00702) (0.00834)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.297*** 0.0884 0.102*** -0.0397
(0.00603) (0.0674) (0.00395) (0.0364)
Observations 47,218 40,957 40,957 47,218 40,957 40,957
R-squared 0.236 0.258 0.026 0.163 0.174 0.010
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, the cluster is the district d.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are dummy variables deﬁned at the household level specifying the type of
activity of the household (see Table 1.3 for deﬁnitions). conﬂict measures are computed at the district
level and are normalised by population. A unit of conﬂict is 1/1000 inhabitants (see Table 1.4 for
deﬁnitions). All equations are estimated with the control variables described in Table 1.5, year and
district ﬁxed eﬀects.
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Chapter 2
Child Labour and Conﬂict, Evidence
from Afghanistan
2.1 Introduction
Does conﬂict aﬀect child labour? While a large literature on child labour and the
economics of conﬂict exist, relatively little is known about whether conﬂict inﬂuences
the incidence of child labour. The starting point of the present paper is that the
economic literature that studies the eﬀect of conﬂict on the extensive margin of child
labour supply is scarce and there are no studies that analysed the impact of conﬂict
on its intensive margin.
The intensive margin response of child labour supply is an important measure
of the impact of conﬂict on child labour. Conﬂict may aﬀect both directly and
indirectly some of the child labour determinants, such as household schooling de-
cisions, the intra-household allocation of the labour supply, and household wealth,
which aﬀects the decision of whether a child enters the labour force. However, it
is also possible that as a consequence of higher conﬂict intensity a child already in
the labour force adjusts the number of hours worked. Chapter one suggests that
higher conﬂict intensity increases private economic activity. This could be a chan-
nel through which conﬂict increases the intensive margin of child labour supply.
Also, the current literature provides evidence of a positive impact of conﬂict on the
extensive margin of child labour supply (e.g. see Di Maio and Nandi [2013] and
Rodriguez and Sanchez [2012]). This may hint at possibility of a positive intensive
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eﬀect - but has, as yet, not been investigated in the economic literature. The impact
of conﬂict on the intensive margin of child labour supply is relevant since if the child
works more hours the time left available for other human capital development (e.g.
studying, playing) decresases with possible negative consequences on the child's fu-
ture outcomes. Other studies that analyse the impact of conﬂict on education ﬁnd
long-term negative eﬀects of violent conﬂict on school enrollment, school attainment
and also on school drop-out (inter alia Akresh and De Walque [2008] for Rwanda;
Chamarbagwala and Morán [2011], for Guatemala; Leon [2012] for Peru; Shemyak-
ina [2011b] for Tajikistan; Swee et al. [2009] for Bosnia and Herzegovina; Rodriguez
and Sanchez [2012] for Colombia). The decrease in the years of education might be
another channel through which we might expect conﬂict to increase the number of
hours worked by children. Some studies in the wider literature analyse the respon-
siveness of hours of child labour to changes in adult wages. For example, Ray [2000]
ﬁnds that the impact of changes in adult wages on hours of child labour diﬀers in
Peru and Pakistan. In Peru rising male wages signiﬁcantly reduce the labour hours
of girls, while in Pakistan rising female wages have a large and signiﬁcantly positive
impact on girls' labour hours.
Afghanistan is one of the countries with the highest incidence of child labour.
According to the data used in this study about 13.8% of children between 6 and
12 years old and about 32.7% of children between 13 and 15 years old were in
work1 between 2007 and 2008. This percentages are quite high when compared to
those reported by the International Labour Organization (ILO) (see progress against
child labour Global [2013]) who reports a worldwide child labour rate of 10.6% in
2012. Even though Afghanistan has made some legislative commitments in the past
two decades, 2, child labour still accounts for one of the largest problems in the
country. As chapter 1 shows, conﬂict has persisted in Afghanistan since the early
1980s, changing in intensity over time, and the high level of insecurity represents
a major impediment to development [Akresh and De Walque, 2008]. The child
labour phenomena has been widely analysed both theoretically and empirically in
1These percentages exclude domestic work
2In 2013, Afghanistan made a moderate advancement in eﬀorts to eliminate the worst forms of
child labour. The Government of Afghanistan announced the adoption of a list of 29 jobs/working
conditions prohibited for children
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the recent literature. Theoretically, a key reference point in the literature is Basu and
Van [1998] and the most recent literature on the topic is summarized in Edmonds
[2007] and Bar and Basu [2009].
This paper aims at identifying the causal impact of conﬂict on both the extensive
and the intensive margin of child labour supply for 6-15 years old children during the
period 2007-2008. It distinguishes both domestic and non-domestic hours worked
and looks for heterogeneous eﬀects across gender and diﬀerent class ages. Morever,
this chapter exploits a district level conﬂict variation and looks at direct, local area
speciﬁc conﬂict eﬀects rather than the indirect conﬂict eﬀects examined by Di Maio
and Nandi [2013] and does not look just at schooling versus working decisions when
compared to Rodriguez and Sanchez [2012].
Which mechanisms could drive an increase in child labour during conﬂict? I
explore the following mechanisms that coud drive the increase in child labour because
of conﬂict.
Households may use child labour to insure against the decrease in consumption
due to conﬂict. The relationship between conﬂict and child labour can be positive
when the marginal beneﬁt of child labour under conﬂict is greater than its marginal
cost3. For example, in the scenario where conﬂict makes households poorer the
marginal beneﬁt of child labour for household subsistance increases, or where sending
children to work has a higher marginal beneﬁt for the household than investing in
their education in an uncertain conﬂict environment.
Conﬂict could also increase child labour as a result of re-allocating the labour
supply within the household and across economic sectors 4. It could be the case
that in conﬂict-ridden districts male adults were involved in war-related activities
and that because of cultural constraints children rather than women were asked to
replace them on the labour market. Then, the increase in child labour could be due
to an increase in child labour-intensive economic sectors.
Finally, it could be that in times of war children do not attend school because
3The child labour phenomena has been widely analysed both theoretically and empirically in
the recent literature. Theoretically, a key reference point in the literature is Basu and Van [1998]
and the most recent literature on the topic is summarized in Edmonds [2007] and Bar and Basu
[2009].
4Other studies, among which ?, suggest that higher conﬂict intensity increases private economic
activity. This could be a channel through which conﬂict increases both the intensive and the
extensive margin of child labour supply.
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either because of security reasons or because they have to work in order to guarantee
the household's survival. Falls in time spent in education might be another channel
through which we might expect conﬂict to increase the number of hours worked by
children. Most studies look at how conﬂict aﬀects school enrollment and attainment.
The empirical evidence on the eﬀect of armed conﬂict on children' s schooling is
mixed. Some studies ﬁnd that conﬂicts have small impacts on the outcomes of
interest (for instance Chen et al. [2008b]). Others tend to ﬁnd long-term negative
eﬀects of violent conﬂict on school enrollment, school attainment and also on school
drop-out (inter alia Akresh and De Walque [2008] for Rwanda; Chamarbagwala
and Morán [2011], for Guatemala; Leon [2012] for Peru; Shemyakina [2011b] for
Tajikistan; Swee et al. [2009] for Bosnia and Herzegovina; Rodriguez and Sanchez
[2012] for Colombia). There is also a growing literature on the gender-speciﬁc eﬀect
of armed conﬂict on schooling that ﬁnds diverse eﬀects. However, several studies
suggest conﬂicting ﬁndings. Chamarbagwala and Morán [2011], Shemyakina [2011b]
and Walsh [2000] ﬁnd that exposure to civil conﬂict causes a larger negative impact
on the enrolment of girls as opposed to boys in diﬀerent countries. The reasons
givent to explain why this eﬀect was more pronounced for females than for males
is that expected returns to education for girls are generally lower and security fears
higher than for boys. Other studies such as Swee et al. [2009], and Kecmanovic
[2013] instead ﬁnd that the negative eﬀect on schooling is driven by males. Recently,
Singh and Shemyakina [2013], explored the long-run eﬀects of the 1981-1993 Punjab
Insurgency on the educational attainment of adults. The authors ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
reduction in expenditure on education by households with a high ratio of girls to boys
and those residing in violence aﬀected districts, which suggests that this reduction
was one of the demand-side channels through which conﬂict aﬀected education.
However, education is a diﬀerent outcome than work. It could be that children
just drop out from school but do not go to work. In this scenario, conﬂict might
have a negative impact on children's returns to schooling (decrease human capital),
but could not have any other impact on any other measure of children development
such as health. In fact, education measures just the loss in terms of human capital
conﬂict could cause to children. Thus, it is important to look at the impact of
conﬂict on children working.
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Overall, the ﬁndings suggest that the necessity hypothesis is the driver of the
increase in children labour supply and that female children are those most aﬀected
by the increase in conﬂict intensity. However, the childen entering the labour supply
because of conﬂict work more in a protected environment, the household dwellings,
while no signiﬁcant eﬀect is found on hazardous type of work (construction and
quarrying). The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic and
summarizes the relevant literature review, Section 2 describes the theoretical frame-
work, Section 3 shows the methodology, Section 4 presents the results. The ﬁndings
on the extensive margin show that conﬂict5 signiﬁcantly increases the probability of
a female child of being working of about 7% points and suggest that all the increase
in child labour is signiﬁcantly is driven just by younger females. The results relative
to the intensive margin instead show a decrease of about 0.48 average non-domestic
hours worked per day in the past week (about half an hour per day) which is sig-
niﬁcant just for females. Even in this case the results are mainly driven by younger
females (decrease of about 0.5 average hours per day). Section 5 concludes.
Child labour
Currently, the International Labour Organization (ILO) provides a broad inter-
national deﬁnition of child labour6.
The child labour phenomena has been widely analysed both theoretically and
empirically in the recent literature. Theoretically, the literature suggests that house-
holds value the marginal beneﬁt of child labour to the household - rather than the
child - more than its marginal cost (see Basu and Van [1998]). However, the em-
pirical literature has not reached a consensus on the relationship between poverty
and child labour (see Dar et al. [2002]). In fact, according to the recent literature
there are several other important socio-economic determinants of the existence of
child labour such as the inﬂuence of local labour markets, family interactions, the
5One conﬂict per 1000 inhabitants in a district
6The current criteria for identifying child labour used by the ILO's Statistical Information and
Monitoring Program on Child Labour (SIMPOC) for its global child labour estimates is: A child
under 12 who is economically active for 1 or more hours per week, A child 14 and under who
is economically active for at least 14 hours per week, A child 17 and under who is economically
active for at least 43 hours per week A child 17 and under who participates in activities that are
"hazardous by nature or circumstance" for 1 or more hours per week A child 17 and under who
participates in an "unconditional worst form of child labour" such as traﬃcked children, children in
bondage or forced labour, armed conﬂict, prostitution, pornography, illicit activities (see Edmonds
[2008].
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net return to schooling, and poverty (Bhatty [1998] and Lieten [2000]).
Child labour can be both positively and negatively aﬀected by local labour mar-
kets characteristics, even if the literature provides little evidence about the channels
through which labour market inﬂuences operate. Goldin and Sokoloﬀ [1982] found
that during an early industrialisation period there was a higher level of child labour
with respect to other stages of economic development. In more contemporary set-
tings the literature has explored the relationship between changes in the activities for
children and the industrial composition of the local labour market. Edmonds [2003]
found that hours worked by children are slightly longer in Vietnamese communities
with signiﬁcant small employer presence. He also observes very little association
between the activities of children and a variation in other types of workplace organ-
isations (over time or between locations). Other authors found that there are some
activities where children may had a competitive advantage such as English cotton
mills in the nineteenth century Galbi [1997] and wood collection (Nankhuni and
Findeis [2004]). Recent studies noticed that children work more in households with
more self-employed activities (Edmonds and Turk [2002], for Vietnam, Parikh and
Sadoulet [2005] in Brazil). Technological changes can replace the type of activities
done by children. Brown et al. [1992] observe this to be the case for the canning in-
dustry in the U.S. while Levy [1985] observes a similar association for the Egyptian
cotton industry. Other authors found that trade instead can increase child labour,
creating work opportunities for children that would otherwise not be present see
Maskus [1997] and Edmonds et al. [2007].
Child labour is also aﬀected by family interactions. The literature presents dif-
ferent views on who makes child labour decisions within the household. Edmond and
Sharma found that decisions about child time allocation will be inﬂuenced by moth-
ers, fathers, extended family and perhaps even children themselves. Basu [2006]
considers how the status of women in the household aﬀects child labour supply.
Interestingly, he ﬁnds that as female status improves the family opts for less child
labour as it is more diﬃcult to take a decision to send a child to work if there is
disagreement among parents. However, when the mother becomes dominant in the
household, child labour is found to increase as the mother can exert more inﬂu-
ence over consumption choices, increasing household demand for consumption of
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other goods. This could increase household expenditures and push the household
to ﬁnd solutions, such as child labour, in order to to increase household disposable
income. The strongest evidence of complementarities between parental and child
work comes from the U.S. Goldin and Parsons [1981] and Goldin [1979] found that
children (rather than wives) were the most common source of labour income apart
from the male household head. Skouﬁas [1993], Wahba [2006] in Egypt and Katz
[1995] in Guatemala instead, found evidence of mother-daughter sex substitution
patterns. Under certain circumstances, child labour may be a substitute for par-
ents work. In particular children can substitute for adult females at work when the
household lacks adult male workers. Hunte and Winterbotham [2009] ﬁnds that in
Afghanistan, households which lack adult male workers, because of death, disability,
migration or the seclusion of adult females in the family due to religious constraints
and their subsequent inability to ﬁnd productive work, contain children who are
more likely to work.
In Afghanistan there here is evidence of how the entrance of women into the
labour market can be constrained by gender-speciﬁc law restrictions that can ex-
clude them from some labour market activities. Recently, Noury and Speciale [2013]
found that growing up under the Taliban rule (1996-2001) in Afghanistan negatively
aﬀects educational attainment and labour market outcomes of Afghan women. They
ﬁnd that women who were exposed to radical religious rule during school age are less
likely to be employed outside the household and more likely to have an agricultural
job, within the household, which is often an unpaid job and that the labour market
(education) consequences are larger (smaller) in absolute value in the capital, Kabul.
The results for Kabul can be explained both from the fact that the broader availabil-
ity of wage-jobs and employment outside the household in the capital implies that
a larger share of women exposed to the Taliban rule during school age could switch
from these types of occupations to employment within the household, and also from
the fact that the Taliban enforced restrictions more strictly in the Afghan capital
than in other districts. Singh et al. [1986] indicate that with no labour market oppor-
tunities for women outside of the household, the type and the amount of work that
a woman does will be constrained by her households production opportunities and
characteristics such as the amount of land and other productive assets the household
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owns and the number of skills of other household members who are available to work
in a family enterprise. Goldin [1994] argues that if women in low-income countries
are mostly conﬁned to work in family enterprises, economic development that comes
in the form of new manufacturing sector may improve economic opportunities for
men relative to women.
There is a little evidence on the role of an individual child in deciding their
own labour supply. Iversen [2002], ﬁnds that in south Indian districts, early teen
migrants may have migrated and work in order to have greater control over their
lives. The eﬀects of parental death on child work are not clear. Guarcello et al.
[2005] and Case et al. [2004] ﬁnd positive correlations between parental death and
various forms of child work. Sibling composition can also aﬀect child labour e.g.
Manacorda [2006] ﬁnds that children are less likely to work when they have older
siblings.
The literature also supports the existence of an inverse relationship between child
labour and returns to schooling. E.g. Chamarbagwala and Morán [2011] observes
that Indian children in regions with higher returns to education are more likely to
attend school and less likely to work.
Finally, the challange of studying the link between economic status and child
labour is that poor households can be diﬀerent from rich households in many ways
that might be associated with child labour. The empirical ﬁndings seem to suggest
that parents choose to use child labour more to cope with poverty than to reduce
their workload see Manacorda [2006] ﬁnds that a rise in the proportion of working
children by household in the U.S. is associated with no variation in parents labour
supply, suggesting that parents are altruistic. Also Basu and Van [1998] and Ed-
monds [2005] ﬁnd that when children work as a mass phenomenon as in many less
developed countries, it is much more likely that this reﬂects not a diﬀerence in the
attitude of their parents but the problem of stark poverty where the parents have
to send the children to work for reasons of survival.
Child labour and conﬂict
The relationship between conﬂict and child labour can be positive when the
marginal beneﬁt of child labour under conﬂict is greater than its marginal cost. For
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example, in the scenario where conﬂict makes households poorer the marginal beneﬁt
of child labour for household subsistance increases, or where sending children to work
has a higher marginal beneﬁt for the household than investing in their education in
an uncertain conﬂict environment. The determinants of child labour on which we
do expect conﬂict to have an impact are changes in schooling decisions, changes in
labour markets opportunities, in the intra-household labour supply and in the level
of households wealth.
Currently, the only papers that aim at estimating the impact of conﬂict on child
labour available agree on the existence of a positive causal relationship between
conﬂict and child labour. Di Maio and Nandi [2013] ﬁnd that an increase in the
number of days of closure between Israel and Palestinian Territories increased child
labour while it (weakly) reduced school attendance in the West Bank. Rodriguez
and Sanchez [2012], show that the conﬂict increases child labour by inducing them to
drop out of school and enter the labour market early using data for Colombia. How-
ever, there are still margins for improvement when exploring the causal relationship
between child labour and conﬂict.
This study is the ﬁrst contribution in the child labour literature that focuses on
the impact of conﬂict on the intensive margin of child labour supply and one of the
few contributions in the economic literature that looks at the impact of conﬂict on
child labour. Morever, this chapter exploits a district level conﬂict variation and
looks at direct, local area speciﬁc conﬂict eﬀects rather than the indirect conﬂict
eﬀects examined by Di Maio and Nandi [2013] and does not look just at schooling
vs. working decisions when compared to Rodriguez and Sanchez [2012].
This chapter uses the same unique individual level dataset obtained by merging
information at the district level from the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
(NRVA) survey and conﬂict data that were publicly made available by the Afghan
War Diary as Chapter 1, but now with a focus on child labour. In addition to
this I use time series conﬂict data made available by the Global Dataset on Events,
Location and Tone (GDELT). Information on the number of individual, household
and district characteristics are used as controls in studying how the intensity of the
Afghan conﬂict is related to child labour in Afghanistan.
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2.2 The Model
I present a stylized model of household labor supply with child labor extending the
one used in Manacorda [2006]. Consider a household H composed of NCH children
(denoted by Ci,i = 1, ...NCH), a father (denoted by F) and a mother (denoted by
M). Suppose that each individual j's (either a child's or a parent's) utility depends
on the consumption of two goods: some public good EH , and own leisure (1− ejH),
where 0 <= ejH < 1 denotes work, with 1 being the endowment.
Assume that parents maximize some linear combination of their children's and
their own individual utilities according to CRTS Cobb-Douglas with αC/NCH being
the weight that parents attach to each child's leisure and αF/NCH and αM/NCH
respectively the father's and mother's utility of work.
In the model, wages are a decreasing function of conﬂict with w'(C)<0. eCiH ,
eFH , eMH is the number of hours worked by the child, the father and the mother.
U(C)H = [lnEH(C) + αF ln(1− eFH(C)+
+ αM ln(1− eMH(C)) + αC
∑
i
ln(1− eCiH(C))]/NCH
subject to the budget constraint:
EH(C) =
∑
i
wCiH(C)eCiH(C) + wFH(C)eFH(C) + wMH(C)eMH(C) + YH (2.1)
and the time constraints. YH denotes household unearned income. In equilibrium
dPH and dCiH represent each individual's labour force participation decisions that
depend on the individual's wage, some measure of the disutility of work αj/AH and
per-child household income ECH ∗ (C).
dPH = I(ePH > 0) = I(wPH(C) > αPECH ∗ (C)/AH)P = F,M (2.2)
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dCiH = I(eCiH > 0) = I(wCiH(C) > αCECH ∗ (C)/AH)i = 1, ...NCH (2.3)
Where ECH ∗ (C) is the household income per-child:
ECH ∗ (C) = (
∑
i
wCiH(C)dCiH + wFH(C)dFH + wMH(C)dMH + YH)/NCH (2.4)
The number of hours worked by children and adults depends on the household
income (ECH ∗ (C)). The household income is a function of conﬂict intensity (C),
higher conﬂict decreases the household income. The impact on the number of hours
worked might be either positive or negative. Positive, if the income eﬀect prevails
(households feel poorer, so both children and adults work more), negative if the
substitution eﬀect prevails (households increase leisure and work less hours as the
opportunity cost of working decreases).
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Data
The dataset used here combines household information on child labour from the
National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2007 - 2008, conﬂict data from
the Afghan War Diary (AWD) and from the Global Data on Events, Location and
Tone (GDELT). The dataset is described in chapter 1 on pages 28-32.
The deﬁnitions of child labour, extensive and intensive margin are listed below
and are given in section 9a of the NRVA 2007/8 survey questionnaire.
The children in the sample are those between 6-15 years old. The data include
both information on if the child is working or not (extensive margin of child labour
supply) and information on how many hours the child is working.
• Extensive margin: It is deﬁned by a dummy variable that describes if a child is
working or not. In the NRVA questionnaire the question used in order to deﬁne
this variable is `Did this child do any work for pay during the past week, or did
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the child help with a family business or handicrafts or assist with agriculture
or livestock or collect things in the street for household use?' (question 9.2)
• Intensive margin: It is deﬁned by a dummy variable that describes the number
of hours worked. The analysis distinguishes:
 Domestic hours worked : They are deﬁned as the average number of hours
per day worked by the child in the past 7 days doing household chores.
In the NRVA questionnaire the question used in order to deﬁne this vari-
able is `In the past 7 days how many hours in total did he/she work on
household chores, or tending children, cooking, fetching water or other
household chores?' (question 9.7)
 Non-domestic hours worked : They are deﬁned as the average number of
hours per day worked by the child in the past 7 days. The survey question
does not distinguish domestic-non-domestic, but from the order of the
questions in the questionnaire and the distributions it seems clear that
this variable excludes the number of hours dedicated to the household
chores. `In the past 7 days on average how many hours per day did
he/she work?' (question 9.6)
• Conﬂict : Number of conﬂicts in a district normalised by population
2.3.2 Data description
Control variables
The variables used for the analysis are listed in Table 2.1.
The model speciﬁcation includes both household controls, child level controls and
ﬁnally district level controls. The latter are also introduced as it was not possible
to introduce in the model either province or district ﬁxed eﬀects, as they capture
most of the variation of the conﬂict variable.
The household control variables chosen are those that are supposed to have an
impact on child labor according to the available literature. The analysis includes
dummies for the household size, that could capture non-linearities in the impact of
the household size on child labour. The model speciﬁcation also includes information
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on gender, literacy and age of the household head and the level of education of
the mother and the father as these characteristics could determine the household
decisions of sending children to work or not. Also the average age in the household,
the male adults share, the share of female adults in work could play a role in the
household decisions (e.g. a household which is composed mainly by old household
members might be more prone to send children to work). In the regression are
also taken into account shocks experienced in the previous year (just exogenous
natural disasters such as ﬂoods, earthquakes etc.), number of assets such as radio
and TV that could be a proxy for household wealth, electricity and the receipt of
remittances. Shocks could increase child labour if households send children to work
as a coping strategy, while receiving remittances could make the household wealthier
and reduce the necessity of sending children to work. The children characteristics I
control for are sex and age. Finally, I control for district level covariates in order to
keep into account the geographical variation in average age, share of male adults,
share of rural communities in the district and average number of households whose
ﬁrst source of income is opium cultivation, as opium cultivation could aﬀect both
child labour and conﬂict. Variables that describe the availability of infrastructures
and markets are added later on as a robustness check due to potential endogeneity
concerns.
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Table 2.1: Variable descriptions
Variables Description
Household variables
2-5 household members (Dummy) Equal to 1 if HH members are less than 2, 0 otherwise
5-10 household members (Dummy) Equal to 1 if HH members are less than 5, 0 otherwise
10-15 household members (Dummy) Equal to 1 if HH members are less than 10, 0 otherwise
15-20 household members (Dummy) Equal to 1 if HH members are less than 15, 0 otherwise
> 20 household members (Dummy) Equal to 1 if HH members are less than 20, 0 otherwise
Male head (dummy) Equal to 1 if the household head is a male, 0 otherwise
Age of the household head Age of the HH head
Avg. age in the household Average age of the HH members
Literacy of the household head (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the HH head is literate, 0 otherwise
Male adults share Male adults share in the household
Household literacy (Dummy) Share of literate members of the HH
Rural (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the HH lives in a rural area, 0 otherwise
Household assets Number of assets in the HH
Shocks (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the HH experienced a shock in the previous year, 0 otherwise
Remittances (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the HH received any remittance in the past year, 0 otherwise
Household migration (Dummy) Equal to 1 if any HH member migrated in the past year, 0 otherwise
Market close (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the HH is close to the market, 0 otherwise
Road Km N. of Km to the closest road
Share of female adults in work Share of female adults that worked (even unpaid) in the last 30 days
Individual variables
Age Age of the individual
Sex (Dummy) Sex of the individual
Domestic hours worked Average n. of domestic hours worked by the child per day in the past 7 days
by the child on household chores, or tending children,
cooking, fetching water or other household chores
Hours worked Average n. of hours worked by the child per day in the past 7 days
Child works (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child works, 0 otherwise
Adult employment ratio Share of adults working in the household
Adult employment ratio (males) Share of male adults working in the household
Adult employment ratio (females) Share of female adults working in the household
School enrolment (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child is enrolled in school, 0 otherwise
School enrolment missing (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the school enrolment dummy is missing, 0 otherwise
Food consumption (in Kg.) Food consumption in Kgs.
Works in the house (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child works in the house
Works in agric. (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child works in agriculture
Works in hazardous activity (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child works in a hazardous activity
Works in a shop (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child works in a shop
Works in other activities (Dummy) Equal to 1 if the child works in other activities
Distance to Pakistan Distance from the household to Pakistan in Km.
Conﬂict variables
N. of conﬂicts Number of conﬂict events in the district 7
N. of wounded/killed Number of conﬂict events with wounded/killed in the district 8
Instrumental variable
IV Number of conﬂict events in the district from 1979-1989 (GDELT data)9
District variables
% of rural communities Share of rural communities in the district
% of households with opium cultivation as a main income Average number of households whose ﬁrst source of income is opium cultivation
Avg. age Average age in the district
% of males Share of males in the district
% of literate adults Share of literate adults in the district
District infrastructures
Avg. distance from the main road Average distance from the households in the district to the main road (in Km)
Avg. distance from the market Equal to 1 if the household can reach the market within one hour
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Table 2.2 below presents the descriptive statistics on child labour in the sample
by gender and per class age (6-12, 13-15).
Table 2.2: Percentage of children working
Total Males Females
Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict
Class age
6-12 13.3 18.9 13.7 8.5 11.5 8.6 4.8 7.5 5.3
13-15 31.9 42.3 35.6 20.8 27.4 22.1 11.1 15.3 13.4
In 2007-2008, about 18% of children between 6 and 15 years old were in work.
This share is higher, 24.3%, when considering just high conﬂict intensity areas, and
lower, about 19.1%, when looking at low conﬂict intensity areas 10. The percentage
of children working is even higher when looking at middle school age (between 13
and 15 years old) (31.9 %). Again, the share of older children working is higher in
high conﬂict level areas than in lower conﬂict level ones. There are also signiﬁcant
gender diﬀerences, as the share of boys participating to the labour force almost
doubles the females one in both the class ages. As already mentioned in the previous
paragraphs, this percentages are quite high when compared to the ones reported
by the International Labour Organization (ILO) (see progress against child labour
Global [2013]) that reports in 2012 a 10.6% of child labour in the 5-17 years age
group in the world.
Table 2.3 below shows the descriptive statistics on child labour in the sample
by gender and type of work. The majority of the children in the sample work in
agriculture, followed by a 39.2% that works at the household dwellings. However,
there are signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences in the distribution of the occupations. 70.6%
of the girls in the sample works at the household dwellings while only a 21% works
in agriculture. Boys instead, mostly work in agriculture (51%) followed by a 22.2%
that works at the household dwellings.
10High is deﬁned as the top 25th percentile of the conﬂict distribuition, low instead is deﬁned as
the lowest quartile.
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Table 2.3: Percentage of children working by type of activity
Type of activity Total Males Females
At the household dwelling 39.2 22.2 70.6
Employer's house 1.1 1.3 0.7
Formal Oﬃce 0.0 0.0 0.0
Factory 0.2 0.2 0.0
Plantations/farm/garden 40.6 51.1 21.0
Construction site 0.7 1.0 0.1
Quarrying sites 0.0 0.1 0.0
Shop/Market/ Kiosk/ Restaurant 4.9 7.3 0.4
On the street (selling or carrying things) 1.1 1.7 0.1
On the street (collecting things for household) 3.9 4.3 3.1
Other (specify) 8.0 10.4 3.5
Total 100.00 100.0 100.0
Table 2.6, 2.5, 2.4 show the average number of hours worked11 per day by a
child in the past week. Children worked on average 5 hours per day in non-domestic
activities and 4 hours in domestic ones in the previous week. Both average domestic,
non-domestic and total number of hours worked slightly decrease in higher conﬂict
intensity areas compared to lower intensity ones. This average number of hours
worked validates the deﬁnition of child labour given the deﬁnition provided in Diallo
et al. [2013] as children between 5-11 years old are considered children working even
if they work less than 43 hours per week and children between 12 and 14 years old
if they work more than 14 hours per week (see the ILO classiﬁcation of child labour
in Figure 2.12.
Table 2.4: N. of average total hours worked per day in the past week by
sex, age and conﬂict intensity (conditional on the child working more
than zero hours)
Total Males Females
Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict
Class age
6-12 5.3 5.4 5.8 5.1 5.2 5.6 5.5 5.6 6.0
13-15 5.9 5.4 6.4 5.9 5.2 6.4 5.9 5.6 6.4
11Deﬁnition in Table 2.1
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Table 2.5: N. of average non-domestic hours worked per day in the past
week by sex, age and conﬂict intensity (conditional on the child working
more than zero hours)
Total Males Females
Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict
Class age
6-12 3.8 4.0 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.1 3.7 4.0 3.9
13-15 4.2 3.9 4.5 4.5 3.9 4.8 3.8 3.7 4.1
Table 2.6: N. of average domestic hours worked per day in the past week
by sex, age and conﬂict intensity (conditional on the child working more
than zero hours)
Total Males Females
Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict Total High conﬂict Low conﬂict
Class age
D6-12 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.8 5.6 6.4
D13-15 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.4 1.3 1.9 2.0 1.6 2.1
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Figure 2.1: Daily average non-domestic hours worked in the past 7 days in both low
and high conﬂict areas
Figure 2.2: Daily average domestic hours worked in the past 7 days in both low and
high conﬂict areas
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Figure 2.3: Daily average non-domestic hours worked in the past 7 days - Compar-
ison between the whole sample and children working more than zero hours
Figure 2.4: Daily average domestic hours worked in the past 7 days in both low and
high conﬂict areas - Comparison between the whole sample and children working
more than zero hours
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Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.8 show the correlations within districts between the
outcome variables and conﬂict intensity. Both the average number of children and
adults working are seen to increase with conﬂict intensity. Finally, Figure 2.9 and
2.11 show the correlation between the average number of children working and aver-
age conﬂict intensity in Afghan districts in 2007-2008. These ﬁgures are conﬁrming
the existence of a positive correlation both between child labour and conﬂict inten-
sity and between average number of adults working and conﬂict intensity in Afghan
districts in 2007/2008.
Figure 2.5: Correlation between average child labour and average conﬂict
intensity per district. Conﬂict intensity is normalised by population.
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Figure 2.6: Correlation between average female child labour and average
conﬂict intensity per district. Conﬂict intensity is normalised by popula-
tion.
Figure 2.7: Correlation between average male child labour and average
conﬂict intensity per district. Conﬂict intensity is normalised by popula-
tion.
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Figure 2.8: Correlation between average adult labour and average conﬂict
intensity per district. Conﬂict intensity is normalised by population.
Figure 2.9: Map of average conﬂict intensity 2007-2008. Conﬂict intensity
is normalised by population (a unit of conﬂict is 1/1000 inhabitants).
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Figure 2.10: Map of the average number of adults working per district.
Total, males and females
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Figure 2.11: Map of the share of children (6-15 years old) working per
district. Total, males and females
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Table 2.7 shows the summary statistics for the sample used in the regressions.
The share of children in work (including unpaid and domestic activities) in the
sample is about 18%. The number of hours worked in the previous week is on average
about 0.7 , while it drops to 0.27 when looking just at domestic hours worked. The
children in the sample are on average about 10 years old and are gender balanced.
Most of the households in the sample have between 5 and 10 household members
(about 70% of the sample). Almost all the households have a male household head
who on average is 44 years old and not literate. Most of the households live in rural
communities (about 77% of the sample) and have an equal share of both male and
female adults and of male and female children. Just a few households experienced
the migration of an household member in the previous 12 months (about 7.5% of
the sample). The average characteristics of the districts indicate that districts are
composed by a large share (on average 80%) of rural communities. On average,
about 16% of the households in the district declares to cultivate opium as a main
household activity. The average age of household members in each district is about
20 years old and the share of literate household members is about 24%. The average
distance by district from a household to the main road is about 3 km, while it is
just 0.155 km when looking at the proximity of the market. In 2007/8 on average an
Afghan district experienced 0.42 conﬂicts and 0.092 wounded or killed every 1000
inhabitants.
The next section, it is aimed at quantifying how exposure to conﬂict inﬂuenced
child labour.
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Table 2.7: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Child characteristics
Working child (Dummy) 0.18 0.384 0 1 48440
N. of non-domestic hours worked 0.725 1.811 0 12 48440
N. of domestic hours worked 0.277 0.914 0 12 48440
Age 10.147 2.883 6 15 48440
Sex 0.519 0.5 0 1 48437
Household variables
2-5 household members (Dummy) 0.167 0.021 0 1 48440
5-10 household members (Dummy) 0.085 0.279 0 1 48440
10-15 household members (Dummy) 0.685 0.465 0 1 48440
15-20 household members (Dummy) 0.171 0.377 0 1 48440
> 20 HH Members (Dummy) 0.046 0.209 0 1 48440
Male head (Dummy) 0.984 0.125 0 1 48440
Age of the household head 44.862 12.287 4 99 48440
Avg. age in the HH 19.291 4.825 7.4 57.667 48440
Male children share 0.52 0.289 0 1 48440
Male adults ratio 0.502 0.138 0 1 48440
Literacy of the household head (Dummy) 0.038 0.06 0 0.5 48440
Rural (Dummy) 0.774 0.418 0 1 45487
Household assets 2.979 2.284 0 7 48440
Household migration 0.075 0.264 0 1 48298
Adult employment ratio 0.638 0.281 0 1 48712
Adult employment ratio (males) 0.805 0.302 0 1 48712
Adult employment ratio (females) 0.482 0.44 0 1 48712
School enrolment (Dummy) 0.473 0.499 0 1 48712
School enrolment missing (Dummy) 0.502 0.5 0 1 48712
Food consumption (in Kg.) 58.312 27.363 0 172.2 48712
Works in the house (Dummy) 0.073 0.259 0 1 48712
Works in agric. (Dummy) 0.075 0.264 0 1 48712
Works in hazardous activity (Dummy) 0.002 0.042 0 1 48712
Works in a shop (Dummy) 0.009 0.095 0 1 48712
Works in other activities (Dummy) 0.024 0.154 0 1 48712
Distance to Pakistan 1.812 1.536 0 5.587 48712
Variables at the district level
% of rural communities 0.785 0.36 0 1 48440
% of HH with opium cultivation as main income source 0.162 0 1 48440
Avg. age 19.716 1.332 12.619 25.588 48440
% of males 0.511 0.027 0.383 0.657 48440
% of literate adults 0.248 0.137 0 0.662 48440
Avg. distance from the HHs to the main road 2.769 11.067 0 293.614 48287
Avg. distance from the HHs to the main road (squared) 130.146 2837.149 0 86209.461 48287
Avg. distance from the HHs to the market 0.155 0.362 0 1 48440
N. of conﬂicts in the district normalised by pop. density 0.424 0.986 0 9.273 48271
N. of wounded/killed 0.092 0.213 0 1.765 48271
IV 0.215 1.495 0 39.892 48271
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2.3.3 Estimation strategy
The estimation strategy relies both on a linear probability model when looking at the
labour decision on the extensive margin, and on a tobit model censored at zero hours
worked in the analysis of the intensive margin. I estimate the equation clustering
standard errors at the district level in order to control for the group correlation of
the error term within the districts.
The regression speciﬁcation and the tobit model are described below:
At a child level:
Yihd = α1 + α2Confd + α3Xi + α4Xh + α5Xd + uihd (2.5)
Where: Yihd is equal to 1 if child_adult i in the household h in district d is in
work, 0 otherwise. In the second part of the analysis this is the number of hours
(domestic ad non) worked by the child in the past week. Conf is the number of
conﬂict events per district (normalised by population ); Xi are children characteris-
tics, sex and age; Xh are household characteristics. In particular, how many young
household members there are in certain age windows, if the household head is a
male, age of the household head, average age of the household, percentage of males
in the household, male children ratio, male adults ratio, household literature, house-
hold size, if the household lives in a rural area, number of household assets, dummy
equal to one if someone in the household migrated during the previous year.Xd are
district characteristics such as the average number of rural communities in the dis-
trict, average number of households that have an illegal activity as a main income
generating activity, average age of household members in the district, percentage of
males in the district, average adult literacy in the district.
Yihd =

0 (Yihd∗ < 0)
Yihd∗ (Yihd∗ ≥ 0)
Yihd∗ = α1 + α2Xidt + uihd, uihd ∼ N(0, σ2) (2.6)
where Yihd∗ is a latent variable.
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2.3.4 Identiﬁcation strategy
The identiﬁcation of the causal eﬀect of conﬂict on child labour means addressing
the endogeneity of conﬂict. Endogeneity could be driven by omitted variable bias.
It is possible that poorer areas are both more aﬀected by conﬂict and have higher
number of children working, or that a Taliban district is both more prone to higher
conﬂict intensity and to higher incidence of child labour. Secondly, our coeﬃcient
of interest could also be biased due to measurement error as it is possible that the
measure of conﬂict is imprecise.
Currently, the only papers that aim at estimating the impact of conﬂict on child
labour available are Di Maio and Nandi [2013] and Rodriguez and Sanchez [2012].
Di Maio and Nandi [2013] identiﬁes the impact of conﬂict on child labour and
school attendance in the West Bank exploiting an exogenous indirect measure of
conﬂict: the number of days of closure between Israel and Palestinian Territories.
Rodriguez and Sanchez [2012], show that the conﬂict increases child labour by
inducing them to drop out of school and enter the labour market early using data
for Colombia. In order to solve the endogeneity problem they use an instrumental
variable approach was undertaken using two diﬀerent available instruments: the av-
erage of two year lagged antinarcotics operations at the municipality level and of
homicide captures at the state level interacted with municipal population. It is ex-
pected then that higher number of antinarcotics operations in a given municipality
will necessarily imply a higher presence of the army and lower levels of income for
the armed groups. Hence, the possibility for irregular armed groups to perpetrate
attacks should diminish. Similarly, homicide captures will be a proxy for the eﬃ-
ciency and strength of the law enforcement in each municipality. For both variables,
the two year lags were chosen given that the eﬀect of the rule of law on violence
in a particular zone takes time and probably more than one year of State presence
is necessary to reduce armed conﬂict. The identiﬁcation assumption used in the
paper is hence that lagged deterrence measures should not be directly related with
current schooling investment decisions at the household level. Even though this is a
highly plausible assumption, they include evidence on their relevance and possible
exogeneity.
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In this study the potential bias due to omitted variables and measurement error
is addressed both controlling for a quite large number of individual, household and
district controls, and using the instrumental variable also used in chapter one.
Similarly to Bartel [1989], Altonji and Card [1991b], Saiz [2003], and others with
regard to immigration patterns, it is assumed that conﬂict events are more likely to
locate where earlier conﬂicts happened. Therefore, the share of conﬂict per district
between 1979-1989 during the Soviet occupation it is taken and it is attributed
to each district the share of Afghan global conﬂict of that period. This allows to
construct an imputed conﬂict measure for district which it is used as an IV (see the
full the description of the IV in chapter one, pages 61-64).
In order to instrument for conﬂict the instrumental variable has to be strongly
correlated with the district-level variation over time in conﬂict intensity (relevance
condition) and, at the same time, it has to be properly excluded from the second
stage regression, i.e., it should aﬀect child labour only through its eﬀect on the
conﬂict intensity variable, not directly (exogeneity or exclusion condition).
The relevance of the instrument (the ﬁrst stage-correlation), is measured by the
magnitude of the F-tests available in Panel A of the tables in Section 2.4, which is
safely above 10. This suggests that past conﬂict shares might be correlated with
the current ones because of exogenous geographical factors (such as accessibility,
position, etc.). These factors make a given district more or less likely to be aﬀected
by conﬂict events where the overall conﬂict intensity in the whole country increases.
In order for the instrument to be valid, also the exclusion restriction has to be
satisﬁed. It is realistic to assume that the exclusion restriction holds in this context
after ruling out some possible obvious factors that could invalidate it.
The ﬁrst concern could be due to the fact that some omitted geographical factors
or religion aﬀected both the Soviet conﬂict in 1979-89 and child labour in 2007-
2008. In order to check the possible eﬀect of these omitted variables I control, as a
robustness check, for the distance of the household from Pakistan. This measure is
a good proxy for terrain ruggedness, altitude and religion. The Afghan conﬂict is
concentrated along the Blue Mountains at the border with Pakistan.
The results presented in Table 2.27 show that the main results still hold.The
signiﬁcance of the results is now lower plausibly because distance from Pakistan is
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strongly correlated with the measure of conﬂict used.
A second concern, could be that conﬂict thirty years before could aﬀect child
labour today through the level of parent's education. This second concern is ad-
dressed controlling in the regressions for the level of education of both mother and
father.
Finally, it could be argued that conﬂict during the Soviet war might had an
impact on the geographical distribution of child-labour-intensive economic sectors
in Afghan districts today. However, the independence of past conﬂict from the
distribution of economic activities in 2007-08 it has already been defended in Chapter
1. In particular, in particular, the surge of illecit opium activities and cross-border
trade with the arise of the Talibans and the cease of the production of natural
gas after the Russian occupation (see the discussion in Section 1.1.2) provide clear
examples of conﬂict intensity during the Soviet period should not be correlated with
the distribution of the economic sectors in 2007-2008 if not through observable ﬁxed
factors that are controlled for in the estimation strategy.
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Main results
The impact of conﬂict on the extensive margin of child labour supply
The impact of higher conﬂict intensity 12 in Afghan districts on children (6-15 years
old) participation in the labour force (the extensive margin of child labour supply)
is analysed using both a Linear Probability Model and an instrumental variable
strategy. The description of the covariates I use in the regressions is available in
Table 2.1, the results are available in Table 2.8 - 2.11. The ﬁrst stages reported in
panel A of Table 2.8 - 2.11 show, as in chapter one, that there is a positive signiﬁcant
relationship between the Russian conﬂict (1979-1989) and conﬂict in Afghanistan in
2007-2008 at a district level, which is signiﬁcant at a 5% level of conﬁdence. The
F-test is greater than 10, which suggests that the instrument is valid along this
dimension.
Table 2.8 column (1)-(9) shows the results of the linear probility model estimates
on the total sample of children and testing for heterogenous conﬂict eﬀects on child
gender. The total sample between males and females testing for heterogeneus eﬀects
across gender in Table 2.8 column (4)-(9). The IV coeﬃcients in columns 3, 6 and 9
show that one more conﬂict over a thousand inhabitants, increases the probability
of a female child working of about 7% points, signiﬁcant at a 10% level. The IV
coeﬃcients here are all signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (higher) than the OLS ones, suggesting
that the latter are downward biased.
Table 2.10 shows the LPM estimates for a sample of male children split also
by class age. Here the IV estimates in column (3) and (6) show that the impact
of conﬂict on the extensive margin of the male children labour supply is never
signiﬁcant.
Table 2.11 shows instead the LPM estimates for a sample of female children
split also by class age. The results shown in column (3) show that the increase
in child labour is signiﬁcantly driven by an increase in the probability of younger
females (between 6 and 12) working, as their probability of entering the labour
12normalised by population
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force is of about 8 % points signiﬁcantly higher when they live in a district with
higher conﬂict intensity. Even here, the IV estimates suggest that LPM results are
downward biased.
Table 2.12 shows the impact of conﬂict events with either wounded or killed
victims on the extensive margin of child labour supply. The magnitude of the impact
of conﬂict on the probability of a female child going to work increases more (about
11.6% points) when compared to Table 2.8 (about 7% points). This suggest that
where the conﬂict either injures or kills members of the household children increase
their labour supply at a higher rate. The coeﬃcient of the estimates are signiﬁcant
at the 10% level.
Concluding, the results seem to suggest that only younger female children in-
crease their labour force participation in Afghan districts under higher conﬂict.
These results seem to be consistent with the economic literature that suggests that
under conﬂict, given higher uncertainty of the returns to capital, households prefer
to invest in boys' education rather than in females'.
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2.4.2 Heterogeneous eﬀects
It could be the case that the impact of conﬂict on child labour is heterogeneous
across households with diﬀerent characteristics.
Table 2.13 and 2.14 show the IV estimates of the impact of conﬂict on the
extensive margin of child labour supply distinguishing between households with a
low educated household head (primary and secondary education) and households
with a highly educated household head (tertiary school or higher degrees).
Table 2.13 shows that the girl's extensive labour supply response is heterogeneous
with respect to the level of education of the household head. Column 1 shows that
girls who live in households with a lower educated household head have an higher
probabiliy of going to work of about 7 percentange points as a response to unitary
increase in the conﬂict measure.
The impact of conﬂict on the boys' probability of going to work instead, does
not seem to be heterogeneus with respect to the level of education of the household
head (see Table 2.14).
These results suggest that conﬂict enhances already existent intra-household dif-
ferences in the accumulation of human capital. The policy implication of these
ﬁndings is the necessity to improveme the access to education as its negative conse-
quences could be transmitted through generations.
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Table 2.13: Heterogeneus eﬀects of the IV estimates of the eﬀect of conﬂict
intensity per district on child labour by the level of education of the
household head (girls)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low Low High High
VARIABLES 6_12 13_15 6_12 13_15
N_conﬂict 0.0653** 0.0140 3.291 0.0999
(0.0289) (0.0450) (42.62) (0.986)
Constant 0.302 0.242 -0.496 -0.0714
(0.210) (0.395) (14.55) (1.213)
Observations 13,967 4,663 1,951 744
R2 0.030 0.068 -154.915 0.017
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses,
the cluster is the district.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are variables deﬁned at the
child level. Conﬂict measures instead are deﬁned at the
district level. All the conﬂict measures are normalised
by population (a unit of conﬂict is 1/1000 inhabitants).
Estimated with the variables described in Table 2.1
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Table 2.14: Heterogeneus eﬀects of the IV estimates of the eﬀect of conﬂict
intensity per district on child labour by the level of education of the
household head (boys)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low Low High High
VARIABLES 6_12 13_15 6_12 13_15
N_conﬂict -0.00861 0.0151 -0.0272 0.186
(0.0309) (0.0554) (0.175) (1.086)
Constant 0.372* 0.455 0.543* 0.122
(0.216) (0.395) (0.317) (0.933)
Observations 15,168 4,941 1,968 730
R2 0.129 0.084 0.072 -0.021
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses,
the cluster is the district.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are variables deﬁned at the
child level. Conﬂict measures instead are deﬁned at the
district level. All the conﬂict measures are normalised
by population (a unit of conﬂict is 1/1000 inhabitants).
Estimated with the variables described in Table 2.1
The impact of conﬂict on the intensive margin of child labour supply
This paper also studies the impact of higher conﬂict intensity in Afghan districts
on the number of both domestic and non-domestic hours worked by children - the
intensive margin of child labour supply.
Table 2.15 shows that the OLS and IV estimates of higher conﬂict intensity per
district on non-domestic children hours worked conditional on more than zero hours
worked. These estimates measure the intensive margin of the children labour supply
response to higher conﬂict intensity. The IV regressions show that females work
signiﬁcantly fewer non-domestic hours a day in the past week. When our measure
of conﬂict increases by one unit non-domestic hours fall by 0.48 hours, on average.
When decomposing these eﬀects by class ages and gender in tables 2.16 -2.19 the IV
results show that the decrease in non-domestic hours worked is signiﬁcant just for
younger females (−0.5) see Table 2.19 column (3). I do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect
of conﬂict on domestic hours worked. Table 2.18 shows the results for males. The
instrument does not seem to be powerful for this subsample as there is not enough
variation in the number of domestic hours worked by the boys when comparing high
and low intensity areas (see Table 2.6. Thus, no conclusions on the impact of conﬂict
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on boys' domestic hours worked can be driven from the analysis that splits the boys'
sample according to the class age.
A tobit model is also estimated lower-bound censored at zero hours worked.
These estimates capture both the extensive and the intensive margin of the children
labour supply response to higher conﬂict intensity. Table 2.28 column (1)-(3) in
the Appendix shows the tobit marginal eﬀects of children both domestic and non-
domestic hours worked for the total sample. The results of the IV tobit regressions
show that the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant.
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2.4.3 Mechanisms
Tables 2.21 - 2.24 show evidence of the possible mechanisms that could explain the
increase in child labour supply due to conﬂict.
First, Table 2.21 suggests that households may use child labour to insure against
the decrease in consumption due to conﬂict. The IV estimates in column 1 show that
households with children in high conﬂict areas do not show any signiﬁcant relative
drop in food consumption. In contrast, households without children, experience
a decrease in food consumption in the high conﬂict areas of about 2.6 Kilos per
unit conﬂict incidence (about 4.6 percentage points fall with respect to the average
weekly consumption in thelast 7 days) which is signiﬁcant at the 10% signiﬁcance
level13 .
Second, conﬂict could increase child labour re-allocating the labour supply within
the household. It could be the case that in conﬂict-ridden districts male adults were
involved in war-related activities and that because of cultural constraints children
rather than women were asked to replace them on the labour market. Table 2.22
suggests that conﬂict increases also adult's labour supply in te hosehold. Both the
share of male adults and the share of female households working increases when our
measure of conﬂict intensity goes up by one unit. The results show that during
war the share of females working increases more (of about 13%) with respect to the
share of males working which increases of about 3.9%. These ﬁndings are consistent
with the literature that suggests that parents are altruistic and send chidren to work
just for necessity. Households under conﬂict become poorer and all the household
members work more for the household survival. Manacorda [2006], ﬁnds that a rise
in the proportion of working children by household is associated with no variation in
parent's labour supply and that parents redistribute entirely the returns from child
labour to the children in the household. Basu and Van [1998], suggest that child
labour as a mass phenomenon occurs not because of parental selﬁshness but because
of the parents' concern for the household's survival.
Third, the increase in child labour could be due to an increase in child labour-
intensive economic sectors. Table 2.23 suggests that the probability of a girl working
13Note conﬂict estimates are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other.
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Table 2.21: IV estimates of conﬂict intensity per district on consumption
(in Kg.)
(1) (2)
(IV) (IV)
VARIABLES food consumption food consumption
Households with children Households without children
N_conﬂict -2.332 -2.764*
(1.766) (1.626)
Constant -62.36*** 36.96**
(13.40) (15.37)
HH controls Yes Yes
District level controls Yes Yes
Observations 15,073 3,727
R2 0.276 0.341
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All the conﬂict measures are normalised by population (a unit of conﬂict is 1/1000 inhabitants)
in the household dwellings increases of about 2.6% points signiﬁcant at the 10%
level as a response to a unitary increase in the measure of conﬂict. The results
show no signiﬁcant changes of the probability of working in other economic sectors
(agriculture, hazardous type of work such as constructions and quarrying, shop-
keeping and other). This seems to rule out the hypothesis of the increase in child-
labour economic sectors during war.
Finally, it could be that in times of war children do not attend school either
because of security reasons or because they have to work in order to guarantee the
household's survival. Table 2.24 shows that I cannot ﬁnd any signiﬁcant impact
of conﬂict on schooling. The reason could be that, having Afghanistan been in
war since 2001, the analysis done for 2007/08 cannot capture the changes in school
enrolment.
Overall, the ﬁndings suggest that the necessity hypothesis is the driver of the
increase in children labour supply and that female children are those most aﬀected
by the increase in conﬂict intensity. However, the childen entering the labour supply
because of conﬂict work more in a protected environment, the household dweelings,
while no signiﬁcant eﬀect is found on hazardous type of work (construction and
quarrying).
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Table 2.22: IV estimates of conﬂict on the share of adults working in the
household
(1) (2)
(IV) (IV)
VARIABLES Males Females
N_conﬂict 0.0393*** 0.137***
(0.0132) (0.0406)
Constant 1.002*** 0.866***
(0.122) (0.326)
HH controls Yes Yes
District level controls Yes Yes
Observations 15,073 15,073
R2 0.168 0.081
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All the conﬂict measures are normalised by population (a unit of conﬂict is 1/1000 inhabitants)
Table 2.23: IV estimates of conﬂict child labour by type of work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV)
VARIABLES HH dwellings agriculture hazardous shop other
N_conﬂict 0.0263* 0.00399 -8.44e-05 -0.000361 -0.00136
(0.0141) (0.0126) (9.97e-05) (0.000265) (0.00159)
Constant 0.294*** -0.0980** 0.000949 0.000693 0.0357***
(0.102) (0.0441) (0.000668) (0.00297) (0.0117)
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 44,132 44,132 44,132 44,132 44,132
R2 0.074 0.027 0.001 0.001 0.006
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All the conﬂict measures are normalised by population (a unit of conﬂict is 1/1000 inhabitants)
Table 2.24: Impact of conﬂict on schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES school school school school school school
6_12 13_15 Boys 6_12 Boys 13_15 Girls 6_12 Girls 13_15
N_conﬂict 0.00635 0.0236 0.00414 0.0240 0.00864 0.0154
(0.00685) (0.0181) (0.0112) (0.0208) (0.00669) (0.0214)
Constant 0.997*** 0.979*** 0.988*** 1.004*** 1.010*** 0.956***
(0.0372) (0.123) (0.0504) (0.168) (0.0434) (0.153)
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 33,054 11,078 17,136 5,671 15,918 5,407
R2 0.938 0.796 0.935 0.790 0.937 0.779
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All the conﬂict measures are normalised by population (a unit of conﬂict is 1/1000 inhabitants)
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2.4.4 Robustness checks
In this section I report some robustness checks which include both an alternative
deﬁnition of conﬂict and additional control variables. Speciﬁcally it is of interest to
test diﬀerent deﬁnitions of conﬂict to see if any conﬂict event increases child labour,
or if only conﬂict events which cause casualties have an important inﬂuence.
Table 2.25 shows the impact of conﬂict on the extensive margin of child labour
supply using more control variables such as the availability of infrustructure (roads
and markets) in the district. These variables are arguably endogenous as they are
potentially correlated with household wealth, an omitted variable that could have
an impact on child labour. Both the magnitude and the signiﬁcance of the results
do not change when compared with those in Table 2.8, suggesting that the results
are fairly stable across diﬀerent regression speciﬁcations.
Table 2.26 shows the impact of conﬂict on the extensive margin of child labour
supply excluding the Kabul district where conﬂict intensity is above the average.
Even here both the magnitude and the signiﬁcance of the results do not change
when compared with those in Table 2.8, suggesting that the results are not driven
by the higher conﬂict intensity in the district of the capital of Afghanistan.
Other robustness checks, not reported in the paper for brevity, were run using
both a quadratic and an hyperbolic measure of conﬂict. The results are not signif-
icant, suggesting that these model do not ﬁt the relationship between conﬂict and
child labour.
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2.5 Concluding remarks
This paper is the ﬁrst study that analyses how higher conﬂict intensity in a district
aﬀects both the extensive margin (participation to the labour force) and the intensive
margin (number of hours worked) of child labour supply in Afghanistan.
The results suggest that children in conﬂict aﬀected areas, especially young fe-
males, are more likely to join the labour force but work fewer non-domestic hours per
week. In particular, the results show that a one unit increase in conﬂict intensity14
has a positive impact on the extensive margin of child labour labour supply and that
this increase is entirely driven by 6-12 years old female children (8% points). I also
ﬁnd an increase in adult labour supply which seems to be driven by female adults
(8.3% points). The results of the analysis of the impact of higher conﬂict inten-
sity in Afghan districts on the intensive margin response of children labour supply
suggest that there is a decrease in non-domestic hours worked which is signiﬁcant
just for younger (6-12 years old) females (−0.5). I do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect
on domestic hours worked. The negative results on the intensive margin can be
reconciled with the positive ones on the extensive margin looking at the distribution
of the numbers of hours worked. The distribution suggests that children entering
the labour supply work a lower number of hours, justifying the negative sign on the
change of the intensive margin, see Fig. 2.3.
Finally I explored the possible mechanisms that could increase the extensive
margin of child labour supply under conﬂict. Overall, the ﬁndings suggest that
the necessity hypothesis is the driver of the increase in children labour supply and
that female children are those most aﬀected by the increase in conﬂict intensity.
However, the childen entering the labour supply because of conﬂict work more in a
protected environment, the household dwellings, while no signiﬁcant eﬀect is found
on hazardous type of work (construction and quarrying).
The results of this analysis shed a light on the impact of conﬂict on child labour
suggesting that policy-makers have to keep in to account that sending children to
work can be driven by households' necessity of survival. Regulating the working
conditions of children prohibiting hazardous work in times of war, following the
14One conﬂict over 1000 individuals in the district.
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example of both Afghanistan (in 2013) and Bolivia (in 2014) seems to be the priority
when adopting new child labour regulations in fragile and conﬂict-ridden states.
2.6 Appendix
Figure 2.12: Deﬁnition of child labour according to the 18th International
Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS). Resolution concerning statis-
tics of child labour (ILO, Geneva, 2008). .
2.6.1 Secondary Results
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Chapter 3
The Diﬀerential Labour Demand
Response to the Financial Crisis:
Evidence from Firms in Transition
Countries
3.1 Introduction
How did the ﬁnancial crisis aﬀect labour demand in transition economies (TEs)1?
While the economic literature focused on labour market dynamics in TEs after
the fall of communism in 1989 (see Lehmann and Muravyev [2011]; Granick [1987],
Svejnar [2002]; Singer [1996]) both the short and the long run impact of the ﬁnancial
crisis on labour demand in the transition region are still unexplored. Twenty years
after the beginning of the change from a centrally planned to a market economy, the
TEs had to face the turmoil of the ﬁnancial crisis. This was a new challenge for the
labour demand adjustments of these countries which have been already tested by
the beginning of the transition. The ﬁnancial market turmoil in Western Europe,
which intensiﬁed sharply in September and October 2008, triggered the ﬁnancial
crisis in transition economies. The latter experienced sudden large output declines
in the fourth quarter of 2008 (after the collapse of Lehman brothers in the U.S.A)
1Transition economies are those changing from being under government control to being market
economies. In this chapter the countries in Table 3.2
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and in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009, in comparison to only a few months before when the
region seemed to have been booming (as shown in Figure 3.1, see EBRD [2009b]).
On average GDP shrank by about 6% and in the same period unemployment rates
considerably increased see Figure 3.2. The crisis hit the TEs heterogeneusly both
in timing and in intensity. Unemployment rates started to soar in the Baltic states
and other economies such as Turkey and Ukraine in mid-2008. In contrast, in
central and South-Eastern Europe, unemployment rates started to increase only
in mid-2009, and even later in South-Eastern Europe. The hardest-hit transition
countries during the ﬁnancial crisis were in the Baltic region and in South-Eastern
Europe (Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania) (see EBRD
[2009b]).
The starting point of the present chapter is that relatively little is known about
the short-term ﬁrm's input demand response to the type of ﬁnancial crisis typically
seen in the industrialised West. About twenty years after the transition process
began, the economies of of central and eastern Europe have evolved often at diﬀerent
speeds and in diﬀerent directions. The Great Recession of 2008 is an opportunity
to look for evidence of diﬀerential response to a large global negative shock and, if
so, to look for explanations.
Previous studies such as EBRD [2009b] and Carlin and Schaﬀer [2012] focus
either on the impact of the crisis on individual unemployment using household data
or on ﬁrm's response to speciﬁc obstacles in the business environment (such as lack
of demand of skilled labour, corruption etc.). Other papers such as Bohachova et al.
[2011] and Babetski et al. [2012], provide a short-term analysis of a speciﬁc country of
the ﬁnancial crisis on ﬁrm's labour demand in transition countries. This paper is the
ﬁrst study that aims at identifying cross-country diﬀerences in the labour demand
response to the ﬁnancial crisis in the transition region distinguishing countries part
of the European Union from those that are not. The recent ﬁnancial crisis could have
impacted diversely ﬁrm's labour demand in these two groups of countries for several
reasons. Employees in European countries could be protected by stricter regulations
on how to ﬁre workers. At the same time European ﬁrms could be eligible to
receive EU subsides and then could be less prone to ﬁre workers during an economic
downturn. Studying both the short and the medium run impact of the ﬁnancial crisis
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on labour demand is relevant as it may aﬀect the levels of wages and employment
in varied ways across diﬀerent countries with diﬀerent systems. The ﬁnancial crisis
may aﬀect both directly and indirectly some labour demand determinants, such as
the cost of capital or the level of sales, decreasing the ﬁrm's demand for labour and
increasing the level of unemployment. For example, Babetski et al. [2012] found
that in the Czech Republic between 2002-2009 the fall in demand had an impact on
the labour demand of ﬁrms. Given wage rigidities ﬁrm's adjusted reducing in prices,
margins, output and costs. The cost reduction, had as a consequence a reduction in
both permanent and temporary employment, hours of work and non-labour costs.
The authors also found that between 2008-2009 employment elasticities with respect
to sales increased, while the employment elasticities with respect to real wages were
not signiﬁcant, probably due to limited variation in wages during the crisis.
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Moldova on wheat, although in the latter case it has since 
been removed.
Elsewhere, the only signifi cant changes were in Croatia and 
Montenegro, with both countries upgraded in the governance 
and enterprise reform category. Croatia achieved a major 
success this year by completing accession negotiations with 
the European Union, which necessitated a commitment to 
restructuring key state-owned industries. Montenegro acquired 
EU candidate status at the end of 2010, and has implemented a 
new bankruptcy law.
Macroeconomic developments 
and outlook
Recovery in domestic demand
Recovery was under way in virtually all countries of the EBRD 
region by the summer of 2011. Although its pace has continued 
to lag behind that of other emerging markets, by the second 
quarter of this year growth in the average transition country was 
almost as high as in Latin America or emerging Asia (see Chart 
1.1). After strong economic rebounds by early 2010 in countries 
such as Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, the Slovak Republic, 
Turkey and Ukraine, growth also gathered momentum in most 
countries with initially weaker recoveries (especially in the Baltic 
states). The recovery was founded on strong growth in the core 
eurozone countries (as major trading partners) and rapidly rising 
commodity prices, mitigated by region-specifi c factors such as 
fi scal tightening and scarce new lending. By now many transition 
countries have reached, or surpassed, their pre-crisis output 
levels, even though the Baltic countries are on average still 
more than 10 per cent below them. On average, real GDP in the 
transition region is just barely higher than it was in early 2008, 
while output in Latin America and emerging Asia has by now 
signifi cantly exceeded its pre-crisis level ( see Chart 1.2).
The recovery has mostly followed a typical post-crisis pattern. 
Following a period of net export-led growth in 2009 and early 
2010, growth has since been driven increasingly by domestic 
demand (see Chart 1.3). The sharp falls in inventories and 
investment that had characterised the immediate aftermath of 
the crisis in Armenia, the CEB countries, Moldova, Russia and 
Ukraine began to reverse in the fi rst half of 2010, and by the 
second half of the year consumption growth had resumed in 
these countries. 
Recovery in the larger south-eastern European countries, 
Belarus and Turkey has followed different trajectories for 
idiosyncratic reasons. In Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania growth 
was slack or negative well into 2011, as fi scal consolidation 
(especially in Bulgaria and Romania) combined with weak capital 
infl ows and the unwinding of a pre-crisis construction boom 
(in Croatia) dampened domestic demand throughout 2010. 
Turkey, in contrast, continued to experience a boom in domestic 
Chart 1.1
Growth in EBRD countries started to approach other 
emerging markets by Q2 2011…
Quarterly real GDP growth, year-on-year, per cent
Source: CEIC Data Company (CEIC) and International Monetary Fund International Financial  
Statistics (IMF IFS).
Note: Growth rates for each group of countries are simple averages of individual countries' growth rates. 
Latin America includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Emerging Asia includes Hong 
Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. The EBRD region includes all transition 
countries except Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Mongolia, Montenegro and 
Turkmenistan.
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Chart 1.2
… but their post-crisis GDP levels remain far below 
those of other emerging markets
Real GDP levels, Q1 2008 = 100
Source: CEIC Data Company (CEIC) and International Monetary Fund International Financial 
Statistics (IMF IFS).
Note: GDP levels for each group of countries are simple averages of individual countries' GDP levels. 
Latin America includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Emerging Asia includes Hong 
Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. The EBRD region includes all transition 
countries except Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Mongolia, Montenegro and 
Turkmenistan. 
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Figure 3.1: GDP trend in transition countries during and after the ﬁnan-
cial crisis.
Source: CEIC Data Company (CEIC) and International Monetary Fund Interna-
tional Financial Statistics (IMF IFS).
Note: GDP levels for each group of countries are simple averages of individual
countries' GDP levels. Latin America includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Mexico and Peru. Emerging Asia includes Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. The European Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (EBRD) region includes all transition countries2 except Albania, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Mongolia, Montenegro and Turkmenistan.
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Figure 3.2: Unemployment rates in transition countries during and after
the ﬁnancial crisis.
Source: EBRD (2010)
Note: Unemployment rate (Index Q4 2007 = 100)
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This chapter studies the causal relationship between the ﬁnancial crisis and the
long-term response of ﬁrms' labour demand. Moreover, this chapter aims at identify-
ing the areas in the transition region where labour demand was more aﬀected, distin-
guishing between European and non-European ﬁrms, in order to indirectly measure
the impact of European policies on labour. These policies are aimed at mantaining
labour demand, improving the employability of the unemployed and the underem-
ployed, providing income support and targeting the most vulnerable. Examples of
these policies can be work-sharing; on-the-job-training (both can be subsidized or
unsubsidised); job/wage subsidies; public works programmes; job search assistance;
work experience and apprenticeship programmes; training; entrepreneurship incen-
tives; unemployment beneﬁts; social assistance; other social protection measures
(including conditional cash transfers); hiring subsidies and training schemes (see
Cazes et al. [2010]).
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic, Section 2
summarizes the relevant literature, Section 3 describes the methodology, Section 4
presents the results. The ﬁndings show that the share of temporary workers shrank
of about 25% between 2009/10 and 2012/13, while no signiﬁcant impact of the
ﬁnancial crisis was found on the number of permanent workers. The analysis also
shows that when we distinguish European and non-European countries these second
ones are those driving the results. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Literature review
3.2.1 Labour demand dynamics in transition countries
The dynamics of labour demand in transition economies (TEs) have drawn con-
siderable attention in the early years of transition from plan to market of the late
1980s-early 1990s, which involved Central and Eastern Europe as well as of Cen-
tral Asia. This institutional change had a deep impact on labour markets in those
regions.
The labour market dynamics in these regions over the last two decades were
summarized by Lehmann and Muravyev [2011] with their emphasis on the role of
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labour market institutions. The authors ﬁnd evidence that there has been consider-
able liberalisation of labour regulations in TEs that have currently established sets
of labour market institutions and policies, which are similar to those existing in
mature market economies. The authors also ﬁnd that labour market deregulation
improves their performance if employment protection legislation (EPL) is relatively
unregulated since ﬁrms will be more willing to hire from the unemployment pool
while lowering the tax wedge 3 and shortening beneﬁt duration have a complemen-
tary eﬀect on unemployment durations.
Until the late 1980s, most of the TEs, apart from Yugoslavia, were characterised
by large excess labour demand (due to an ineﬀective allocation of labour), no open
unemployment, and high labour force participation at the price of extremely low
labour productivity and substantial labour hoarding (see Granick [1987]).
The start of the transition saw a rapidly collapsing demand for labour due to
labour markets addressing the ineﬃcient use of labour resources during the central
planning period. From the start of transition in 1989 until the resumption of eco-
nomic growth 15 years later, these countries lost between one ﬁfth and two-thirds
of their pre-transition level of GDP, EBRD [2009a] . Interestingly, the resumption
of economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE ) in the mid-1990s was
not always accompanied by increasing employment and falling unemployment (here
there are cross country diﬀerences). The diverse patterns of labour market adjust-
ment in TEs have caused scholars and policy-makers to look for explanations of
these diﬀerent labour market outcomes such as heterogenous labour market policies
and institutions (e.g. labour unions) roles across these countries.
Evidence on how labour market institutions and policies have aﬀected labour
market outcomes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is scarce because of data
constraints. Overall, data from TEs suggest that deregulation of labour markets
improves their performance (see EBRD [2009a]).
Svejnar [2002] studies the TE economic performance after the fall of communism
and shows that in most transition economies, employment decline reached 15 % to
30 % in the 1990s relative to the 1980s. He also observed that when combined with
GDP data, employment data suggest that restructuring in the transition economies
3The diﬀerence between take home pay and the labour cost to the employer
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involved an initial decline in labour productivity as output fell faster than employ-
ment and a subsequent rise in productivity as output and labour stopped declining.
But the author points out that it is also possible, with production shifting from
large to small ﬁrms, that the decline in employment (and output) is less pronounced
than suggested by the oﬃcial data, since small ﬁrms, a typical feature of TEs in the
early stages, are harder to capture in oﬃcial statistics.
Singer [1996] estimated a dynamic labour demand equation derived from a cost-
minimization model of monthly data from Czech ﬁrms from 1992 to 1993. These
estimates are presented with derived long-term wage elasticities. The author ﬁnds
small, insigniﬁcant estimates of short and long-term elasticities, that suggest the
possibility of labour hoarding.
A more recent paper by Carlin and Schaﬀer [2012] using ﬁrm level data in-
vestigates the interaction between the widespread opportunities for new business
activities (after the collapse of planning) in transition countries and their business
environment. The business environment includes physical infrastructure, the avail-
ability of an educated labour force, provision of administrative and judicial services,
the control of corruption and crime, and the stability of the macroeconomic environ-
ment. They compare how diﬀerent elements of the business environment aﬀected
ﬁrms in formerly planned economies with those in economies outside transition, doc-
umenting not only the challenges faced by transition ﬁrms but also the eﬀects of
the planning legacy. Their model predicts that higher quality ﬁrms report higher
shadow costs of constraints.
3.2.2 The Impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on ﬁrms' labour de-
mand
There is a little evidence of the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on labour demand both
in Europe and in in TE's. Bohachova et al. [2011] studied the employment response
to the ﬁnancial crisis in Germany. They estimate a dynamic labour demand function
for the years 2000-2009 accounting for the degree of working time ﬂexibility and the
presence of works councils. They found that employment hardly changed over the
crisis because of ﬁrm's labour hoarding (due to working time ﬂexibility and the
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presence of works councils).
Babetski et al. [2012] ﬁnd that, in Czech manufactoring ﬁrms, both the wage
and sales employment elasticities increased during the crisis, suggesting that ﬁrms
became demand constrained because of the fall in external demand, but only the
sales elasticity is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (data until 2009 4). They also ﬁnd coeﬃcients
on the lagged dependent variable capturing the persistence of labour demand, of
beween 30 and 40%, which are quite low given that usually, in absence of a crisis,
the coeﬃcients are higher in magnitude (around 80%). This ﬁnding suggests less
persistence in employment, and that both sales and wages were channels through
which ﬁrms adjusted to the crisis.
EBRD [2011] examines how the crisis aﬀected the economic well-being of house-
holds, making direct reference to unemployment using the 2010 EBRD-World Bank
Life in Transition Survey II (LiTS). The results show heterogeneity in the increase
in unemployment. They show that an index of the strength of the crisis on house-
holds and the rise in unemployment are strongly positively correlated. According
to the impact index 5, the hardest-hit transition countries during the ﬁnancial cri-
sis were those in the Baltic region and in South-Eastern Europe (FYR Macedonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia). Tajikistan, which
saw a sharp decline in remittances due to a return of migrant workers, is also in
this group. At the other end of the spectrum, countries where the crisis impact ap-
pears to have been relatively mild included the Czech Republic, Georgia, the Kyrgyz
Republic and Poland.
EBRD [2010] studies how unemployment rates reacted to the ﬁnancial crisis.
The report ﬁnds that as early as mid-2008, unemployment rates soared in the Baltic
states and other economies where growth had begun to slow in 2007 (for example,
Turkey and Ukraine). In contrast, in central and South-Eastern Europe, unemploy-
ment rates started to increase only in mid-2009, and even later in South-Eastern
Europe. Despite gradual declines by the second quarter of 2010 in some countries,
unemployment remains high. The aim of this study is to provide some microeco-
nomic evidence on the scale of the adjustment labour demand process across TEs.
4This was just the beginning of the crisis in the transition region
5The crisis event impact summarises the crisis impacts, job loss, business closure, reduced wages,
reduced hours and fewer remittances (See EBRD [2011] pg. 52)
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Entry to the European Union (EU) could have been a source of heterogeneity
in the ﬁrm's labour demand response to the ﬁnancial crisis, as either it could have
given access to EU subsidies, or guaranteed more regulation of labour markets. Both
access to subsidies and more regulations should have smoothed the impact of the
crisis on ﬁrm's labour demand. Firms which had to face the economic downturn, the
consequent reduction of sales and proﬁts and the credit crunch could have beneﬁted
from EU policies, resulting in the termination of fewer workers. Thus, this study
tests the hypothesis that ﬁrms reacted diﬀerently to the 2008/9 ﬁnancial crisis in
the EU-non EU regions.
3.3 Empirical strategy
3.3.1 Data description
The dataset used is the Business Environment Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)
which consists of cross-sectional data in 4 waves from 2002 to 2012. The data are
not a panel, but data were aggregated at the industry level in order to create a
pseudo-panel. The survey provides ﬁrm-level data on the business environment
and performance of ﬁrms, including business-government relations, ﬁrm ﬁnancing,
labour, infrastructure, informal payments and corruption, and other topics such as
training and innovation.
Table 3.1 describes the main variables used for the analysis.
The twenty-seven transition countries included in the sample are listed in Table
3.2 below. Ten of them are part of the European Union and among those, just
Croatia entered the EU after the ﬁnancial crisis.
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Table 3.1: Variable deﬁnitions
Variable Deﬁnition
N. of permanent workers N. of paid employees that are
contracted for a term of one or more ﬁscal years
and/or have a guaranteed renewal of their employment
contract and that worked full-time
N. of temporary workers N. of full-time employees paid
short-term (i.e. for less than a ﬁscal year)
with no guarantee of renewal of their employment contract
Share of temporary workers N. of part time employees over
the number of full-time employees
Sales Total annual sales in the last ﬁscal year for all products and services
Labour costs Total annual cost of labour including wages,
salaries, bonuses, social payments
Labour regulations To what degree are labour regulations an obstacle to the
current operations of this establishment?
Innovation (Dummy) During the last three years, has this establishment
introduced any new or signiﬁcantly improved methods
for the production or supply of products or services?
Research and development (Dummy) During the last three years, did this establishment spend
on research and development activities
either in-house or contracted with other companies (outsourced)?
Subsidy (Dummy) Over the last three years has this establishment
received any subsidies from
the national, regional or local governments
or European Union sources? Yes/No
Share of exports Share of direct exports over total sales in the last ﬁscal year
Table 3.2: Countries in the sample
EU Non-EU
Croatia (Jun 2012) Albania
Bulgaria (Jan 2007) Belarus
Czech Republic (Jan 2004) Tajikistan
Estonia (Jan 2004) Turkey
Hungary (Jan 2004) Ukraine
Latvia (Jan 2004) Uzbekistan
Lithuania (Jan 2004) Russia
Slovenia (Jan 2004) Kazakhstan
Poland (Jan 2004) Moldova
Romania (Jan 2007) Azerbaijan
FYR Macedonia
Armenia
Kyrgyz Republic
Slovak Republic
Georgia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Serbia and Montenegro
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The data were aggregated to 1-digit industry level, taking the average across
diﬀerent sectors, ﬁrm sizes and diﬀerent countries in order to build-up a pseudo-
panel as shown in Table 3.3 below. The pseudo-panel includes 6 sectors and 4
survey waves. The ﬁnal sample size is 636 observations.
Table 3.3: Pseudo-panel structure
Sector Survey waves
2002 2005 2008/2009 2012/2013 Total
Manufacturing 27 21 27 27 102
Mining and quarrying 21 27 27 27 102
Construction 27 27 27 27 108
Transport 27 27 27 27 108
Wholesale/retail/
services for motor vehicles 27 27 27 27 108
Other services 27 27 27 27 108
Total 156 156 162 162 636
Table 3.1 contains the deﬁnitions of the main variables used for the analysis, while
sub-section 3.7.2 in the Appendix shows how these were harmonised across diﬀerent
survey waves. Tables 3.17 - 3.24 in Appendix show the variation over time of the
mean of the main variables across sectors both in European and in non-European
countries.
In European countries the average number of permanent workers decreased in
all sectors, with the exception of wholesale and retail trade and services for motor
vehicles where it increased on average by about 62%. The sector that experienced
the larger fall in the number of permanent workers is services, where the average
number of permanent workers per ﬁrm decreased from about 168 to 77. The average
number of temporary workers decreased as well in most of the sectors, with the
exception of both construction and transport where it slightly increased. The sector
where the drop in the number of temporary workers was highest is manufacturing
where the average number of temporary workers per ﬁrm dropped by about 50%.
Average sales decreased as well in all sectors. The sharpest drop can be observed
for manufacturing ﬁrms, for ﬁrms engaged in wholesale/retail trade and services for
motor vehicles. Average total labour costs per ﬁrm increased between 2009/10 and
2012/13 in all the sectors, especially for ﬁrms engaged in wholesale/retail trade, and
services for motor vehicles.
In non-European countries the average number of permanent workers decreased
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in all sectors. The sector that experienced the larger shrink in the number of per-
manent workers is transport, where the average number of permanent workers per
ﬁrm more than halved. The average number of temporary workers decreased as well
in most of the sectors with an exception for mining and quarrying where it slightly
increased. Average sales decreased as well in all the sectors. The sharpest drop
can be observed both for transport ﬁrms and for ﬁrms engaged in wholesale/retail
trade and services for motor vehicles. The average total labour costs per ﬁrm de-
creased between 2009/10 and 2012/13 in all the sectors especially for ﬁrms engaged
in wholesale/retail trade and services for motor vehicles.
Thus, a comparison of European and non-European ﬁrms ﬁnds similar patterns
of variation in the labour demand and in the labour demand determinants.
Figures 3.3 and n. 3.4 show the kernel densities of the average number of per-
manent workers by sector over time. The blue line represents the density in the
post-crisis period, showing a fall in the average number of permanent workers in all
sectors of about between 25 and 50 %. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the kernel densities
of the average number of temporary workers by sector over time. Also the average
number of temporary workers shrinks towards the zero over time but less evidently
(of about 25%), suggesting that mostly permanent workers were ﬁred during the
crisis. However, the ﬁgures 3.3 and 3.4 represent a very rough representation of the
variation in the dependent variables.
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Figure 3.3: Average number of permanent workers by survey wave and by
sector
Figure 3.4: Average number of permanent workers by survey wave and by
sector
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Figure 3.5: Average number of temporary workers by survey wave and by
sector
Figure 3.6: Average number of temporary workers by survey wave and by
sector
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Figure 3.7: Average labour costs by survey wave and by sector
Figure 3.8: Average sales by survey wave and by sector
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3.3.2 Estimation of a Labour Demand Function from Panel
Data
The purpose of this section is to to give the theoretical framework underlying the
estimation. The focus of this chapter is to compare the coeﬃcient on the lagged
number of employees that accounts for the persistence of employment between EU-
non EU countries. This coeﬃcient identiﬁes the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on
ﬁrms' labour demand as it captures the change in ﬁrms' labour demand between
2008/9 and 2012/13.
Assuming a CES technology the production function is (see Hamermesh [1996]):
Y = [αLρ + (1− α)Kρ]1/ρ (3.1)
where α and ρ are parameters. The marginal products are:
D′Y/D′L = α(Y/L)1/ρ (3.2)
and
D′Y/D′K = [1− α](Y/K)1/ρ (3.3)
since the ratio of 3.5 and 3.2 is equal to the factor-price ratio, taking logarithms,
diﬀerentiating with respect to ln(w/r), and making σ >= 0, yields the elasticity of
substitution:
−D′ln(L/K)/D′ln(w/r) = σ = 1/[1/ρ] (3.4)
The CES cost function can be derived (see Ferguson [2008] p. 167) as:
C = Y [ασw1−σ + [1− α]σr1−σ]1/(1−σ) (3.5)
where, as before, σ = 1/[1/ρ] >= 0 The demand for labour is:
L = D′C/D′w = ασw−σY (3.6)
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Taking logarithms in 3.6 yields:
lnL = α− σlnw + lnY (3.7)
The empirical model derived from 3.7 is speciﬁed as:
lnlscti = α1 + α2lnlscti−1 + α3lnYscti + α4lnwscti + α5lnZscti + Y earF.E.+ SectorF.E.+ uscti
(3.8)
where:
• i: size of the ﬁrm (small, medium, large)
• s: sector of the ﬁrm
• c: country
• t: survey wave
• lscti−1: Lagged n.of employees. It accounts for the persistence of employment.
This coeﬃcient identiﬁes the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on ﬁrms' labour
demand as it captures the change in ﬁrms' labour demand between 2008/9
and 2012/13.
• Yscti: Firm level ouput/sales measured at the beginning of the previous ﬁscal
year
• wscti: Labour costs measured at the beginning of the previous ﬁscal year
• Zscti: Vector of control variables
Following Buch et al. [2005] the empirical speciﬁcation also includes a lagged
term which allows a partial adjustment process to be modeled and the persistence
of labour demand to be estimated. Lagged employment accounts for the fact that
hiring and ﬁring costs may cause employment persistence. All variables are speciﬁed
in logs, and we can therefore interpret the coeﬃcients as elasticities.
I follow Slaughter [2001] in assuming that the labour supply faced by the indi-
vidual ﬁrm is perfectly elastic. In this case, changes in the labour supply schedule
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allow changes in labour demand to be observed, and therefore coeﬃcients estimates
can be interpreted as labour demand elasticities.
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3.3.3 Identiﬁcation strategy
According to the speciﬁcation used in order to estimate dynamic labour demand
time and industry FE are included to capture price/cost of capital changes for
which the survey does not provide reliable ﬁrm-level estimates. Since the residuals
are correlated with the endogenous variables, in ﬁxed eﬀects estimates endogeneity
persists because of both simultaneity and time varying unobserved heterogenity.
Thus, sales and wages should be treated as endogenous and their ﬁrst lags can be
used as an IV.
3.4 Results
The impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on the persistence of ﬁrm's labour demand both in
European and in non-European countries is analysed using both OLS and an IV esti-
mator proposed by Anderson-Hsiao (AH) that uses the ﬁrst lags of the explanatory
variables as instruments 6. The dataset contains information on both permanent
and temporary workers, the share of temporary workers, total annual sales of the
ﬁrm, total annual labour costs, the degree of labour regulations imposed to the ﬁrm
(deﬁned as a categorical variable), an indicator of both innovation and R&D activity
of the ﬁrm in the last 3 years, a dummy variable that indicates if the ﬁrm received
a subsidy over the last three years and a measure of the share of direct exports over
total sales in the last ﬁscal year.
The results are given in Table 3.4 - 3.6. Table 3.4 shows that the IV estimate
of the persistence of permanent employment in transition countries over this period
(2008-2012) is, on average, about 9.5%, but it is not signiﬁcant. This estimate
is quite low compared to the ﬁndings in the current literature (usually between
30% and 80%. The reason for low persistence could be due to the adjustment of
ﬁrm's labour demand to the credirunchand to the fall in consumption/output . The
elasticity of employment of permanent workers with respect to sales is about 12.6%
and it is signiﬁcant at the 10% level of signiﬁcance (Table 3.4 column 4). Table 3.5
shows that the estimated elasticity is negative implying that the share of temporary
6The period covered by the dataset is not long enough to allow for Arrellano-Bond GMM
estimation (Arellano and Bond [1991])
182 CHAPTER 3. LABOUR DEMAND, CRISIS
workers is volatile over this period and it decreases of about 23% with respect to the
previous year signiﬁcantly at the 5% level. Table 3.6 shows instead no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the number of temporary workers. The ﬁrst stages of the IV estimates are
all signiﬁcant and are reported in the Appendix, Tables 3.26 - 3.28. Estimating the
persistence over the crisis period of the share of temporary workers rather than the
absolute number of temporary workers in a ﬁrm sheds light on the substitutability
between temporary and permanent workers during the economic downturn.
Overall, the results seem to suggest that the ﬁnancial crisis decreased more tem-
porary labour demand in transition countries rather than ﬁrm's labour demand of
permanent workers. This ﬁnding is in contrast with Figures 3.3-3.6 which seem to
suggest that the number of permanent workers decreased more than the number of
temporary workers. The diﬀerence can be explained by the fact that in the regres-
sions we control for other covariates (sales, labour costs etc.) that could have an
impact on the outcome variables. It seems reasonable to think that ﬁrm's labour
demand adjusts through temporary workers as they have more ﬂexible contracts.
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Table 3.4: Dynamic labour demand estimation on the n. of permanent
workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS IV IV
log (labour costs) 0.0323 0.0683 0.0547
(0.0301) (0.0560) (0.0563)
log (sales) 0.0674** 0.0690 0.127*
(0.0304) (0.0476) (0.0658)
log (n. permanent) (t-1) -0.239*** -0.337*** 0.0816 0.0973
(0.0437) (0.0410) (0.162) (0.167)
labour regulations 0.0537
(0.0700)
legal status -0.322
(0.264)
Constant 4.662*** 5.379***
(0.176) (0.189)
Observations 646 646 646 646
R-squared 0.097 0.301 -0.081 -0.192
Number of nid 323 323 323 323
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust s.e.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are averages by country, sector, year and size
(see Table 3.1 for deﬁnitions). Both sales and labour costs are speciﬁed
in 1000 dollars (see the Appendix section 3.7.2). The countries in the
sample are listed in Table 3.2
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Table 3.5: Dynamic labour demand estimation on the share of temporary
workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS IV IV
log (labour costs) 0.00537 0.00257 0.00284
(0.00371) (0.00785) (0.00774)
log (sales) -0.00375 -0.00580 -0.00821
(0.00380) (0.00721) (0.00851)
share of temporary (t-1) -0.466*** -0.475*** -0.245** -0.238**
(0.0726) (0.0729) (0.112) (0.114)
labour regulations 0.0107
(0.00747)
legal status 0.00871
(0.0206)
Constant 0.122*** 0.138***
(0.00581) (0.0122)
Observations 646 646 646 646
R-squared 0.196 0.202 0.136 0.121
Number of nid 323 323 323 323
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust s.e.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are averages by country, sector, year and size
(see Table 3.1 for deﬁnitions). Both sales and labour costs are speciﬁed
in 1000 dollars (see the Appendix section 3.7.2). The countries in the
sample are listed in Table 3.2
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Table 3.6: Dynamic labour demand estimation on the number of tempo-
rary workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS IV IV
log (labour costs) 0.671 1.587 1.199
(0.440) (1.405) (1.265)
log (sales) -0.0288 0.141 1.659*
(0.549) (0.799) (0.879)
n. temporay (t-1) -0.00434 -0.00484 0.00739 -0.00173
(0.00664) (0.00683) (0.00970) (0.00552)
labour regulations 1.665
(1.552)
legal status -8.460**
(3.955)
Constant 8.098*** 11.14***
(0.109) (1.239)
Observations 646 646 646 646
R-squared 0.002 0.015 -0.038 -0.050
Number of nid 323 323 323 323
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust s.e.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are averages by country, sector, year and size
(see Table 3.1 for deﬁnitions). Both sales and labour costs are speciﬁed
in 1000 dollars (see the Appendix section 3.7.2). The countries in the
sample are listed in Table 3.2
186 CHAPTER 3. LABOUR DEMAND, CRISIS
This paper also studies the diﬀerences in the labour demand response to the
ﬁnancial crisis of both European and non-European ﬁrms. The results are reported
in Table 3.7 - 3.12
The persistence of the share of the labour demand of temporary workers is lower
in non-European countries (it decreases about 25%, signiﬁcant at the 10% level of
conﬁdence) see Table 3.11 and it is more volatile than in European countries where
the persistence of ﬁrm's labour demand is about 25%, even though not signiﬁcant,
as shown in Table 3.8. The ﬁrst stages of the IV estimates are reported in the
Appendix, Tables 3.29 - 3.34.
Table 3.7: Dynamic labour demand estimation on the n. of permanent
workers in European countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS IV IV
log (labour costs) 0.0583 0.0232 0.00302
(0.0411) (0.0802) (0.0791)
log (sales) 0.0296 0.0760 0.114
(0.0400) (0.0674) (0.0933)
log (n. permanent) (t-1) -0.174*** -0.282*** -0.0586 -0.0393
(0.0594) (0.0634) (0.133) (0.128)
labour regulations 0.0901
(0.0787)
legal status -0.146
(0.310)
Constant 4.407*** 5.116***
(0.239) (0.282)
Observations 274 274 274 274
R-squared 0.062 0.225 0.096 0.045
Number of nid 137 137 137 137
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust s.e.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are averages by country, sector, year and size
(see Table 3.1 for deﬁnitions). Both sales and labour costs are speciﬁed
in 1000 dollars (see the Appendix section 3.7.2). The countries in the
sample are listed in Table 3.2
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Table 3.8: Dynamic labour demand estimation on the share of temporary
workers in European countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS IV IV
log (labour costs) 0.00511 0.000749 -0.00104
(0.00378) (0.00971) (0.00938)
log (sales) -0.00668* -0.000667 0.000667
(0.00345) (0.00912) (0.0132)
share of temporary (t-1) -0.653*** -0.668*** 0.00564 0.00330
(0.103) (0.103) (0.223) (0.249)
labour regulations 0.0103
(0.0105)
legal status -0.00373
(0.0319)
Constant 0.122*** 0.131***
(0.00758) (0.0135)
Observations 274 274 274 274
R-squared 0.367 0.380 -0.006 0.003
Number of nid 137 137 137 137
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust s.e.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are averages by country, sector, year and size
(see Table 3.1 for deﬁnitions). Both sales and labour costs are speciﬁed
in 1000 dollars (see the Appendix section 3.7.2). The countries in the
sample are listed in Table 3.2
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Table 3.9: Dynamic labour demand estimation on the number of tempo-
rary workers in European countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS IV IV
log (labour costs) 0.662 0.266 -0.222
(0.922) (2.060) (1.719)
log (sales) -0.794 -0.101 1.857
(1.075) (1.778) (1.658)
n. temporay (t-1) -0.0335 -0.0327 -0.000116 -0.0146
(0.0659) (0.0650) (0.0966) (0.116)
labour regulations 0.147
(1.884)
legal status -8.040
(5.975)
Constant 8.081*** 9.257***
(0.659) (2.203)
Observations 274 274 274 274
R-squared 0.004 0.009 -0.001 -0.014
Number of nid 137 137 137 137
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust s.e.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are averages by country, sector, year and size
(see Table 3.1 for deﬁnitions). Both sales and labour costs are speciﬁed
in 1000 dollars (see the Appendix section 3.7.2). The countries in the
sample are listed in Table 3.2
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Table 3.10: Dynamic labour demand estimation on the number of perma-
nent workers in non European countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS IV IV
log (labour costs) 0.517 2.129 2.054
(0.425) (1.896) (1.817)
log (sales) 0.691 0.867 1.800
(0.567) (0.963) (1.261)
n. temporay (t-1) -0.00399 -0.00484 0.00912 0.00183
(0.00644) (0.00675) (0.0136) (0.00358)
labour regulations 3.807
(2.672)
legal status -8.919*
(5.281)
Constant 8.317*** 13.24***
(0.137) (1.789)
Observations 372 372 372 372
R-squared 0.002 0.044 -0.082 -0.094
Number of nid 186 186 186 186
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust s.e.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are averages by country, sector, year and size
(see Table 3.1 for deﬁnitions). Both sales and labour costs are speciﬁed
in 1000 dollars (see the Appendix section 3.7.2). The countries in the
sample are listed in Table 3.2
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Table 3.11: Dynamic labour demand estimation on the share of temporary
workers in non European countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS IV IV
log (labour costs) 0.00515 0.00271 0.00374
(0.00556) (0.0108) (0.0111)
log (sales) -0.00180 -0.00849 -0.0122
(0.00589) (0.00994) (0.0116)
share of temporary (t-1) -0.373*** -0.388*** -0.274** -0.255*
(0.0832) (0.0840) (0.136) (0.144)
labour regulations 0.0105
(0.0135)
legal status 0.0178
(0.0308)
Constant 0.123*** 0.146***
(0.00705) (0.0170)
Observations 372 372 372 372
R-squared 0.128 0.140 0.060 0.028
Number of nid 186 186 186 186
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust s.e.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are averages by country, sector, year and size
(see Table 3.1 for deﬁnitions). Both sales and labour costs are speciﬁed
in 1000 dollars (see the Appendix section 3.7.2). The countries in the
sample are listed in Table 3.2
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Table 3.12: Dynamic labour demand estimation on number of temporary
workers in non European countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS IV IV
log (labour costs) 0.517 2.129 2.054
(0.425) (1.896) (1.817)
log (sales) 0.691 0.867 1.800
(0.567) (0.963) (1.261)
n. temporay (t-1) -0.00399 -0.00484 0.00912 0.00183
(0.00644) (0.00675) (0.0136) (0.00358)
labour regulations 3.807
(2.672)
legal status -8.919*
(5.281)
Constant 8.317*** 13.24***
(0.137) (1.789)
Observations 372 372 372 372
R-squared 0.002 0.044 -0.082 -0.094
Number of nid 186 186 186 186
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust s.e.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are averages by country, sector, year and size
(see Table 3.1 for deﬁnitions). Both sales and labour costs are speciﬁed
in 1000 dollars (see the Appendix section 3.7.2). The countries in the
sample are listed in Table 3.2
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3.5 Robustness checks
Table 3.13 in this section shows the same IV estimates discussed in section 3.4 but
introducing more controls that could aﬀect ﬁrms' labour demand. In particular,
subsidy is a dummy variable which reveals if the ﬁrm received a subsidy over the
last three years, research and development it indicates if the ﬁrm engaged in any
research and development activity in the previous three years and share of exports
is a variable that describes the ﬁrm's share of exports in the previous year. The
variables might be endogenous. However, the main coeﬃcients of interests are robust
to the introduction of these extra explanatory variables. In particular, the share of
temporary workers signiﬁcantly decreased of about 22.5 percentage points between
2005 and 2007/8, while both the coeﬃcient on the lag of the number of permanent
and temporary workers is not signiﬁcant.
Tables 3.14, 3.15 and 3.16 in this section show the results as in section 3.4 but
estimated with random eﬀects instead of ﬁxed eﬀects. The coeﬃcients of interests
in these regressions are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those in section 3.4 as they show
a signiﬁcant increase both in the number of permanent and in the share of tem-
porary workers. The diﬀerence in the results suggests that the RE estimates are
inconsistent.
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Table 3.14: Dynamic labour demand estimation on the n. of permanent
workers (random eﬀects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS IV IV
log (labour costs) -0.00743 -0.262* -0.199*
(0.0243) (0.153) (0.115)
log (sales) 0.0555** 0.255 0.185
(0.0234) (0.159) (0.120)
log (n. permanent) (t-1) 0.814*** 0.768*** 0.912*** 0.524***
(0.0171) (0.0189) (0.0285) (0.153)
labour regulations 0.0960*
(0.0490)
legal status -0.0878
(0.101)
size 0.693***
(0.260)
Constant 0.419*** 0.710*** -0.539* -0.106
(0.0733) (0.113) (0.304) (0.243)
Observations 646 646 646 646
Number of nid 323 323 323 323
Notes:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are averages by country, sector, year and size
(see Table 3.1 for deﬁnitions). Both sales and labour costs are speciﬁed
in 1000 dollars (see the Appendix section 3.7.2). The countries in the
sample are listed in Table 3.2
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Table 3.15: Dynamic labour demand estimation on the share of temporary
workers (random eﬀects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS IV IV
log (labour costs) 0.00287 0.0819* 0.0695*
(0.00317) (0.0432) (0.0419)
log (sales) -0.00551* -0.0849* -0.0784*
(0.00308) (0.0445) (0.0434)
share of temporary (t-1) 0.268*** 0.253*** 1.325*** 1.845***
(0.0426) (0.0427) (0.409) (0.619)
labour regulations 0.0208
(0.0154)
legal status 0.0437*
(0.0251)
size 0.0450**
(0.0216)
Constant 0.0629*** 0.0634*** 0.141 -0.0974
(0.00483) (0.00927) (0.0953) (0.119)
Observations 646 646 646 646
Number of nid 323 323 323 323
Notes:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are averages by country, sector, year and size
(see Table 3.1 for deﬁnitions). Both sales and labour costs are speciﬁed
in 1000 dollars (see the Appendix section 3.7.2). The countries in the
sample are listed in Table 3.2
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Table 3.16: Dynamic labour demand estimation on the number of tempo-
rary workers (random eﬀects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS IV IV
log (labour costs) 1.457*** 2.307 -0.595
(0.535) (33.69) (5.416)
log (sales) -0.267 -1.270 0.435
(0.517) (34.86) (5.702)
n. temporay (t-1) 0.00211 0.00170 0.0158 0.0570
(0.00460) (0.00451) (0.248) (0.145)
labour regulations 0.663
(1.373)
legal status -1.620
(4.613)
size 6.945***
(2.229)
Constant 7.992*** 14.07*** 15.21 -5.793
(0.652) (1.477) (70.91) (9.818)
Observations 646 646 646 646
Number of nid 323 323 323 323
Notes:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variables are averages by country, sector, year and size
(see Table 3.1 for deﬁnitions). Both sales and labour costs are speciﬁed
in 1000 dollars (see the Appendix section 3.7.2). The countries in the
sample are listed in Table 3.2
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3.6 Conclusions and policy implications
Was the labour demand response to the ﬁnancial crisis heterogeneous across transi-
tion countries? What were the sources of heterogeneity?
A cross-country comparison of the impact of the crisis on ﬁrm's labour demand
can facilitate knowledge of "what works". According to the results of this analysis
the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on the share of temporary workers between 2009
and 2012 in European countries was about 24% negative and signiﬁcant. Their share
didn't show instead any signiﬁcant variation in European countries over the period
of the crisis. No signiﬁcant eﬀect is found on the number of permanent workers.
The results could be justiﬁed by the fact that diﬀerent labour regulations in
European countries could play a role in favouring temporary worker's labour hoard-
ing. These ﬁnding are policy relevant as they suggest that European institutions
might pay a role in controlling the level of unemployment, at least in th short run,
oﬀering job protection to workers. Most importantly, the results might suggest that
during an economic downturn gender diﬀerences count as nowadays mostly women
are employed part time.
Future research, making use of a longer panel survey and national data on workers
could investigate both the diﬀerence between the long and the short run impact of the
ﬁnancial crisis on unemployment, and look for heterogeneous eﬀects across diﬀerent
clusters of European countries (new members vs. old members). Finally, it would
be interesting to look at the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on ﬁrm's labour demand
exploring the heterogeneity of its impact across male and female employees. If it
is true that part-time workers are those loosing more jobs than permanent workers
during a ﬁnancial turmoil, and if women are represent the largest share of employees
in these jobs, then governments should keep that into account when shaping public
policies.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Data description
Table 3.17: Summary statistics EU countries by sector in 2008/2009 (to
be continued...)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Manufactoring
N. temporary workers 8.587 13.385 0 100.333 193
N. permanent workers 136.766 216.345 3 1675 195
Log of the n. of permanent workers 3.995 1.389 1.099 7.424 195
Share of temporary workers 0.08 0.094 0 0.833 193
Sales 24.23 103.945 0.001 1083.332 193
Labour costs 3.246 15.886 0 152.1 193
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 15.37 32.449 0 300 193
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 310.303 497.923 6.359 4400 193
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 4.568 1.687 1.85 8.388 193
Log of labour costs -2.701 2.673 -8.255 5.025 193
Log of sales -0.498 2.822 -6.534 6.988 193
Lag of the log of labour costs -3.312 2.508 -7.929 3.262 173
Lag of the log of sales -1.092 2.555 -5.976 5.874 192
Second lag of the log of sales 1.134 1.919 -3.293 5.57 154
Mining and quarrying
N. temporary workers 4.274 5.723 0 23 26
N. permanent workers 211.52 359.926 6 1675 28
Log of the n. of permanent workers 4.299 1.501 1.792 7.424 28
Share of temporary workers 0.046 0.061 0 0.233 26
Sales 36.411 131.706 0.003 686.233 27
Labour costs 4.376 18.916 0.001 98.526 27
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 17.595 33.258 0.375 130.463 28
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 324.595 427.706 10.611 1842.6 28
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 4.799 1.617 2.362 7.519 28
Log of labour costs -2.728 2.982 -7.207 4.59 27
Log of sales -0.242 3.258 -5.972 6.531 27
Lag of the log of labour costs -2.925 2.566 -7.131 3.152 28
Lag of the log of sales -0.97 2.561 -5.351 4.764 28
Second lag of the log of sales 2.039 2.022 -1.244 4.834 11
Constructions
N. temporary workers 13.614 16.353 0 76.25 33
N. permanent workers 98.369 100.941 5.667 290.286 33
Log of the n. of permanent workers 3.99 1.163 1.735 5.671 33
Share of temporary workers 0.119 0.104 0 0.53 33
Sales 15.913 47.528 0.01 222.444 33
Labour costs 1.935 5.762 0.002 25.356 33
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 7.703 11.41 0 60 33
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 212.424 316.345 8.182 1658 33
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 4.437 1.491 2.102 7.413 33
Log of labour costs -2.492 2.502 -6.203 3.233 33
Log of sales -0.449 2.606 -4.574 5.405 33
Lag of the log of labour costs -3.477 2.274 -6.679 2.179 31
Lag of the log of sales -1.203 2.506 -4.928 4.172 33
Second lag of the log of sales 0.778 1.801 -2.831 5.57 29
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Table 3.18: Summary statistics EU countries by sector in 2008/2009 (...
continued)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Transports
N. temporary workers 7.457 10.445 0 37.308 33
N. permanent workers 156.477 255.403 7.25 1222.846 33
Log of the n. of permanent workers 3.977 1.49 1.981 7.109 33
Share of temporary workers 0.073 0.091 0 0.345 33
Sales 11.62 30.237 0.012 143.335 33
Labour costs 1.078 3.506 0.001 17.049 33
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 25.159 41.048 0 187.75 33
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 394.003 540.804 7.043 2074.4 33
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 4.688 1.858 1.952 7.637 33
Log of labour costs -2.803 2.449 -6.55 2.836 33
Log of sales -0.497 2.656 -4.41 4.965 33
Lag of the log of labour costs -3.176 2.549 -7.438 2.303 33
Lag of the log of sales -1.417 2.442 -5.53 3.45 33
Second lag of the log of sales 1.172 2.03 -2.023 5.406 32
Wholesale/retail
/services for motor vehicles
N. temporary workers 9.054 13.11 0 58.833 34
N. permanent workers 164.643 245.548 5 1058.407 34
Log of the n. of permanent workers 3.972 1.588 1.609 6.965 34
Share of temporary workers 0.063 0.035 0 0.126 34
Sales 52.813 195.432 0.026 1083.332 33
Labour costs 5.473 26.165 0.001 152.1 34
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 13.727 19.625 0.459 65.444 33
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 247.333 324.158 6.359 1184.833 33
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 4.383 1.749 1.85 7.077 33
Log of labour costs -2.596 2.742 -6.851 5.025 34
Log of sales 0.142 2.821 -3.649 6.988 33
Lag of the log of labour costs -3.697 2.747 -7.929 3.262 33
Lag of the log of sales -1.183 2.761 -5.583 5.874 33
Second lag of the log of sales 1.438 2.106 -3.069 5.376 33
Other services
N. temporary workers 13.854 32.101 0 300 129
N. permanent workers 168.372 263.326 3 1435 129
Log of the n. of permanent workers 4.034 1.574 1.099 7.269 129
Share of temporary workers 0.1 0.097 0 0.833 129
Sales 6.663 39.202 0.001 439.008 129
Labour costs 1.581 10.98 0 105.41 93
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 14.152 33.55 0 300 95
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 193.878 293.152 3.5 1435 95
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 4.174 1.597 1.253 7.269 95
Log of labour costs -3.767 2.66 -8.255 4.658 93
Log of sales -1.418 2.705 -6.556 6.085 129
Lag of the log of labour costs -3.349 2.601 -8.255 4.658 62
Lag of the log of sales -0.881 2.61 -6.534 6.085 95
Second lag of the log of labour costs -3.768 2.391 -7.353 2.318 29
Second lag of the log of sales -0.61 2.497 -5.976 3.972 62
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Table 3.19: Summary statistics EU countries by sector in 2012/2013 (to
be continued...)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Manufactoring
N. temporary workers 3.962 5.484 0 26.722 33
N. permanent workers 105.8 115.097 8.979 391.263 33
Log of the n. of permanent workers 3.933 1.316 2.195 5.969 33
Share of temporary workers 0.04 0.028 0 0.123 33
Sales 12.021 65.138 0.003 374.727 33
Labour costs 0.109 0.357 0 1.894 33
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 6.829 9.663 0.292 48.587 33
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 104.088 107.431 10.536 348.704 33
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 4.021 1.199 2.355 5.854 33
Log of labour costs -4.591 2.022 -7.864 0.639 33
Log of sales -2.322 2.529 -5.953 5.926 33
Lag of the log of labour costs -2.67 2.704 -6.691 4.099 33
Lag of the log of sales -0.474 2.652 -5.068 5.546 33
Second lag of the log of labour costs -2.861 2.585 -6.685 1.159 15
Second lag of the log of sales 0.118 2.408 -4.183 4.456 32
Mining and quarrying
N. temporary workers 3.684 8.646 0 40 28
N. permanent workers 163.077 475.966 6 2530 28
Log of the n. of permanent workers 3.746 1.418 1.792 7.836 28
Share of temporary workers 0.046 0.058 0 0.213 28
Sales 1.38 6.334 0 33.02 27
Labour costs 0.03 0.06 0 0.265 23
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 4.397 5.569 0 23 27
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 183.622 363.918 6 1675 28
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 3.976 1.511 1.792 7.424 28
Log of labour costs -5.006 1.913 -8.273 -1.328 23
Log of sales -3.066 2.291 -7.955 3.497 27
Lag of the log of labour costs -3.044 2.925 -7.036 4.59 27
Lag of the log of sales -0.801 3.318 -5.972 6.531 27
Second lag of the log of labour costs -3.222 2.587 -7.131 3.152 24
Second lag of the log of sales -1.255 2.441 -5.351 4.764 26
Constructions
N. temporary workers 16.524 36.728 0 200 32
N. permanent workers 95.931 127.705 6.385 517.5 32
Log of the n. of permanent workers 3.748 1.334 1.854 6.249 32
Share of temporary workers 0.122 0.115 0 0.667 32
Sales 0.248 0.663 0.002 3.56 32
Labour costs 0.035 0.095 0 0.513 30
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 12.899 16.082 0 76.25 32
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 92.921 97.503 5.667 290.286 32
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 3.939 1.144 1.735 5.671 32
Log of labour costs -4.944 1.84 -8.311 -0.667 30
Log of sales -3.023 1.823 -6.251 1.27 32
Lag of the log of labour costs -2.514 2.539 -6.203 3.233 32
Lag of the log of sales -0.453 2.648 -4.574 5.405 32
Second lag of the log of labour costs -3.477 2.274 -6.679 2.179 31
Second lag of the log of sales -1.371 2.35 -4.928 3.095 32
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Table 3.20: Summary statistics EU countries by sector in 2012/2013
(...continued)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Transports
N. temporary workers 10.503 20.725 0 70.600 30
N. permanent workers 109.813 168.587 6 704.75 30
Log of the n. of permanent workers 3.755 1.405 1.792 6.558 30
Share of temporary workers 0.063 0.093 0 0.455 30
Sales 6.414 33.173 0.002 178.839 29
Labour costs 0.092 0.345 0 1.8 28
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 7.141 10.416 0 37.308 30
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 147.816 262.623 7.25 1222.846 30
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 3.859 1.482 1.981 7.109 30
Log of labour costs -5.039 2.119 -8.266 0.588 28
Log of sales -2.84 2.294 -6.484 5.186 29
Lag of the log of labour costs -2.956 2.503 -6.55 2.836 30
Lag of the log of sales -0.839 2.497 -4.41 4.311 30
Second lag of the log of labour costs -3.412 2.476 -7.438 2.303 30
Second lag of the log of sales -1.634 2.388 -5.53 3.45 30
Wholesale/retail
/services for motor vehicles
N. temporary workers 6.469 10.02 0.086 35.154 33
N. permanent workers 264.924 732.162 7.349 4163.75 33
Log of the n. of permanent workers 4.007 1.704 1.995 8.334 33
Share of temporary workers 0.055 0.044 0.002 0.259 33
Sales 0.569 1.051 0.006 4.705 33
Labour costs 0.039 0.078 0 0.397 33
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 9.327 13.213 0 58.833 33
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 169.481 247.704 7.667 1058.407 33
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 4.043 1.556 2.037 6.965 33
Log of labour costs -4.79 1.918 -7.97 -0.923 33
Log of sales -2.008 1.876 -5.158 1.549 33
Lag of the log of labour costs -2.492 2.716 -6.851 5.025 33
Lag of the log of sales 0.142 2.821 -3.649 6.988 33
Second lag of the log of labour costs -3.697 2.747 -7.929 3.262 33
Second lag of the log of sales -1.183 2.761 -5.583 5.874 33
Other services
N. temporary workers 11.118 25.3 0 126.667 29
N. permanent workers 77.257 110.262 6 423.25 29
Log of the n. of permanent workers 3.487 1.325 1.792 6.048 29
Share of temporary workers 0.092 0.081 0 0.343 29
Sales 0.138 0.3 0.001 1.53 29
Labour costs 0.145 0.672 0 3.503 27
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 6.806 9.803 0 37.8 29
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 77.344 95.366 3.5 384.714 29
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 3.631 1.28 1.253 5.953 29
Log of labour costs -5.196 2.092 -7.988 1.254 27
Log of sales -3.436 1.816 -6.556 0.425 29
Lag of the log of labour costs -3.242 2.803 -8.255 4.658 29
Lag of the log of sales -1.644 2.851 -6.534 6.085 29
Second lag of the log of labour costs -3.768 2.391 -7.353 2.318 29
Second lag of the log of sales -2.157 2.367 -5.976 3.972 29
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Table 3.21: Summary statistics non EU countries by sector in 2008/2009
(to be continued...)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Manufactoring
N. temporary workers 8.882 9.766 0.686 43.095 48
N. permanent workers 143.093 203.134 11.194 1178.595 48
Log of the n. of permanent workers 4.21 1.245 2.415 7.072 48
Share of temporary workers 0.072 0.037 0.011 0.164 48
Sales 33.983 122.2 0.002 700.35 48
Labour costs 3.974 15.858 0 89.595 48
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 9.766 15.736 0 66.667 47
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 255.665 321.604 9 1387.5 48
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 4.674 1.472 2.197 7.235 48
Log of labour costs -3.989 3.263 -7.895 4.495 48
Log of sales -1.658 3.287 -6.189 6.552 48
Lag of the log of labour costs -5.301 3.192 -10.382 3.883 21
Lag of the log of sales -2.266 3.296 -8.665 5.511 37
Second lag of the log of labour costs 0
Second lag of the log of sales -0.469 3.113 -4.225 10.537 33
Mining and quarrying
N. temporary workers 5.164 7.24 0 33.929 45
N. permanent workers 140.601 251.591 5.333 1548.067 45
Log of the n. of permanent workers 4.026 1.36 1.674 7.345 45
Share of temporary workers 0.062 0.071 0 0.344 45
Sales 40.794 162.192 0 990 45
Labour costs 3.643 14.93 0 93.75 44
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 45.386 137.63 1.206 740.167 45
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 280.047 345.59 13.286 1514.333 45
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 4.696 1.518 2.587 7.323 45
Log of labour costs -4.342 3.499 -9.121 4.541 44
Log of sales -2.194 3.637 -8.455 6.898 45
Lag of the log of labour costs -4.605 2.954 -9.356 3.347 42
Lag of the log of sales -2.606 3.041 -7.179 6.051 42
Second lag of the log of labour costs 0
Second lag of the log of sales 0.069 3.989 -6.155 11.492 21
Constructions
N. temporary workers 27.589 40.847 0 229.625 46
N. permanent workers 136.128 175.914 6.333 741.625 46
Log of the n. of permanent workers 4.128 1.299 1.846 6.609 46
Share of temporary workers 0.179 0.111 0 0.462 46
Sales 16.273 65.185 0.001 430.71 46
Labour costs 2.511 10.666 0 69.808 46
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 24.442 64.906 0 379.286 44
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 254.504 422.661 7.875 2150.333 44
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 4.528 1.466 2.064 7.673 44
Log of labour costs -4.108 3.177 -9.287 4.246 46
Log of sales -1.894 3.15 -7.275 6.065 46
Lag of the log of labour costs -4.871 2.891 -10.097 2.405 40
Lag of the log of sales -2.839 3.046 -8.32 5.335 40
Second lag of the log of labour costs 0
Second lag of the log of sales -0.839 2.712 -3.979 7.74 43
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Table 3.22: Summary statistics non EU countries by sector in 2008/2009
(... continued)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Transports
N. temporary workers 8.292 29.193 0 199.75 46
N. permanent workers 248.463 896.315 7.571 6142.111 47
Log of the n. of permanent workers 4.077 1.445 2.024 8.723 47
Share of temporary workers 0.058 0.059 0 0.222 46
Sales 50.134 258.529 0.001 1742.924 46
Labour costs 6.16 23.565 0 144.774 47
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 20.642 72.795 0 490 46
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 299.063 409.885 9.75 1591 46
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 4.61 1.62 2.277 7.372 46
Log of labour costs -3.992 3.723 -9.609 4.975 47
Log of sales -2.269 3.68 -7.535 7.463 46
Lag of the log of labour costs -4.621 3.198 -9.898 3.352 41
Lag of the log of sales -2.786 3.409 -7.74 6.18 42
Second lag of the log of labour costs 0
Second lag of the log of sales -0.661 2.971 -4.648 8.869 42
Wholesale/retail
/services for motor vehicles
N. temporary workers 5.551 10.526 0 52.6 47
N. permanent workers 112.602 165.959 7.721 845.935 47
Log of the n. of permanent workers 3.894 1.276 2.044 6.74 47
Share of temporary workers 0.052 0.034 0 0.141 47
Sales 108.48 396.287 0.002 1999.056 47
Labour costs 7.616 34.284 0 227.081 47
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 29.438 92.235 0 545.327 46
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 210.423 297.054 7.978 1462.615 47
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 4.314 1.612 2.077 7.288 47
Log of labour costs -4.187 3.614 -9.326 5.425 47
Log of sales -1.322 3.485 -6.362 7.600 47
Lag of the log of labour costs -5.001 3.108 -10.352 4.366 40
Lag of the log of sales -2.458 3.167 -8.016 6.701 44
Second lag of the log of labour costs 0
Second lag of the log of sales -0.688 3.092 -4.513 8.944 40
Other services
N. temporary workers 7.056 11.242 0 50 46
N. permanent workers 106.339 309.207 4 2097.75 46
Log of the n. of permanent workers 3.582 1.293 1.386 7.649 46
Share of temporary workers 0.078 0.065 0 0.255 46
Sales 8.527 36.784 0 184.934 46
Labour costs 0.884 3.604 0 22.919 46
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 74.905 436.665 0 2936.042 45
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 176.182 213.01 7.313 964 45
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 4.303 1.492 1.99 6.871 45
Log of labour costs -4.942 3.145 -10.054 3.132 46
Log of sales -3.392 3.158 -9.989 5.22 46
Lag of the log of labour costs -4.88 3.03 -10.14 2.447 42
Lag of the log of sales -3.353 3.038 -8.56 3.574 42
Second lag of the log of labour costs 0
Second lag of the log of sales -1.466 2.382 -4.795 6.378 41
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Table 3.23: Summary statistics non EU countries by sector in 2012/2013
(to be continued...)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Manufactoring
N. temporary workers 8.322 10.962 0 54.5 48
N. permanent workers 123.444 159.733 8.385 625.805 48
Log of the n. of permanent workers 3.913 1.414 2.126 6.439 48
Share of temporary workers 0.063 0.045 0 0.227 48
Sales 0.527 3.094 0.001 21.461 48
Labour costs 0.052 0.256 0 1.763 48
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 8.882 9.766 0.686 43.095 48
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 143.093 203.134 11.194 1178.595 48
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 4.21 1.245 2.415 7.072 48
Log of labour costs -5.933 2.139 -9.182 0.567 48
Log of sales -3.906 2.004 -6.693 3.066 48
Lag of the log of labour costs -3.989 3.263 -7.895 4.495 48
Lag of the log of sales -1.658 3.287 -6.189 6.552 48
Second lag of the log of labour costs -5.301 3.192 -10.382 3.883 21
Second lag of the log of sales -2.266 3.296 -8.665 5.511 37
Mining and quarrying
N. temporary workers 7.685 10.794 0 45 45
N. permanent workers 134.737 217.454 8 911 45
Log of the n. of permanent workers 3.861 1.435 2.079 6.815 45
Share of temporary workers 0.096 0.121 0 0.553 45
Sales 0.342 1.195 0 7.100 44
Labour costs 0.044 0.191 0 1.2 44
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 4.804 6.793 0 33.929 45
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 154.451 270.272 5.333 1548.067 45
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 4.045 1.42 1.674 7.345 45
Log of labour costs -6.06 2.048 -9.341 0.182 44
Log of sales -3.902 2.269 -8.657 1.96 44
Lag of the log of labour costs -4.175 3.637 -9.121 4.541 44
Lag of the log of sales -2.006 3.761 -8.455 6.898 45
Second lag of the log of labour costs -4.674 3.055 -9.356 3.347 39
Second lag of the log of sales -2.56 3.169 -7.179 6.051 40
Constructions
N. temporary workers 20.47 29.302 0 174.286 47
N. permanent workers 118.018 201.866 8.571 1023 48
Log of the n. of permanent workers 3.881 1.324 2.148 6.93 48
Share of temporary workers 0.172 0.124 0 0.528 47
Sales 0.744 4.705 0.001 32.645 48
Labour costs 0.047 0.253 0 1.728 47
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 47.251 145.932 0 999 48
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 148.185 183.614 6.333 741.625 48
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 4.206 1.328 1.846 6.609 48
Log of labour costs -5.809 1.773 -8.438 0.547 47
Log of sales -3.994 1.904 -7.091 3.486 48
Lag of the log of labour costs -3.92 3.3 -9.287 4.246 48
Lag of the log of sales -1.715 3.28 -7.275 6.065 48
Second lag of the log of labour costs -4.871 2.891 -10.097 2.405 40
Second lag of the log of sales -2.544 3.55 -8.32 9.231 41
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Table 3.24: Summary statistics non EU countries by sector in 2012/2013
(...continued)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Transports
N. temporary workers 3.04 5.202 0 19.8 38
N. permanent workers 106.35 271.585 2 1656 40
Log of the n. of permanent workers 3.442 1.397 0.693 7.412 40
Share of temporary workers 0.06 0.092 0 0.267 38
Sales 0.057 0.19 0 1.072 37
Labour costs 0.009 0.029 0 0.152 37
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 8.603 31.671 0 199.75 39
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 233.075 968.003 7.571 6142.111 40
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 3.808 1.375 2.024 8.723 40
Log of labour costs -6.724 1.82 -9.931 -1.885 37
Log of sales -5.338 2.023 -8.752 0.07 37
Lag of the log of labour costs -4.425 3.524 -9.609 4.138 40
Lag of the log of sales -2.776 3.381 -7.535 5.119 39
Second lag of the log of labour costs -5.104 3.049 -9.898 2.121 34
Second lag of the log of sales -3.252 3.219 -7.74 3.597 35
Wholesale/retail
/services for motor vehicles
N. temporary workers 4.808 9.246 0 43.333 48
N. permanent workers 107.654 138.846 7.964 591.968 48
Log of the n. of permanent workers 3.813 1.387 2.075 6.383 48
Share of temporary workers 0.046 0.044 0 0.195 48
Sales 1.256 7.266 0.002 50.31 48
Labour costs 0.191 0.888 0 5.288 48
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 5.551 10.526 0 52.6 47
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 112.602 165.959 7.721 845.935 47
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 3.894 1.276 2.044 6.74 47
Log of labour costs -5.753 2.16 -8.691 1.665 48
Log of sales -3.191 2.002 -6.113 3.918 48
Lag of the log of labour costs -4.187 3.614 -9.326 5.425 47
Lag of the log of sales -1.322 3.485 -6.362 7.600 47
Second lag of the log of labour costs -5.001 3.108 -10.352 4.366 40
Second lag of the log of sales -2.458 3.167 -8.016 6.701 44
Other services
N. temporary workers 6.933 11.901 0 56.667 45
N. permanent workers 127.482 231.808 6.8 1063.667 47
Log of the n. of permanent workers 3.749 1.447 1.917 6.969 47
Share of temporary workers 0.095 0.105 0 0.417 45
Sales 0.127 0.603 0.001 4 44
Labour costs 0.008 0.019 0 0.113 44
Lag of the n. of temporary workers 10.055 22.854 0 144 47
Lag of the n. of permanent workers 117.523 309.95 4 2097.75 47
Lag of the log of the n. of permanent workers 3.663 1.358 1.386 7.649 47
Log of labour costs -6.281 1.651 -9.047 -2.179 44
Log of sales -4.585 1.797 -7.396 1.386 44
Lag of the log of labour costs -4.746 3.338 -10.054 3.132 46
Lag of the log of sales -3.082 3.444 -9.989 5.22 47
Second lag of the log of labour costs -4.886 3.067 -10.14 2.447 41
Second lag of the log of sales -3.101 3.473 -8.56 7.552 42
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3.7.2 Variables harmonisation across survey waves
Sales and labour costs were deﬂated using the GDP deﬂator 7 at market prices
using 2013 as a reference year. Then, both sales and labour costs in 2009 and in
2012/13 were expressed in local current currencies and were ﬁnally converted in
thousand dollars using as currency rates those at 18th February 2015. Both the
unit of measure of sales was reduced dividing by 100000000.
Table 3.25: Sectors harmonisation across survey waves
Sector Survey waves
2002 2005 2008/2009 2012/2013
Question s3 s3 s3 a4b
Manufactoring 3 1 15, 17, 18, 24, 15, 20, 22, 24, 25,
25, 28, 29, 31, 2 28, 29, 31, 33, 36, 16, 17, 18,
19, 21, 23, 27, 30, 32, 34, 35, 37
Mining and quarrying 1 3 26, 27 26, 27
Constructions 2 2 27 45
Transports 4 4 60 60
Wholesale/retail/
services for motor vehicles 5 5 50, 51, 52 50, 51, 52
Other services 6, 7, 8 6, 7, 8 55, 72 55, 72, 63, 64
3.8 First stage
7http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS
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Conclusions
This thesis studies how diverse shocks could aﬀect diﬀerent forms of entrepreneur-
ship diﬀerentially and hinder the process of economic development in develop-
ing/transition countries.
Entrepreneurship is a crucial driver of economic development and growth, both
in developing and in industrialized economies. Violent conﬂict, conversely, is a clear
obstacle to economic development and growth, particularly in countries ragged by
several decades of conﬂict such as Afghanistan.
The ﬁrst chapter of the thesis is based on a detailed and comprehensive dataset
to carefully investigate the relation between conﬂict and PEA in the context of
Afghanistan. Two unique sources of information are matched with a detail of pre-
cision along many diﬀerent dimension (type of economic activity, household back-
ground information, and type of conﬂict events) and a comprehensiveness which are
extremely rare in a developing country. The dataset enabled us to assess how the
households' choices with respect to the source of income are aﬀected by the conﬂict
intensity in the area in which they live. Here we focused on the choice to hold
one type of private economic activity. The results show that the probability that a
household engages in PEA is, in general, positively aﬀected by the level of conﬂict.
However, the results are heterogeneous with respect to the type of activity and the
conﬂict indicator used.
Indeed, it is mainly less capital-intensive self employment activities  e.g. sales
of prepared food and petty trade  and activities related to subsistence agriculture,
which drive the positive relationship. More capital-intensive self employment activ-
ities requiring higher ﬁxed capital investments  e.g. milling and taxi driving  are
less positively aﬀected by the intensity of the conﬂict. All in all, this study ﬁnds ev-
idence that conﬂict pushes households towards marginal self employment activities
and towards agriculture, and households do not gain from doing business with the
foreign army. Thus, whereas the overall eﬀect of conﬂict on the economy is likely to
be negative, people tend to hold on their survival capabilities.
Are the ﬁndings supportive of directing international aids to entrepreneurship
in conﬂict-ridden countries? Possibly, for two reasons. The results show that the
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causal relation goes from conﬂict to entrepreneurship: it is resilient private eco-
nomic activity  self employment  which is driven by intensity, and not private
economic activity which attracts more conﬂict (at least at the scale of private eco-
nomic activity that an Afghan households holds). Second, and more speculatively,
if ﬁnanced, some of the entrepreneurial activity may become a strong leverage for
economic development as soon as a conﬂict reduces in a speciﬁc area, even though it
continues in other areas of the country. People who are forced out from employment
into self employment may become a source of future development. However, more
importantly, the results do show that violent conﬂict, even when driven by a foreign
coalition, rewinds the slow process of structural change of a low income country. If
the conﬂict lasts long enough, such regression may require a long time before the
country can change direction again.
The second chapter of the thesis is the ﬁrst study that analyses how higher
conﬂict intensity in a district aﬀects both the extensive margin (participation to
the labour force) and the intensive margin (n.of hours worked) of child labour in
Afghanistan. Interestingly, the results suggest that children in conﬂict aﬀected areas,
especially young females, are more likely to join the labour force but work less non-
domestic hours per week. In particular, the results show that a one unit increase
in conﬂict intensity8 has a positive impact on the extensive margin of child labour
labour supply and that this increase is entirely driven by 6-12 years old female
children (8% points). I also ﬁnd an increase in adult labour supply which seems to
be driven by female adults (8.3% points). The results of the analysis of the impact
of higher conﬂict intensity in Afghan districts on the intensive margin response
of children labour supply suggest that there is a decrease in non-domestic hours
worked which is signiﬁcant just for younger (6-12 years old) females (−0.5). I do
not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect on domestic hours worked. The ﬁndings about the
extensive margin are consistent with the stream of the literature that ﬁnds higher
school drop outs of girls in conﬂict ridden states due to a gender-biased decrease
in human capital investment in times of uncertainty, which partially explains why
younger females join the labour force. The decrease in non-domestic hours worked
per week instead, could be explained by both a decrease in highly child labour
8One conﬂict over 1000 individuals in the district.
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based intensive economic activities such as agricultural ones or petty trade and an
increase of insecurity that could keep children indoors decreasing the number of
hours worked in a non-domestic environment. How could governments reduce child
labour in developing conﬂict-ridden states given that child labour is mostly informal
and thus regulations do not work? More research is necessary in order to disentangle
the mechanisms that lead to an increase in child labour in conﬂict aﬀected areas so
that alternative policies to direct regulation can be suggested.
Finally, the last chapter of the thesis provided a cross-country comparison of
the impact of the crisis on ﬁrm's labour demand can facilitate knowledge of "what
works". According to the results of this analysis the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on
the share of temporary workers between 2009 and 2012 in European countries was
about 24% negative and signiﬁcant. Their share didn't show instead any signiﬁcant
variation in European countries over the period of the crisis. No signiﬁcant eﬀect is
found on the number of permanent workers.
Future research is necessary to better understand how conﬂict shifts the diﬀerent
categories of self-employment, building up a model of occupational choice. At the
same time, future research is needed to better understand the mechanisms that can
explain an increase in the number of young female children working and a decrease in
the number of the number of non-domestic hours worked because of higher conﬂict
intensity in Afghan districts. Finally, more research is needed in order to explain the
reasons why the share of temporary workers signiﬁcantly decreased in Non-European
versus European ﬁrms.
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